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ABSTRACT 
At the end of the 19th century and at the begining of 
the 20th century natural gas was only used as a source of 
heat. It was only during the late 50's that, with the 
development of plastics, a new utilisation of natural gas 
was introduced. During the 60's and the 70's world demand 
for natural gas has considerably grown and its price has 
gone up allowing exporting countries like Algeria to 
develop their potentials of production. 
Hassi R'Mel gas field is the 4th largest reservoir in 
the world with proved reserves of 3000 billion cubic 
meters of gas. Five natural gas processing plants have 
been installed with a daily production of 60 million cubic 
meters to answer the demand of both the national and 
international markets. The latest plant constructed by JGC 
(Japan Gas Corporation) was the ME'P 4 (Module Processing 
Plant 4). 
The primary objective of the study was to learn about 
the different techniques of hazard analysis and give a 
description and a review of some of them. To illustrate 
the study two examples of near-miss events were 
investigated. 
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CHAPTER I - 
INTRODUCTION - 
INTRODUCTION. 
At the end of the 19th century and at the begining of 
the 20th century natural gas was only used as a source of 
heat. It was only during the late 50's that, with the 
development of plastics, a new utilisation of natural gas 
was introduced. During the 60's and the 70's world demand 
for natural gas has considerably grown and its price has 
gone up allowing exporting countries like Algeria to 
develop their potentials of production. 
Hassi R'Mel gas field is the 4th largest reservoir in 
the world with proved reserves of 3000 billion cubic 
meters of gas. Five natural gas processing plants have 
been installed with a daily production of 60 million cubic 
meters to answer the demand of both the national and 
international markets. The latest plant constructed by JGC 
(Japan Gas Corporation) was the MPP 4 (Module Processing 
Plant 4). 
OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY. 
The primary objective of the study was to learn about 
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the different techniques of hazard analysis and give a 
description and a review of some of them. To illustrate 
the study two examples of near-miss events were 
investigated. 
3. REASONS FOR THE STUDY. 
The growth of the nuclear and aerospace industries in 
the mid 50's and the 60's necessitated the development of 
techniques which would assure the reliability and safety 
of the new and complex systems which were being designed. 
It was recognized that although learning from mistakes was 
of great value, methods for identifying and assessing the 
frequency and consequence of failure were needed if 
accidents involving large loss of life and capital were to 
be avoided. 
It was not until the late 60's that ICI led the way in 
applying and developing new techniques to help counteract 
the increasing risk associated with the large single 
stream chemical plants which were constructed to minimize 
production costs. 
The effect of accidents at Feyzen and Flixborough was to 
give the discipline Loss Prevention Engineering a much 
needed boost. It brought an increased awarness of the 
shortcomings of the traditional design methods which 
omitted to pay close attention to the risk inherent in the 
processes that were being planned. 
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By the late 70's regular courses in hazard analysis were 
being run by several universities; some in conjunction 
with the professional institutions. 
In common with other industries, oil companies have 
learnt from their experience of accidents. By 
investigating the causes, guidance is given and processes 
are modified in order to reduce the likelihood of hazard 
reccuring. 
4. SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION TECHNIQUE. 
Four methods of hazard analysis were used to study the 
near miss-events which occured in certain parts of the 
process where the potential risk is the greatest. 
The four methods selected were: 
a)The Mond Index 
b)Fault Tree Analysis 
c)Cause Consequence Analysis, and 
d)Failure Mode and Effects Analysis. 
These methods represent different type of analysis 
being: 
a)Points Scheme (Mond Index) 
b)Event Orientated Analysis (FTA and CCA), and 
c)Component Orientated Analysis (FMEA). 
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The analyses are qualitative and to some 	extent 
subjective being dependent on: 
a)The knowledge of the system studied 
b)The ease with which the methods can be applied, 
and 
c)The time taken to carry out the study. 
5. LAYOUT OF THESIS. 
In order to present the results of the study clearly, 
the analyses of the near-miss events occuring in the MFP 4 
are to be found in Chapters 4 and 5. 
Appendix Al contains a list of the abreviations used 
throughout the text. 
Chapter 2 reviews the development of risk analysis in 
the process industries. 
A short review of the generic types of hazard analysis 
and some details about the methods in each type is given 
in chapter 3. 
Appendices Cl, C2, C3 and C4 present a detailed review 
of the different methods of analysis used in this study. 
Chapter 6 presents some conclusions and recommendations. 
Their aim is to provide the engineer with the advice he 
requires in order 'to make the most of investigating 
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near-miss events. 
A detailed description of the process, piping and 




RISK ANALIYSIS - 
1. INTRODUCTION. 
In the past thirty years the rapid growth of industrial 
activities has resulted in many new problems related to 
environmental protection, energy, resource conservation 
and safety. Industry has been continually developing its 
design methods and operating techniques in order to 
overcome these problems. The process industries, which 
operate chemical, petrochemical and petroleum refining 
plants, handle a wide range of flammable and toxic 
materials wich are potentially hazardous. These industries 
have had an exellent safety record when compared with 
industry as a whole. Nevertheless the few major incidents 
which have oceured have made public aware of the hazards 
involved. 
In this period rapid developments were occuring in other 
fields of new technology, such as the use of atomic energy 
for power generation and in the aircraft and aerospace 
industries. Here little relevant experience for assessing 
the safety aspects of new designs was available from the 
past and this led to the development of quantitative risk 
analysis techniques for decisions in the area of 
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reliability and safety. 
As a result, interest in the use of quantified risk 
analysis techniques for assessing the safety of process 
plants has grown considerably in Europe, both within 
industry and within national authorities. 
The terms used in systematic safety analysis and 
assessment are not rigidly defined. They are 
interchangeably used by different authors. 
To provide more understanding of the way I shall use 
terms Hazard Analysis, Risk Analysis, Reliability Analysis 
and the like, this chapter discusses what each term 
commonly means. Several methods of analysis are also 
briefly described. 
2. RELIABILITY ANALYSIS. 
The reliability of a component, device or system is 
defined as the probability that an item will perform a 
required function under stated conditions for a stated 
period of time. 
Reliability analysis is the term given to the methods 
used to determine the reliability of a component. For 
example, historical records of failure rates could be used 
to determine the reliability of each component of a system 
when it is being studied. The interactions of the 
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components are then investigated and functional dependency 
diagrams are drawn to illustrate them. From this a 
mathematical model of the ways in which the system will 
fail is constructed; usually by drawing a fault tree. 
The 	main objective of reliability analysis is to 
indicate methods of ensuring that the unavailability of 
the system is minimized and kept to an economically 
acceptable level. 
3. HAZARD ANALYSIS. 
Hazard is the term used to describe the existance of a 
condition or a set of conditions which may result in the 
occurrence of an event which will cause loss of life, 
injury to the public, the operating personnel or damage to 
the plant. 
The inherent characteristics of a petrochemical plant 
make the whole complex a hazard. The nature of the 
hazardous events that may occur provide the analyst with 
the basis upon which to compare plant with plant, or units 
within a plant with similar units. As a result, it can be 
said that one plant or unit is more hazardous than 
another. 
Hazard Analysis is to a certain degree a misuse of the 
term hazard, since the analysis concentrates on the ways 
in which hazardous events occur because of the hazard 
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identified as being inherent in the plant. 
For example., a pressure vessel is a hazard. Because it 
operates at a pressure there is a chance that the it will 
rupture. A vessel that operates at a pressure of 150 bar 
is thought to be more hazardous than a vessel that 
operates at a pressure of 15 bar. The probability of 
rupture will be similar given that both vessels are 
designed according to the same mathematical relationships. 
However, the consequences that may result are more serious 
if the 150 bar vessel ruptures, since more energy will be 
released. When comparisons are made they include the 
perception of the probability of occurrence and that of 
the possible consequences. Hence, the 150 bar vessel is 
said to be more dangerous than the other. It is also well 
known that the consequences resulting from 100 individual 
vessel ruptures will not be identical. 
If loss of life is to be considered, the probability 
that a person is in the vicinity of the vessel, and the 
probability that this person will be killed when the 
rupture occurs must be taken into account. 
The risk is the sum of all possible consequences with 
the probability of rupture. The.term risk is applied also 
to the possible consequences of the occurrence of a 
natural calamity, an earthquake for example. 
Hazard 	analysis 	is 	the method or methods which 
OPM 
identifies hazards, and analyses hazardous events. Simple 
events which may lead to the occurrence of a hazardous 
event 	are 	identified 	and 	their 	relationship 	is 
investigated. These simple events may themselves be 
hazardous! They are at the least undesirable. The hazard 
analysis can be purely qualitative, or the probability of 
occurrence of hazardous events may be quantified. 
In a hazard analysis external events are not taken into 
consideration. It only processes hazardous events which 
may happen in the system being studied. Where external 
events which may cause the top event are considered, a 
risk analysis is carried out. For example, if the 
occurrence of an explosion in a gas plant was being 
studied, the possibility of a sabotage would be excluded 
in a hazard analysis, but included in a risk analysis. 
Hazard analysis does not investigate the consequences 
that may be caused by hazardous events. Some authors make 
no distinction between hazard and risk. They perceive. 
hazard as being an assessment of probability and the 
extent of the consequences of hazardous events. However, 
the word hazard is not used in this sense in the text. 
The degree of hazard, and the hazard potential, are 
terms used to describe the product of probability of 
occurrence and consequence. They are synonymous with risk. 
They are solely used in connection with a speOific item or 
plant, and therefore do not include the risk associated 
MISIE 
with external events. These terms are used sparingly in 
the text. Where they are used, it is because the author of 
the method of analysis being discussed uses the term. 
4. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION. 
4.1 Hazard Identification. 
Before an assessment of hazardous events can take place, 
the hazard associated with the system or process being 
studied must be identified (see chapter 3). 
The quality of the analysis depends on the successful 
identification of all the hazards inherent in the system. 
A technique used commonly to identify potential hazards is 
• checklist. Checklists provide a means for ensuring that 
• process conforms to existing codes and standards of good 
practice. The checklist is valuable but restricted when 
considering a new process which utilizes new technology. 
Hazard 	Indices 	are 	methods 	designed to give a 
quantitative indication of the potential for hazardous 
incidents associated with a given plant. Their most 
efficient use is in ranking processes against each other 
and thus directing attention to the worst cases. Standards 
and codes of practice have evolved from many years of 
experience in processing hazardous materials. Application 
of these practices can protect against a large number of 
hazards previously encountered and contribute 
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significantly 	to designing a plant capable of safe 
operation. The inherent weakness is that codes are not 
specific and lag behind new technologies. 
Fundamental methods of hazard identification such as 
Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP), and Failure Mode and 
Effects Analysis (FMEA) have been developed as a result of 
the increasing complexity of plants. They are aimed at two 
particular out-comes. Firstly, there is the identification 
of serious incidents which may result directly in danger 
to employees or the public, or in a financial loss. These 
incidents are usually known as the 'Top event'. Secondly, 
the fundamental methods can be used to identify the 
underlying root causes which can lead to the top event. 
Another advantage is that if the review takes place during 
the design phase of the project, particularly with HAZOP, 
operating problems are identified and can be rectified 
before the plant is commissioned. 
Hazard identification has always been an integral part 
of the design and operational practice. However, it was to 
a large degree an informal process dependent on experience 
of those directly involved. 
4.2 Comparative Methods 
These methods, such as used by Exxon Chemicals (1), use 
engineering codes and practices as the standards against 
which the acceptability of the design is evaluated. 
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An important advantage of these methods (or checklists) 
is that the lessons learned over many years of experience 
are incorporated in the coinpanys practices and thus are 
available to be used at all stages in the design and 
construction of the plant. The main task of the hazard 
identification study is to ensure that the companys 
practices, and therefore its past experience, have indeed 
been incorporated in the design. 
4.3 Fundamental Methods 
4.3.1 Hazard indices. 
Hazard indices such as that developed by the Dow Chemical 
Company (2) and extended by Lewis (3) are methods which 
are designed to give a quantitative indication of the 
potential for hazardous incidents associated with a given 
design of plant. 
4.3.2 Hazard and operability studies. 
The most widely known of these is that published by 
H.G.Lawley of ICI (4) and later published by Kletz under 
the title "HAZOP & HAZAN: Notes on the Indentification an 
Assessment of Hazards'(5). 
4.3.3 Failure modes and effects analysis. 
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Failure modes and effects analysis (6) is based on 
identifying the possible failure modes of each component 
of the system and predicting the consequences of the 
failure. 
4.3.4 Fault tree analysis. 
Fault tree analysis works from a chosen 'top event', 
such as 'fire in reboiler, and then considers the 
combination of failures and conditions which could cause 
the event to occur. Both failure modes and effects 
analysis and fault tree analysis are useful aids to hazard 
identification as they both structure and document the 
analysis. However, because they involve very detailed 
analysis of components and operations, their use on the 
process industry is mainly limited to identification of 
special hazards where they form the basis of 
quantification of risks. 
4.3.5 Event tree analysis. 
Event trees which work from a chosen 'bottom event' 
consider the developments which may follow the top event 
of a fault tree. However, they can also be useful for 
helping to establish the various sequences of events which 
may lead from a failure of a piece of equipment through to 
the release of flammable or toxic material from the plant. 
4.3.6 Common-cause failure analysis. 
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In fire prevention problems, things may 	not 	be 
independent. Dependencies exist with regard to failure. To 
identify these and categorize these, is the subject of 
common-cause failure analysis. 
A common-cause failure is a secondary cause of failure 
which can develop more than one component malfunction. 
Analysis of such causes is directed towards the cause of 
the component failure rather than the specific event which 
causes this failure. 
4.4 Ease Of Application. 
Hazard identification is an important part of the safety 
assessment of a plant. The depth of the study and the 
- technique to be used has to be chosen to suit the 
situation. When the process is concerned with hazardous 
reactions or toxic materials the hazard identification 
must begin at the research stage and be continued through 
the pilot plant or process development stages of a 
project. Project approval procedures should include the 
requirements for potential hazards reviews at appropriate 
stages from the inspection of the project, through the 
project completion and during the life of the operating 
plant. The type and depth of studies should be determined 
by the needs at each stage. 
4.4.1 Data availability. 
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Successful hazard identification depends upon having 
documentation to review which truly reflects the way the 
plant will be built and operated. The quality of the 
hazard study is improved by having the designer present 
his design to the study team. 
4.4.2 Method selection. 
The methods selected for hazard identification (or the 
combination of methods) should be the methods which best 
fit into the other design and hazard control activities of 
the particular organisation. For example, where the 
process is an assembly of previously used equipment 
modules operating within previously accepted limits, 
companies who have well documented engineering and design 
practices, will find it appropriate to use a comparative 
method similar to that of Exxon Chemicals (checklists). 
Where significant new technology is involved either in 
terms of process equipment or previously unknown reactions 
or process conditions, the fundamental methods such as 
Hazop would generally be prefered. 
4.4.3 Report. 
The report of the hazard identification study to senior 
management should be sufficiently detailed to communicate 
the concerns of the study team. It also should adequately 
describe how each hazard was controlled but not attempt to 
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show the precision of the survey by listing how the 
identification has been carried out. 
4.4.4 Team methods. 
It has been noticed, when using team methods for hazard 
identification, both for new projects and existing plant, 
that in addition to attaining safer design, the operating 
performance is also improved by the better understanding 
and motivation of the operating and maintenance people who 
have participated in the studies. 
4.5 Future Developments In Hazard Identification. 
Hazard identification procedures are probably the best 
developed element of risk analysis. Thus the future will 
probably not see much fundamental development of the 
methods. One area which may be explored is the automation 
of hazard identification based on computer modeling of the 
plant. However, the complexity of logic involved and the 
degree of experience which would need to be built into 
the system suggest that we are still several years away 
from having a tool powerful enough to significantly help 
the analysts. 
5. WHAT IS RISK ANALYSIS? 
Risk analysis investigates the possible consequences of 
a hazardous event, as well as determining its causes. In 
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this way it differs from hazard analysis which does not 
investigate consequences. Risk analysis considers risk 
from all sources. For example, a risk analysis of a module 
in Hassi R'Mel field would include the consequence of a 
plane crash (an airport existing on the field), an 
earthquake or of a process fire or explosion. 
Risk analysis can be summarized by three questions. 
-What can go wrong? 
-What are the effects and consequences? 
-How often will it happen? 
The first and basic step of hazard identification (the 
first question) is purely qualitative and is often called 
a safety study. Such a study may reveal aspects of the 
plant or installation which require more consideration. It 
is then necessary to answer the next two questions in 
order to complete the risk analysis; The results of the 
analysis are used for judgeinent about the acceptability of 
the risk and for decision making. 
Qualitative answers are often given to the second 
question. However, recent developments have involved the 
application of quantitative techniques for obtaining 
answers to this question and the third one. 
Unlike hazard analysis, risk analysis considers events 
which are initiated by external events, and predicts the 
probability and the extent of the consequences. 
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Risk analysis is the more comprehensive of the two 
methods and often includes the lost production due to 
plant downtime, thus necessitating a complete reliability 
study of all systems on the plant. 
6. CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS. 
Consequence analysis is 	a 	very 	large 	sub.ject. 
Cause-consequence diagrams are constructed by defining a 
critical event, and then both defining the consequence 
events and paths which flow from the critical event and 
defining cause events for the critical event and logical 
relations between the cause events. The areas which merit 
further work in this field are seen to be: 
6.1 Two Phase Flow Release. 
Methods of estimating two phase flow releases from 
equipment and piping and for determining the subsequent 
vaporisation of the released material are still not 
satisfactory. More work is required in this field. 
6.2 Heavy Gas Dispersion. 
Considerable work has been done in the field of heavy 
gas dispersion. However, many assumptions still have to be 
made concerning terrain and topography. Further work will 
be necessary, both in wind tunnels and on ground, if a 
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better understanding of dispersion in actual situations is 
to be achieved. 
6.3 Explosions. 
The situations which lead to flame acceleration, so that 
ignition of a gas cloud gives an explosion rather than a 
flash fire, are still not understood. Work should proceed 
towards a better understanding of the phenomena since this 
could lead to the development of revised plant design and 
layout concepts in order to minimise the possibility of an 
explosion if there is a release of a flammable vapour or 
gas. 
6.4 Toxic Gas Releases. 
Prediction of injury caused by toxic gas releases is at 
an early stage of development. Injury assessments tend to 
be strongly focussed towards large numbers of injuries or 
fatalities, well above the level that has been experienced 
in past incidents. More consideration should be given to 
this problem. 
6.5 Consequence Phenomena. 
Experimental work on consequence phenomena has to be 
carried out on a large scale in order to establish scaling 
laws. Field experiments can be costly and require 
considerable resources. 	The 	present 	trend 	towards 
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cooperative research in this field should be continued. 
7. QUANTIFICATION OF RISK. 
7.1 Logic Diagrams. 
Logic 	diagrams 	provide 	a 	valuable 	addition to 
traditional 	techniques 	for 	investigating 	failure 
mechanics. In particular, they allow a thorough 
understanding of an activity to be built up. This enables 
persons not familiar with that activity to bring an 
independent viewpoint to an established procedure or 
operation. It assists in identification of key areas and 
provide an aid to communication on how systems may fail 
and what effect modifications might have. However, the 
purely qualitative use of such tools does not give all 
possible information. Quantification can provide a clearer 
indication of the relative importance of the various 
causes of an undesired event. Quantification enables one 
to see more clearly the relative importance of an 
undesired event in the overall safety of a particular 
activity in which a number of such events is possible. It 
is in judging this importance that quantification can 
prove useful,, giving clearer insight into performance of 
systems. 
7.2 Data Sharing. 
Information sharing schemes and data banks have a vital 
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role to play as long as problems and inhibitions regarding 
commercial confidentiality can be avoided. The problem of 
demonstrating very high reliability, i.e. obtaining a 
statistically meaningful sample for rare events, will 
always remain. Data collection may well proceed 
independently of, quantitative risk analysis, as much of 
the data is useful in reliability studies. 
7.3 Human Error. 
Human error is often an important factor in the logic 
chain which leads to an unwanted event. Identification of 
the role that human error plays can in itself provide 
insight into the failure process (see section 9 of this 
chapter). Data on the probability of human error quoted in 
the literature, although based on a number of studies, is 
still arbitrary and uncertain. Human reliability is 
expected to remain largely intractable to quantification 
for specific cases. 
7.4 quantification Of Event Probabilities And Risks. 
The quantification of event probabilities and risks 
contains many uncertainties. The quality of data is 
extremly. variable, and errors can be made if the analyst 
is not fully aware of the theoretical basis of the 
relatively simple mathematical tools which are used. If an 
organisation is to use the techniques it must ensure that 
it has adequate resources and expertise to do the work. 
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8. ACQUISITION OF PROBABILITIES. 
8.1 Mathematical Description of Component Behaviour. 
The probability with which a component adopts its two 
possible states in practical work is taken to be either a 
constant value or is described by an exponential 
distribution. 
If the behaviour of a component i is characterized by a 
constant probability, either its unavailability, Ui (the 
probability of being in a failed state), or its 
complementary value, the availability, N 	1-Ui, are 
indicated. If the description is in terms of an 
exponential distribution, the corresponding probability 
density function is: 
Fi(t) = (1/Ti)exp(-t/Ti) 	(t>O) (Ti>O) (1) 
where Ti is the mean time to failure for component i. 
Equation 1 yields upon integration over time t the 
unreliability (the probability that component I 
experiences its first failure up to time t): 
ti(t) = 1-exp(--t/Ti) 	 (t>O) (Ti>O) 	(2) 
In Equations 1 and 2. Ti is the mean time to failure for 
components of type i. This parameter is the inverse of the 
frequently used failure rate @, i.e., ®1/Ti, which gives 
the probability of failure in an infinitesimal increment 
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of time under the condition that the component has not 
failed before (see 8.2) 
Constant failure probabilities are used for components 
which have to function on demand, such as interuptors, if 
their life time principally depends on the number of 
demands they have experienced. However, this is not always 
the case since the lifetime of components of this type is 
apparently more strongly influenced by factors which 
depend on the period of installation (such as corrosion). 
Thus, a description in terms of failure rates is usually 
preferred (7). Other fields of application for constant 
failure probabilities are the treatment of human error and 
of operational characteristics. In addition, they may be 
used for components subjected to 	maintenance 	whose 
unavailability is given by: 
downtime /(downtime + functioning time) 	(3) 
In Equation 3 the downtime is the period during which 
the component is out of service, either because its 
failure has not been detected or because it is 
disconnected during its repair. In all other cases failure 
rates are generally used. 
Failure rates are generally supposed to exhibit a time 
behaviour which can be described by the so-called 'bathtub 
curve'. At the beginning of component lifetime failures 
are relatively frequent (burn-in period). After that 
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follows a time interval with virtually constant failure 
rate. Toward the end of the lifetime another increase due 
to aging can be observed (8). 
In addition to the quality of the components maintenance 
has an influence on system performance. Two basic types of 
maintenance may be distinguished: preventive and 
corrective. In preventive maintenance, periodic 
inspections are carried out which are meant to discover 
anomalies which have not yet led to a failure and remedy 
them before a failure occurs. Corrective maintenance 
implies repair or substitution of the component after its 
failure has occured. A mathematical maintenance 
description may be achieved using the theory of Markov 
processes or renewal theory (9). 
The model for periodic inspection is valid under the 
following conditions: 
* The lifetime of the component may be described by an 
exponential distribution 
* The time between inspections is constant throughout 
component lifetime 
* Failures are only detected on the occasion of an 
inspect ion 
* The duration of the repair is negligible compared 
with the mean time to failure of the component 
* After inspection the component is assumed to be "as 
good as new. 
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8.2 Reliability Data For Process Plant Analysis. 
The reliability data should idealy have been obtained in 
a system which is similar to that under investigaion 
(similar components work under similar operating 
conditions). This goal may be satisfied in the case of 
specific types of nuclear reactors using the data compiled 
in Reference 1. On the other hand, the data obtained from 
the literature (10,11) do not supply component 
characteristics and give hardly any indication as to 
operation conditions. The knowledge of both is essential 
for making an adequate choice of reliability data in 
quantification of hazards. 
8.3 Uncertainties. 
Uncertainties exist in the estimation of reliability 
data. In the case of technical components these may be due 
to: differences in the performance of components on the 
same class and grouping together of similar but not 
identical components working under similar but not 
identical operating conditions; if data from the 
literature are used, values are necessarily selected from 
different sources without knowing whether component 
designs and operating conditions are comparable, and it is 
very probable that they are not. For this reason use of a 
statistical distribution for unavailabilities and failure 
rates is indicated instead of a single point value. 
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Usually a lognormal distribution is chosen for this 
purpose because it fits observed data reasonably well (7). 
9. HUMAN ERROR. 
Thus far only failures of technical components have been 
considered. Since technical systems, however advanced 
their level of automation, still rely on human 
intervention in some respects, a hazard analysis would be 
incomplete if this aspect were neglected. In modern 
process plants direct operator control is unusual. 
Automatic controllers generally ensure that process 
parameters are maintained close to nominal levels, except 
perhaps for start-up and shut-down, when an increased 
degree of human intervention is normally required. The 
operator's job therefore usually consists of a number of 
intermittent activities such as (12): 
a) Operational tasks: 
* Sequential control, starting pumps and motors, 
opening and closing valves etc., during start-up and 
shut-down, and batch processing operations 
* More direct control of process parameters when 
control loops are not working 
* Monitoring the plant for correct operation (compared 
with expected performance) 
* Carrying out manual operations such as loading 
materials into hoppers and carrying out manually 
steered operations such as crane control 
_27 - 
* Collecting and changing paper on chart recorders 
* Completing plant production and operation log books 
* Taking samples and operating instruments 
* Alarm response and diagnosis of unusual plant 
conditions 
* Reporting and following up equipment failures 
b) Maintenance task: 
* 	Adjusting manually controlled 
couplings for correct line up 
* Adjusting set points for control 
positions. 
valves and pipe 
loops and valve 
Human error quantification is, at present, only possible 
for the failure of an operator to carry out a planned 
intervention (e.g., opening a valve to increase the 
coolant flow when the temperature gets too high). 
Unplanned acts (playing around with buttons or changing 
positions of valve because of absent-mindedness or with 
the intention of causing harm) cannot be quantified. Even 
if this limitation is accepted, human error quantification 
still remains less exact than the quantification of the 
failure of technical components. Therefore, it may be 
recommended to calculate bounds for system reliability, 
assuming on the one hand perfect human intervention (UO) 
and complete failure (Uzl) on the other (13). 
Human error is most frequently treated by the methods 
described in Reference 10. A human error is defined there 
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as an act outside tolerence limits. It is evident that the 
permissible interval of tolerance depends on the type of 
human act in question and on the circumstances under which 
it is carried out. The definition has to be made by the 
analyst in the light of these aspects. Usually the 
following kinds of human error are distinguished: 
Error of omission: 	Faiure to perform a task or part of 
a task 
Error of commission: Performing a task incorrectly 
Extraneous act: 	Introducing some task which should 
not have been performed 
Sequential error: 	Performing some task out of sequence 
Timing error: 	 Failure to perform a task within the 
gllotted time or performing them too 
early or too late. 
The basis for the evaluation of human error is the 
identification of the acts to be carried out and their 
analysis. Important parameters to be established are the 
moment of the intervention, the time available for their 
realisation, the information at hand (instrument readings, 
knowledge of process behaviour, computerised information 
supply, etc.), and the possibility of correction if the 
initially required intervention has not been carried out. 
Ergonomic and environmental aspects have to be considered 
as well. In addition, it is important to take into account 
possible dependencies of human acts. These may be due to 
factors such as elevated stress which would affect several 
consecutive 	acts 	realised 	by 	the same person or 
circumstances which would influence the action of two 
different persons trying to carry out the same act such as 
difficult access to the place of intervention. 
The 	most 	widely 	used 	method 	for 	human error 
quantification is THERP (Technique for Human Error 
Prediction), which is discussed in detail in Reference 14. 
It is based on assigning error probabilities to simple 
tasks and breaking down more complicated tasks into simple 
ones, whose probabilities are combined according to the 
laws of probability in order to obtain the error 
probability of the complicated 	task. 	In 	addition, 
performance shaping factors (factors affecting these 
probabilities significantly) are taken into account by 
multiplying the base values, which apply to normal 
conditions, with them. In Reference 14 a great number of 
such performance shaping factors are discussed. In the 
present context only a few of the more important ones are 
commented upon: 
9.1 Ergonomic Layout Of The Control Room. 
An increase of failure probabilities is to be assumed if 
the arrangement, labeling, and design of the control 
mechanisms is such that error is enhanced. This may be the 
case, for example, if labeling of instruments and buttons 
is confusing or hardly legible or if stereotypes are 
violated (A stereotype is the expected reaction of a human 
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to an outside influence: for example, turning a button in 
a clockwise direction is associated with switching on). 
9.2 Feedback Through Indicators And Alarms. 
The probability of human failure is reduced, if feedback 
through indications and alarms which render the detection 
of probable error exists. The possibility of the discovery 
of an error is to be taken into account especially if the 
operator is warned immediately after committing it. This 
applies most of all if the system response to error is 
rapid. 
9.3 Human Redundancy. 
A further important way of detecting errors results from 
human redundancy, i.e., a decision of an act involves more 
than one person with adequate qualification. Redundancy is 
also assumed if a person's acts are controlled by another. 
9.4 Pschycological Stress. 
Stress is a very important factor for human performance. 
If it is too low, i.e., work is of routine type and 
considered as boring, error becomes more probable. If 
stress is very high, on the other hand, error again 
becomes very probable, reaching the value 1 for dangerous 
situations. This value should be adopted, for example, for 
interventions during a runaway reaction, if it implies 
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getting close to the reactor. Between these two extremes, 
there lies an optimal stress range which is assumed for 
control room work during normal operation, maintenance 
work, and testing. 
9.5 Qualification And Training Of Operators. 
Among other factors, appropriate qualification for work 
to be done is essential for avoiding errors. This implies 
neither under nor overqualification and includes general 
education and a specific understanding of the bases and 
procedures of the process in question. Another important 
aspect in this context is the training for emergency 
situations which helps to maintain an acceptable level of 
emergency response probability. This probability would 
otherwise decrease in the course of time. 
9.6 Written Instructions. 
A good explanation of what should be done in operating 
the plant both in normal and emergency conditions in 
written form tends to reduce the probability of human 
error. 
Human error is treated in fault tree analysis by analogy 
with the failure of technical components. Its 
quantification, however, is much more complicated than 
that of the latter and requires the collaboration of 
experts from various disciplines such as engineering, 
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psychology, ergonoiny, and statistics. 
10. THE AFFLICATION OF RISK ANALYSIS. 
10.1 Some Limitations Of Quantified Risk Analysis. 
A quantified risk analysis will have covered hazard 
identification, selection of risk senarios and 
quantification of the consequences and probabilities. 
Before we arrive at a judgeinent on its acceptability we 
have to consider the characteristics of the assessment of 
consequences and probabilities that have been carried out. 
In many cases only very general data are available on 
equipment failure, for which statistical accuracy is often 
poor. In other cases there may be very little data 
available at all. This applies in particular to data on 
human failures. Data may have an accuracy no better than a 
factor of ten so that, when combined in a fault tree, they 
lead to incident frequencies that will have wider 
confidence limits although they may not necessarily be 
less accurate. 
The lower the estimated probability of a hazard is, the 
wider will be the confidence limits of the calculated 
figure. Therefore, it is not possible to compare the 
frequencies of two catastrophic events at e.g. 10-5 and 
10-6 per year and be confident about wh ich event is more 
likely to happen. 
-33- 
The quantification of the effects and consequences of 
incidents also have large uncertainties associated with 
them. Methods of estimating dense gas dispersion and the 
effects of an ignition of flammable gas clouds are still 
at the development stage and the rest of the data will 
contain many assumptions. 
The analytical models have been developed in an attempt 
to give a quantitative understanding of physical 
phenomena. In practice however, there are many 
uncertainties. A small event can lead to a major accident 
or only have a localised effect (for instance a release of 
flammable hydrocarbons). 
The whole analytical exercise might be considered to be 
objective. However, it must be realised that because of 
the large body of assumptions, estimates, judgenients and 
opinions involved, much of the input information is often 
subjective. 
Because of these limitations considerable skill is 
needed to interpret the results produced by a quantified 
risk analysis. At the present state of development these 
techniques should only be used by those who understand 
their limitations and then only with caution. 
10.2 Application In The Process Domain. 
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Qualitative methods for the identification of hazards 
have been used for many years by the process industries to 
ensure that their plants are adequately safe. It should be 
remembered that these methods are used to audit a design 
which should already meet the many codes of practice (both 
from the authorities and from the company) which cover 
most aspects of the engineering of the plant. Whilst a 
number of large companies have found benefit from the use 
of quantified risk analysis, it must be recognised that 
others in the process industry have not found it 
necessary. These companies, although well aware of the 
quantification methods, judge that the outcomes of 
quantitative risk analysis studies are not producing 
results on which they can rely or which contribute much to 
making a plant safer. They rely on identification 
procedures 	coupled 	with good engineering judgement, 
experience from actual practice and experiment, and 
regulations and guidelines. The availability of a large 
body of long term technical experience embodied in proven 
codes of practice obviates the use of quantitative 
methods. 
Consequence calculations are becoming more widely used, 
particularly by companies handling large quantities of 
flammable or toxic liquefied gases. These can be useful 
for determining plant siting and layout. They can also be 
used by the people concerned with planning emergency 
procedures. However, there is always a possibility that 
too much weight is given to the largest possible 
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consequences if a judgement of the probability of the 
event occuring is not taken into 	ecount. If potential 
consequences 	are considered al e this may lead to 
unnecessary additions to a plant and excessive capital 
Cos t. 
A company using quantitative risk analysis will use its 
own experience and judgement to define targets against 
which to compare the results. This comparison will assist 
them for example to decide on the degree of redundancy 
required in an instrument protection system for plant 
handling an exotherinic reaction. 
Not withstanding the problems that still exist in the 
use of quantitative risk analysis. for safety decision 
making, definite advantages are available if it is used 
prudently, particularly where new technology is involved. 
Benefits are to be gained in obtaining a better insight 
into causes of potential plant failures. The 
quantification of these can help with an understanding of 
the relative importance of the causes and assist with the 
development of improved designs. For these reasons 
selective use of quantitative risk analysis "in house" as 
one of the tools to assist with decision making. Any 
organisation considering a move in this direction should 
ensure that it has adequate expertise to handle the 
analytical techniques properly. 
10.3 The Way Forward. 
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Quantification of risk may support safety decisions 
about plant involving step changes of scale, complexity or 
technology. The need for this should become apparent when 
the initial process safety analysis is carried out. 
Recent 	and continuing developments in the process 
industries are also influencing the 	development 	of 
quantitative risk analysis. For instance we have: 
-computer technology 
-large integrated process plant complexes 
-the higher education requirements that are needed 
for people handling these new systems. 
These will have an influence on the development of 
methodologies for analysing risk situations for people and 
the environment in which they live. Areas in which change 
can be expected are: 
-A combination of reliability and risk studies with 
more multi-disciplinary analytical methods, including 
long term toxicological effects. 
-Machine/operator relationship (e.g. ergonomics and 
training). 
-Better exchange of data via data banks (computer 
networks). 
-Better 	understanding 	of ways of dealing with 
uncerainties, where there is a lack of knowledge and 
data. 
-A combination of quantitative risk analysis and 
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cost/benefit analysis as part of 	the 	decision 
process. 
The position of quantitative 
will depend on how well the 
answers which are needed. An 
their development into a form 
meaningfully communicated from 
e.g. managers, politicians, thi  
risk analysis in the future 
analytical methods can give 
important aspect will be 
in which the results can be 
the analysts to others, 
public. 
However, even with these developments, quantitative risk 
analysis remain a small part of the total safety package. 
The main requirements for safe process plant will always 
be good engineering, well qualified personnel and good 
management. 
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CHAPTER 111 
DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD EVALUATION 
PROCEDURES - 
1. INTRODUCTION. 
This chapter describes a variety of hazard evaluation 
procedures that are being used in the chemical and 
petrochemical industries. These procedures have been 
developed to identify the hazards that exist, the 
consequences that might occur as a result of the hazards, 
the likelihood that events might .take place that would 
cause an accident with such a consequence, and the 
likelihood that safety systems, mitigating systems and 
emergency alarms would function properly and eliminate or 
reduce the consequences. 
The different hazard evaluation procedures can be 
classified into four generic types: 
a)Point Schemes 
b )Check]. ists 
c)Component Orientated Technique, and 
d)Event Orientated Technique 
Each type has its own purpose and function. 
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Each category coitains several evaluation procedures 
some of which will be described in the following sections. 
References for each procedure are given at the end of 
this chapter. 
2. POINTS SCHEMES. 
A point scheme is a rapid tool in which each factor 
which increases or reduces the risk is assigned a score. 
The total score is then compared with a standard value 
which represents a predefined acceptable level of risk. 
The best use of a points scheme is to identify areas 
which are more in need of attention than others. A review 
of a chemical works may indicate that the risk associated 
with one process is more significant than the risk from 
the other processes on the site. 
2.1 The Mond Index. 
This method has been developed from an initial approach 
used for insurance assessments by chemical organisations 
along the lines of identifying features of plant or other 
activities which have been historically associated with 
many incidents. Its primary aim is to roughly rank hazards 
of a wide ranging character on the basis that they are a 
function of: 
The activity carried out, and 
The nature of the materials being handled. 
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It is always assessed without any allowance for safety 
features and practices and hence gives as the first result 
obtained a measure of the hazard potential for a "worst 
case. A key advantage of the technique is that it can be 
applied at very early stages of design or development 
before decisions on equipment selection and layout have to 
be finalised. It does not require the availability of 
detailed piping and instrumentation diagrams for its use 
and is thus quite different to conventional hazard 
analysis where much detailed information is necessary. 
Such an assessment made early in a development can 
identify problems so that they can be avoided and the 
results of the modified assessments by this method can 
form a major input to the preparation of Safety Cases and 
in carrying out emergency planning activities. This is 
because it enables a "worst case assessment to be 
considered as recommended by Cassidy (see references). 
The use of the "worst case" assessment is not a complete 
answer to the assessment of plant units especially where 
spacing requirements are concerned. Hence, a range of 
"offsetting" safety factors are incorporated in the second 
part of the Mond Index technique. These factors provide a 
mean of reducing the "worst case" potential to arrive at a 
result that represents the activity as is likely to be 
actually operated and maintained. 
Many of the "offsetting" factors relate to features such 
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as training 	and 	experience 	plus 	safety 	features 
incorporated into the plant as a result of hazard studies 
(including fire protection and fire fighting). Included in 
them are consideration of general safety pratices for a 
site as a whole. 
A direct benefit of the early use of the Mond Index 
technique is that it allows a relative assessment to be 
made of the hazard potential as "worst cases" for various 
parts of a whole plant/system so that more extensive 
hazard study and related activities can be allocated in 
proportion to relative unit hazard levels. Otherwise, such 
allocations of effort have to be based on judgements which 
may or may not be sound. 
2.2 Instantaneous Fractional Annual Loss Method. 
The Insurance Technical Bureau (ITB now part of the Loss 
Prevention Council) has developed a method of calculating 
the expected average loss from fire and explosion for 
plants handling flammable materials. The method is 
synthetic, calculating the course of the events leading to 
loss from data on the materials being handled, the main 
plant items, and the layout. This technique provides the 
insurance industry with the means of calculating insurance 
premiums in a more systematic way and in a manner that 
more accurately evaluates the financial risk that 
companies underwrite when insuring a plant. 
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IFAL is the average fractional loss per year which a 
system will sutain if it were to operate unchanged and in 
an unchanging environment for a very long time. The loss 
may be lives or money or whatever is the hazard of primary 
concern. IFAL is not just an index of hazard. It is a 
measure. It does not simply rank hazards as the Mond Index 
do. It rates them in absolute terms. The IFAL numbers can 
be manipulated arithmetically in calculations concerning 
expected loss. So far the technique is being used to rate 
the hazard of property loss from fire and explosion, but 
it should be adaptable to hazard resulting in loss of life 
or injuries to the personnel and public. 
The IFAL is a function of the process hazards, the 
standard of engineering, and the way in which the process 
is managed. 
Like the Mond Index, IAFL can be used to investigate 
changes in: 
a)The layout of the plant 
b)Measures taken 	to 	prevent 	hazardous 	events 
occurring, and 
c)Protective systems which limit the damage plant 
that may occur. 
However, it does not appear that its evaluation of 
preventive and protective measures is as developed as that 
in the Mond Index. 
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IFAL is basically empirical, the systematic mathematical 
procedure 	using 	available 	failure 	rate data. The 
difficulty of acquiring adequate reliable basic 
information is a weakness which hopefully will improve 
with time and effort (see chapter 2). The procedure is 
involving and time consuming, event with computer help. It 
needs expert handling. 
3. CHECKLISTS. 
A checklist is a summary of good design procedures and 
is an expression of senior design personnel who have 
collaborated to pass on their experience in the form of 
codes of practice and design rules. It can also high-light 
a lack of basic information or a situation that requires a 
detailed evaluation. The results obtained are qualitative. 
They vary with the specific situation, but generally they 
lead to a "yes-or-no" decision about compliance with 
standard procedures. 
3.1 Preliminary Hazard Analysis. 
A Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA), as described 
herein, is an analysis which is part of the U.S. Military 
Standard System Safety Program Requirements. The main 
purpose of this analysis is to recognise hazards early, 
thus saving time and cost which could result from major 
plant redesigns if hazards are discovered at a later 
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stage. Many chemical companies use similar procedure under 
a different name. It is generally applied during the 
concept or early development phase of a process plant and 
can be very useful in site selection. 
PHA is a precursor to further hazard analyses. It is 
included in this description of the hazard evaluation 
procedures to provide a cost effective, 
early- in-plant-life method for hazard identification. 
Indeed, the PHA is really intended for use only in the 
preliminary phase of plant development for cases where 
past experience provides little or no insight into any 
potential safety problems, for example, a new plant with a 
new process. 
The PHA focuses on the hazardous materials and major 
plant elements since few details on the plant design are 
available, and there is likely not to be any information 
available on procedures. The PHA is sometimes considered 
to be a review of where energy can be released in an 
uncontrolled manner. The PHA consists of formulating a 
list of the hazards related to: 
* Raw materials, intermediate and final products, and 
their reactivity 
* Plant equipment 
* Interface among system components 
* Operating environment 
* Operations (test, maintenance, etc.) 
-47- 
* Facilities 
* Safety equipment. 
The 	results, 	which 	are 	qualitative, 	include 
recommendations to reduce or eliminate hazards in the 
subsequent design plant. 
3.2 Process/System Checklists. 
Checklists are frequently used to indicate compliance 
with standard procedures. A checklist is easy to use and 
can be applied to each stage of a project or plant 
development. A checklist is a convenient means of 
communicating the minimal acceptable level of hazard 
evaluation that is required for any job, regardless of 
scope. It is particularly useful for an inexperienced 
engineer to work through the various requirements in the 
checklist to reach a satisfactory conclusion. It also 
provide a common basis for management review of the 
individual engineer's work. 
A checklist is intended to provide direction for 
standard evaluation of chemical or petrochemical plant 
hazards. It can be as detailed as necessary to satisfy the 
specific situation, but it should be applied 
conscientiously in order to identify problems that require 
further attention and to ensure that standard procedures 
are being followed. Checklists are limited to the 
experience base of the checklist author(s). They should be 
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audited and updated regularly. 
Many 	organisations 	use 	standard 	checklists 	for 
controlling the development of a project from initial 
design through plant shutdown. The checklist is frequently 
a form for approval by various staff and management 
functions before a project can move from one stage to the 
next. In this way, it serves both as a means of 
communication and as a form of control. 
3.3 Safety Review. 
A Safety Review can vary from an informal routine 
function that is principally visual(walk-through on-site 
inspection), with emphasis on housekeeping, to a formal 
week-long examination by a team with appropriate 
backgrounds and responsibilities. The emphasis in this 
section is on the latter and it is sometimes referred to 
as "Safety Review. Such a program is intended to identify 
plant conditions or operating procedures that could lead 
to an accident and significant losses in life or property. 
While 	this technique is most commonly applied to 
operating process plants, it is also applicable to pilot 
plants, laboratories, storage facilities, and support 
facilities. The comprehensive Safety Review is intended to 
complement other safety efforts and routine visual 
inspections. The Safety Review should be treated as a 
cooperative effort to improve the overall safety and 
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performance 	of 	the plant rather than as a feared 
interference with normal operations. Cooperation is 
essential. People are likely to become defensive unless 
considerable effort is made to present the review as a 
benefit to each participant. 
The review includes interviews with many people in the 
plant: operators, maintenance staff, engineers, 
management, safety staff, and others, depending upon the 
plant organisation. Having the support and involvement of 
all these groups provides a thorough examination from any 
perspective. 
The review looks for major risk situations. General 
housekeeping and personnel attitude are not the objective, 
although they can be significant indicators of where to 
look for real problems or places where real improvements 
are needed. Various hazard evaluation techniques, such as 
checklists, "what if?" questions, and raw material 
evaluations, can be used during the review. 
At the end of the Safety Review, recommendations are 
made for specific actions that are needed, with 
justification; recommended responsibilities; and 
completion dates. A follow-up evaluation or re-inspection 
should be planned to verify the acceptability of the 
corrective action. 
4. COMPONENT ORIENTATED ANALYSIS. 
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Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) and Hazard and 
Operability Studies (HAZOP) are the principal 
component-orientated analysis techniques. In each method, 
the process under review is studied in detail and question 
"What if?", is used to identify hazards and investigate 
the way in which hazardous events occur. 
Although a top down approach can be used in FMEA I both 
methods are more generally used to study a process from 
the bottom up. This causes the analyst to carry out a 
disciplined and comprehensive study of a process. 
The major disadvantage of these methods is the time 
taken to carry out the study as they require the analyst 
to have a detailed understanding of the process. 
Therefore, these methods are often taught to design 
engineers and a team approach adopted when carrying out 
the analysis. This helps reduce the time required to 
complete the study. The team consists of design personnel 
and a hazard analyst may chair the study group. 
4.1 "What If?"Analysis. 
The "What If?" procedure is not as structured as Hazard 
and Operability (HAZOP) study and Failure Modes and 
Effects Analysis (FMEA). Instead, it requires the user to 
adapt the basic concept to the specific application. Very 




method or its application. However, it is frequently 
referred to within the industry. 
The purpose of "What If?' analysis is to consider 
carfully the result of unexpected events that would 
produce an adverse consequence. The method 	involves 
examination 	of possible deviations from the design, 
construction, modification, or operating 	intent. 	It 
requires a basic understanding of what is intended and the 
ability 	to 	mentally combine or synthetise possible 
deviations from design intent that would cause on 
undesired result. This is a powerful procedure if the 
staff is experienced; otherwise, the results are likely to 
be incomplete. 
The "What If?" concept uses questions which begin "What 
If ... ?. For example: 
* What 1f the wrong material is delivered? 
* "What If Pump A stops running during startup? 
* "What If" the operator opens valve B instead of A? 
The 	questions are divided into specific areas of 
investigation (usually related to consequences of 
concern), such as electrical safety, fire protection, or 
personnel safety. Each area is addressed by a team of two 
or three experts. The questions are formulated based on 
previous experience and applied toexisting drawings and 
charts; for an operating plant, the investigation may 
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include questions for the plant staff (there is no 
specific order to these questions, unless the application 
provides a logical form or model). The questions can 
address any variation related to the plant, not just 
component failure or process variation. 
4.2 Hazard And Operability (HAZOF) Studies. 
The HAZOP study was developed to identify hazards in a 
process plant and to identify operability problems which, 
though not hazardous, could compromise the plant's ability 
to achieve design productivity. Thus, a HAZOP goes beyond 
hazard identification. Although originally developed to 
anticipate hazards and operability problems for new/or 
novel technology where past experience is limited, it has 
been found to be very effective for use at any stage in a 
plant's life from final design onwards. In addition, one 
variation of the HAZOP has been developed specifically to 
address preliminary design. 
The approach taken is to form a multidisciplinary team 
that works together to identify hazards and operability 
problems by searching for deviations from design intents. 
An experienced team leader systematically guides the team 
through the plant design using •a fixed set of words, 
called "guide words" (see Table 4.2), or uses checklists 
or knowledge. These guide words are applied at specific 
points or "study nodes in the plant design to identify 
potential deviations of the plant process parameters at 
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those nodes. The nodes are usually specified by the team 
leader before the meetings. For example, the guide word 
"no" combined with the process parameter "flow" results in 
the deviation no flow". The team then agrees on possible 
causes of the deviations (for example, operator error 
shuts off pump) and the consequences (for example, product 
contamination). If the causes and consequences are 
realistic and significant, they are recorded for follow-up 
action, which takes place outside of the study. In some 
cases, the team identifies a deviation with a realistic 
cause but unknown consequences (for example, unknown 
reaction product) and recommends follow-on studies to 
determine the possible consequences. 





As well as Concentration 
Part of Heat 
Other than Cooling 
Table 4.2 
4.3 Failure Modes And Effects Analysis (FMEA). 
Failure 	Modes 	and 	Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a 
tabulation of the system/plant equipment, their failure 
modes, each failure mode's effect on the system/plant, and 
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a ranking for each failure mode (see Appendix C.2). The 
failure mode is a description of how equipment fails 
(open, closed, on, off, leaks, etc.). The effect of the 
failure mode is the system response or accident resulting 
from equipment failure, FMEA identifies single failure 
modes that either directly result in or contribute 
significantly to an important accident. Human/operator 
errors are generally not examined in a FMEA; however, the 
effects of mis-operation are usually described by an 
equipment failure mode. FMEA is not efficient for 
identifying combinations of equipment failures that lead 
to accidents. The FMEA can be performed by two analysts or 
a multidisciplinary team of professionals. 
4.4 Human Error Analysis. 
As the operator is the main component in any plant, his 
error could have a substantial influence on the safety of 
a system/plant. Human Error Analysis is a systematic 
evaluation of the factors that influence the performance 
of human operators, maintenance staff, technicians, and 
other personnel in the p]ant. It involves the performance 
of one of several types of task analysis, which is a 
method for describing the physical and environmental 
characteristics of a task along with the skills, 
knowledge, and capabilities required of those who perform 
the task. A Human Error Analysis will identifiy 
error-likely situations that can cause or lead to an 
accident. A Human Error Analysis can also be used to trace 
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the cause of a given type of human error. This type of 
analysis can be performed in conjonction with a Human 
Factor Engineering Analysis, a Human Reliability Analysis, 
or any of several types of system analysis. 
5. EVENT ORIENTATED METHODS. 
In contrast to FMEA and HAZOF, which start at the most 
detailed levels of a system and work up, event orientated 
methods are refered to as 'top down" techniques. 
An event of interest, for example a fire, is specifed as 
the top event and the events that cause the top event are 
identified. Events that may occur simultaneously, and 
alternative causes, are related in the form of a logic 
tree, so called because the final diagram looks like a 
tree. 
Tveit 	(26) 	presents 	the 	following 	diagram 	to 
differentiate between FTA, CCA and ETA. See figure 5 
below. 
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Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a deductive technique that 
focuses on one particular accident event and provides a 
method for determining causes of that accident event. The 
fault tree itself is a graphic model that displays the 
various combinations of equipment faults and failures that 
can result in the accident event. The solution of the 
fault tree is a list of the sets of equipment failures 
that are sufficient to cause the accident event of 
interest. FTA can include contributing human/operator 
errors as well as equipment failures. 
The strength of FTA as a qualitative tool is its ability 
to break down an accident into basic equipment failures 
and human errors. This allows the safety analyst to focus 
preventive measures on these basic causes to reduce the 
probability of an accident. FTA is described in more 
details in Appendix C.3. 
5.2 Event Tree Analysis. 
Event tree analysis is a technique for evaluating 
potential accident outcomes resulting from a specific 
equipment system failure or human error known as an 
initiating event. Event tree analysis considers operator 
response or safety system response to the initiating event 
in determining the potential accident outcomes. The 
results of the event tree analysis are accident sequences; 
that is, a chronological set of failures or errors that 
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define an accident. These results describe the possible 
accident outcomes in terms of the sequence of events 
(successes or failures of safety functions) that follow an 
initiating event. Event tree analysis is well suited for 
systems that have safety systems or emergency procedures 
in place to respond to specific initiating events. 
5.3 Cause-Consequence Analysis. 
Cause-Consequence Analysis is a blend of fault tree and 
event tree analysis (disáussed in the preceding sections) 
for evaluating potential accidents. A major strength of 
cause-consequence analysis is its use as a communication 
tool: the cause-consequence diagram displays the 
interrelationships between the accident outcomes 
(consequences) and their basic causes. The method can be 
used to quantify the expected frequency of occurrence of 
the consequences if the appropriate data are available. 
CCA is discussed in more details in Appendix C.4. 
6. SELECTION OF HAZARD EVALUATION PROCEDURES. 
Selecting a hazard evaluation for a particular purpose 
can be difficult. The different hazard evaluation 
procedures are different from each other in some ways and 
alike in others. There are many factors that characterise 
the need for the hazard evaluation that influence the 
selection of the procedure. This section addresses those 
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factors. 
6.1 Factors Affecting Which Procedure is Selected. 
6.1.1 Phase of Process/Plant Development. 
Hazard evaluation should be a continuing process from 
process conception to plant shutdown and decommissioning. 
Each stage of process development has its own priorities 
for hazard evaluation, dependent mostly on achieving the 
best balance among: 
Early identification to avoid costly redesign or 
construction modifications 
Postponement of evaluation to await more detail 
Avoidance of costly duplication of effort. 
The best balance is usually achieved by using coarse 
screening evaluation procedures to identify major problems 
as early as possible and using more detailed and more 
costly procedures for more complete evaluations when the 
details on the final design and procedures are available. 
The complete and detailed evaluations made prior to 
startup can provide a useful baseline for evaluating the 
impact of any process/plant modifications that may be 
suggested during the operation phase. 
6.1.2 Purpose of Hazard Evaluation. 
The hazard evaluation process could be described as a 
number of steps, each of which has its own purpose. In 
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most cases each procedure will provide information for 
more than one step in the hazard evaluation process. Also, 
in many cases, the hazard evaluation step can be covered, 
to a greater or lesser extent, by more than one procedure. 
"Worst case" conservative estimates of consequence 
levels can influence the choice of hazard evaluation 
procedure. A potential large release of flammable or toxic 
materials can justify a more complete and detailed search 
for events and combinations of events that could cause 
such a large release. Conversly, if there is high 
confidence of a low hazard level, a less exhaustive seach 
for causes may be in order. 
6.1.4 Complexity of Process/Plant. 
The degree of complexity can influence the choice of 
hazard evaluation procedure. A plant that incorporates 
several levels of protection through redundant controls, 
safety systems, mitigation systems, etc., needs an 
evaluation procedure that can identify, evaluate, and 
present the variety of accident event sequences that are 
possible. This is sometimes but not always a function of 
size. Simpler and smaller systems can be evaluated with 
simpler hazard evaluation procedures. 
6.1.5 Familiarity With Procedures. 
A very well done, simple procedure will provide better 
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results for decision making than a poorly done, more 
sophisticated procedure. Familiarity of staff with certain 
procedures is an argument for using them, provided that 
the limitations of the procedures are completely 
understood. 
6.1.6 Information and Data Requirements. 
Some of the procedures described in this thesis require 
more input data and information than others. If this 
information is not available, the results will not justify 
the use of those procedures. This is not as much as of a 
problem when the procedures are used to provide 
qualitative results as when quantitative results are 
required. 
6.1.7 Time and Cost Requirements. 
Time for analysis and cost of the evaluations should not 
be an absolute factor in the choice of hazard evaluation 
procedures. However, it is a factor which should be 
compared to the cost of hazard reduction opportunities 
which might obviate or reduce the cost of the analysis. 
Also, there may be other choices, such as not modifying a 
plant because of the cost of evaluating the modifications, 
or not continuing to operate a marginal plant. 
6.2 Selection Of Hazard Evaluation Methods For The Study 
Of Near-miss Events. 
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For the purpose of this study, I have selected the four 
following methods: 
a)Mond Fire and Explosion Index 
b)Failure Mode and Effect Analysis 
c)Fault Tree Analysis, and 
d)Cause Consequence Analysis. 
In the investigation of near-miss events Point Schemes 
have no direct impact. They are only used to spot the most 
dangerous areas of the plant or the unit under 
investigation so that more attention will be devoted to 
any incident occurring within the boundaries of this 
particular plant or unit. The Mond Index was chosen in 
preference the other methods because it is the more 
developed method. 
The choice of the FMEA'was based on the fact that this 
method can be used to help discriminate between minor 
problems and those which should be investigated in a more 
detailed manner. 
Of 	all 	the 	event 	orientated 	methods, FTA has 
consistently been the most widely adopted technique. It 
quantifies the frequency of occurrence of the top event. 
Finally CCA was chosen to study the consequences of top 
events already defined by FTA. 
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One of the objectives of this study was also to provide 
the Algerian industry with a method of investigation, 
which combines several methods, to study in a more 
detailed way the near-miss events that occur during the 
operation of chemical and petrochemical plants. 
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CHAPTER IV. 
MOND INDEX APPLICATION 
INTRODUCTION. 
This chapter describes the results of the application of 
the Mond Fire and Explosion Index to one of the three 
parallel trains or process lines of the HASSI R'MEL gas 
processing plant (MPP4). 
The calculation of the Mond index was carried out 
according to the procedure presented in the review of the 
Mond index (Appendix C.1). 
CALCULATION PROCEDURE. 
To illustrate the procedure, this section will present 
the calculations applied to one of the three units which 
constitute a train. 
Throughout this section reference should be made to 
sheets contained in section 5 at the end of this chapter. 
These calculation sheets show the value assigned to each 
factor, the values of the indices that were calculated and 
also the offsetting index values. 
2.1 Division Of The Train Into Units. 
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Considering the operating pressure, the train or process 
line will be divided in two different units. A high 
pressure separation unit and a distillation unit. The 
latter could further be divided into two different parts. 
The reboilers or furnaces will be investigated as a unit 
apart since they are distant from the remaining equipment 
which constitute the distillation unit. Finally to show 
the importance that the area has on the calculation of the 
fire load, one of the vessels constituting the high 
pressure separation unit was investigated as a unit apart 
(see section 5 of this chapter). 
The high pressure separation unit has been chosen for 
the remaining calculations. A paragraph will be devoted to 
the specific aspects encountered in the evaluation of the 
two other units. 
2.2 Selection Of The Dominant Material (Section 4). 
Methane being the main constituent in the raw gas (84% 
by wt), was selected as the key material in the high 
pressure separation unit. 
2.3 Material Factor (Section 5). 
The material factor B is calculated in terms of the heat 
of combustion in air at 25'C (excluding the heat of 
condensation of the water vapour. The technical manual (1) 
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gives the equation: 
B = DHc * 1.8 / M 
Where: 	DHc is the net heat of combustion in air at 25'C 
in kcal/inol. 
H is the molecular weight of the key material in 
gm/mo 1. 
For methane DHc z 212.79 kcal/gm mole (2). 
In order to compensate for the assumption that the 
processed gas is only methane, the average gas molecular 
weight was used. H = 19 gm/mol. 
B = 212.79 * 1.8 / 19 z 20.15 
2.4 Special Material Hazards (Section 6). 
In subsection 3, Mixing and Dispertion Characteristics, 
the technical manual recommends that a factor of -20 be 
used when the key material is methane. 
The values used to account for Ignition Sensitivity 
(subsection 6) are listed in Table 1 of the technical 
manual. A factor of -5 is given for methane and a factor 
of 0 for propane. The latter factor was used because the 
presence of propane will make the gas more sensitive. 
A factor of 20 is used in subsection 10, Other, to take 
account for the hazards introduced by the presence of 
liquid hydrocabons in the process stream. 
The Special Material Hazards M, has the total value of 
ii 
2.5 General Process Hazards (Section 7). 
The technical manual specifies that 
operations which only involves handling 
changes and are carried out in closed 
permanently installed pipework such as 
exchangers and columns, should be allocated 
10. The value of P., which represents the 





a factor of 
eneral Process 
2.6 Special Process Hazards (Section 8). 
The total value of 376 for S is made up of several 
factors. 
Given an operating pressure of 140 bars (2058 psi) a 
factor of 96, read off from the graph Figure 4 in the 
technical manual was assigned to subsection 2, High 
Pressure. 
Under the heading Corrosion and Erosion 	Hazards, 
subsection 5, the manual recommends a factor of 100 for an 
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internal corrosion rate of about 1 mm/year with erosion 
effects. The corrosion is mainly due tQ the presence of 
mercury (50 to 80 micro gm/Sin3) in the raw gas and the 
erosion to the velocity of the gas. 
In subsection 6, Joints and Packing Leakage, a factor of 
20 is used to take account of the leaks of minor nature 
occuring into pumps and, gland seals especially when they 
are permuted. 
This unit operating rotating machines (turbo-expanders), 
there is a chance that vibrations will induces problems, 
like a joint failure, and result in a gas release into the 
unit. Subsection 7, Vibration and Load Cycling, is 
assigned a value of 20 to take account of this hazard. 
If a release from the equipment of a small quantity of 
gas at high pressure occurs it will probably result in the 
formation of a flammable concentration in a large part of 
the surrounding atmosphere. A factor of 40 is assigned to 
subsection 10, Greater Than Average Explosion Hazard. 
When gas escapes at high velocity from the containment 
system the build up of a static electrical charge often 
results. The discharge may release sufficiant energy to 
ignite a flammable mixture of the escaping gas. This 
hazard is enhanced by the presence of liquid in the 
containment system and further enhanced if the equipment 
is itself lined with insulating materials. A factor of 100 
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was adopted in subsection 14, where electrostatic hazards 
are taken into consideration. 
2.7 Quantity Hazard (Section 9). 
The volume of material present at any time in the unit 
is assumed to be 315 m3 and the average density of the gas 
is approximately 122 kg/m3. The factor Q which represents 
the quantity hazard was read off Figure 6 in the technical 
manual, and has a value of 65. 
2.8 Layout Hazards (Section 10). 
The highest point above the ground in this unit is 
situated at a height of 18 meters. The normal working area 
is 530 in2. 
The most important feature for open process structures 
is the height at which significant quantities of flammable 
materials are contained in the unit. A factor of 50, taken 
from the table listed in subsection 3, Structure Design, 
was used. 
The collapse of a unit due to explosion or weakness of 
the structure by fire may involve adjacent units this 
aspect is considered under the heading Domino Effects in 
subsection 4. For a unit height of less than 20 meters a 
factor of 0 is given. 
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Liquid hydrocarbons being processed along with gas, the 
drainage of the working area is of importance. In the case 
of containment rupture, pool formation has to be avoided. 
Because the grids intersect with the normal working area a 
factor of 50 was used in subsection 6, Surface Drainage. 
The total value of L, Layout hazards, is 100. 
2.9 Acute Health Hazards (Sectionli). 
For a maximum liquid recovery the raw gas, entering the 
process line at a temperature of 60C, is cooled down to 
-40'C by heat exchange and expansion. The effects that 
would have the material on the skin by contact, are 
evaluated in subsection 1, Skin Effects. For example, 
scalding (or freezing) would be the result of skin contact 
with the low temperature gas. A factor of 50 was assigned. 
Subsection 2, 
mixture of gas 
component (e.g., 
asphyxiant. No 
contact with the 
used. 
considers the Inhalation Effects. The 
processed, does not contain any toxic 
hydrogen suiphide), and is a simple 
irreversible effects due to inhalation or 
gas have to be feared. A value of 10 was 
The Acute Health Hazards T, Has a total value of 60. 
2.10 Computation Of Indices (Section 12). 
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The computation of the various indices is shown on page 
4 of the sheets at the end of this chapter. Tables in the 
technical manual give the different categories in which 
each index numerical value is classified. 
The equivalent Dow Index has a value of 155.38. The 
availability of the other indices convertion of the Dow 
Index value into descriptive ratings or to use it to 
compare units, unnecessary. It is, however, a basic 
element of the Overall Risk Rating. 
The Overall Risk Rating falls into the 'Extreme" 
category with a value of 18,307. This is mainly due to the 
high values of the Aerial Explosion index and the Internal 
Explosion Index which respectively have values of 9,869 
and 4.86. The corresponding categories are "Extreme for 
the first and "high" for the latter. The Fire Load Index 
falls under the category "Light' with a value of 1.46 this 
is mainly due to the large area of the unit as it is 
demonstrated by the investigation of one of the vessels 
composing the unit. 
2.11 Process Development By Hazard Factor Review (Section 
13). 
A review of the process was not carried out due to the 
lack of more precise information, the only literature 
being the operating manual for most of the factors. The 
values givexi to the factors in the previous stages are the 
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more optimistic available. 
The values of the indices are the same as those in 
section 10. 
2.12 Offsetting Index Values For Safety And Preventive 
Measures (Section 13). 
The measures which attempt to prevent the occurence of a 
hazardous incident, and the measures which reduce the 
consequences of hazardous incident are taken into account 
in the following six subections: 
a)Containinent Hazards. 
The design and quality control of the pressure vessel 
warrants a factor of 0.8 to be applied under the factor, 
"Pressure Vessels". A factor of 0.75 is used to account 
for the design stress in the transfer pipelines. Under 
"Joints and Packing" are entered three factors (0.9, 0.9 
and 0.95) to take account of the welded pipework, the type 
of flanges used, and the seal oil system protecting the 
turbo-expanders. All relief or emergency venting releases 
being piped to a flare stack and the liquids dumped by 
pipeworks to a burn pit, a factor of 0.85 is assigned to 
"Emergency Venting or Dumping". 
b)Process Control. 
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The whole plant being fitted with a wide range of 
alarms, a factor of 0.9 is given to "Alarm System". A 
value of 0.8 is assigned to "Emergency Power Supplies". If 
the two high-tension lines, which can separately supply 
the plant with energy, fail, a gas turbine is 
automatically switched on to provide emergency power. A 
battery room provide power for the essential systems, such 
as air compressors, light and main control panel, for 24 
hours should the turbine fail. 
Under the heading "Inert Gas Systems' a value of 0.9 is 
given, inert gas being supplied to all parts of the 
process. It is used to inert the vessels before a-startup. 
During the design and the construction stages of the 
plant, number of hazards studies were carried out. The 
value assigned to 'Hazard Studies Activities' is 0.95. 
A very high performance shutdown system has been 
designed for this plant. Strict specifications were 
applied and the relay logic carefully checked. Many 
features such as very low or very high, liquid levels or 
gas pressures, low flow rates and the like initiate the 
plant shutdown. Under the heading "Safety Shutdown 
Systems", a factor of 0.7 is applied. 
A computer in the main control room (MCR) is used to 
monitor the process and to close the wells by remote 
control which consequentely initiate the shutdown. The 
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computer does not control the process, but the shutdown 
could be initiated from the MCR, therefore, a factor of 
0.85 is assigned to "Computer Control'. The "Operating 
Instructions' for the plant are clear and comprehensive. 
Start-up, normal operation and routine and emergency 
shutdown are adequately covered. A value of 0.8 is given 
to this factor. 
The plant supervision is very good over all the HASSI 
R'MEL complex. Strict security measure to keep out any 
unauthorised person, efficient de-matching and no-smoking 
system and good control of vehicle movement in hazardous 
areas are applied. All process operators are in constant 
contact with the NCR via two-way haridheld radios. 0.81 is 
given to "Plant Supervision'. 
c)Safety Attitude. 
The HASSI R'MEL management is very concerned with the 
employees and the equipment safety . No compromise is 
allowed between production factors and safety. 
Requirements for pressure equipment inspection are 
complied with, and dangerous events, including near misses 
are investigated, reported and the necessary actions 
taken. "Management Involvement" scores 0.81. 
On the first day of their visit, all employees must 
attend the safety briefing given by the safety officer. 
This briefing covers various aspects of the complex safety 
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practices, and the plan for evacuation in the event of a 
major disaster. A value of 0.9 is given to "Safety 
Train ing" 
A strict 	permit to work" system is observed for 
maintenance and modification work, and no work could be 
done without the presence of a safety officer. The 
housekeeping on the plant is of high standard and 
preventive maintenance is carried out on a scheduled 
basis. Under "Maintenance and Safety Procedures three 
factors (0.90, 0.97 and 0.90) are given. 
d)Fire Protection. 
Fixed Nozzle systems help to protect the equipment 
structures if a fire occurs and this warrants a factor of 
0.9 being assumed under "Structural Fire Protection. 
Water curtains can be generated to isolate the unit from 
its neighbouring units. Under the heading "Fire Walls, 
Barriers and Similar Devices" 0.90 is assigned. 
Since all instrument cables and electrical cables needed 
for unit control functions are fire resistant a factor of 
0.85 is applied, and a factor of 0.98 takes account of the 
possibility to use the fixed nozzle system to provide 
external fire protection insulation to the equipment under 
the collective heading "Equipment Fire Protection". 
e)Materia]. Isolation. 
All vessels and major pipelines within the plant are 
fitted with remotely operated isolation valves and an 
emergency pressure blow down system is provided. A factor 
of 0.72 is assigned to "Valve Systems". 
f)Fire Fighting. 
The break glass call points system which is linked 
directly to the works fire brigade, will activate the 
shutdown system. The works fire brigade is also connected 
to the communication system of the plant so that the fire 
brigade will have an early description of any hazardous 
event and will save precious time. "Fire Alarms"is given 
0.90. 
Throughout the plant, hand held, large and small trolley 
mounted fire extinguishers containing various fire 
fighting substances, are provided. Their positions are 
well marked so that the operatives can obtain an 
extinguisher quickly. Factors 0.90 and 0.85, are assigned 
to "Hand Fire Extinguishers". 
A pressure decrease in the firewater 	ring 	will 
automatically start-up two electrical motor centrifugal 
pumps. Two diesel motor centrifugal pumps are kept on 
stand-by in the case of an electrical power supply system 
failure. The high pressure and flow rate obtained from the 
firewater ring score 0.75 under "Water Supply". A value of 
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0.95 has been assigned under "Water Spray or Monitor 
Systems" to take account for the hand setting of direction 
of the monitor guns. 
Installed foam systems are provided throughout the unit 
with sufficient quantities of foam making compounds to 
start fire fighting and give the enough time to the fire 
brigade to bring the supplies. A value of 0.81 was 
assigned under "Foam and Inerting Installations". 
Under the heading "Fire Brigade Attendance" a factor of 
0.75 has been assigned to take account the number of works 
appliances with adequately trained crews that are ready 
for any eventuality at any time. The regular training of 
the operatives in the use of hand extinguishers, fixed 
equipment, and their involvement alongside the works fire 
brigade in fire fighting exercice score 0.80 under "Site 
Co-operation in Fire Fighting". 
2.13 Final Offset Indices Calculations. 
The offset Overall Risk Rating becomes 113 and is 
categorized "Moderate". The Fire Load and the Internal 
Explosion indices fall into "Light" category with 
respective values of 5.62E-2 and 0.25, whereas the Aerial 
Explosion index still of importance with a value of 379 
and falls into "High" category. 
3. SPECIFICITIES OF THE REMAINING UNITS. 
_80_ 
The distillation unit and the furnaces constitute in 
fact one unit. Most of the factors that will be discussed 
in this section are common to the two units. The specific 
factors will be pointed out. 
The key material chosen for the two units was propane. 
Its proportions in the process stream and its properties 
make of it the most dangerous material present in these 
units. B the material factor has a value of 21.50. 
Under "Mixing and Dispersion Characteristic the propane 
is given a factor of 0. Special Material Hazard, M, has a 
value of 20. 
Special Process Hazard has a total value of 360. The 
reduction in pressure decreases the value of p under "high 
pressure by 26, but the high temperature scores 20 under 
"high temperature flammable material". 
The 	quantity 	of material in each unit has been 
determined separately. The distillation unit contains at 
any time approximately 160 tonnes and the furnaces 10 
tonnes. Their quantity factors will respectively be 88 and 
40. 
The height and the working area are also specific for 
each unit and are equal to 50m and 665m2 for the 
distillation unit and 40m and 256m2 for the furnaces unit. 
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The heights determine the "Domino Effect" factor. The 
distillation unit has a factor of 150 and the furnaces 
unit a factor of 100. Under Layout Hazards the first one 
score 200 and the second 150. 
Concerning the investigation of the vessel (DiOl) few 
factors are different from the ones previously determined 
in the investigation of the high pressure separation unit. 
These concern the Quantity Hazards K and Q with values of 
respectiveluy equal to 3.45 and 22, the working area N 
with a value of 18 m2 and the height with a value of 14 in. 
The offsetting index values for safety and preventive 
measures are assumed to be the same for all the units. 
4. COMMENTS. 
The comparison the results obtained show that the 
division of the plant into units is the most important 
part of the investigation and has a direct impact on the 
final results. The larger the area the lower the fire load 
will be. In the case of the high pressure unit the fire 
load is equal to 1.46 whereas for the DiOl the fire load 
is equal to 3.86. The difference isinainly due to the 
large area under the pipe tracks that has to be taken into 
account when calculating the indices for the whole unit 
whereas when calculating the indices for the DiOl only the 
area under the vessel is considered. When interpretating 
-82- 
the results one must pay considerable attention to this 
fact to avoid any error of judgement. 
5. REFERENCES. 
1) "Technical Manual For The Mond Fire And Explosion 
Index ICI Mond Division, 1985. 
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LOCATION -Lks 	j 
PLANT 	
P%AJ -r L4 
UNIT 	
IPAVjoJ 
MATERIALS iJAWoRAL. G-c 
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 








F'RESSURE = psig X0 	 TEMPERATURE t= DEG.0 	Q 
MATERIAL FACTOR (Section 5) 
KEY MATERIAL OR MIXTURE : ctE1AN6 
FACTOR DETERMINED BY 	: 
MATERIAL FACTOR 	 : B= 2o.c 
RANGE 
SPECIAL MATERIAL HAZARDS (Section 6) 
1.OXIDISIHG MATERIALS I TO 20 
2.61 YES COMBUSTIBLE GAS WITH WATER 0 TO 30 
3.MUING & DISPERSION CHARACTERISTICS -60 10 100 
4.SUSJECT TO SPONTANEOUS HEATING 30 TO 250 
5.MAY RAPIDLY SPONTANEOUSLY POLYMERISE 25 TO 75 
6. IGNITION SENSITIVITY -75 TO ISO 
1.SUBJECT TO EPLOSIYE DECOMPOSITION 75 TO 125 
8.SIJBJECT TO GASEOUS DETONATION 010 150 
9.CONDENSED PHASE PROPERTIES 200 10 1500 
ILOTHER I TO 150 
SPECIAL MATERIAL HAZARDS TOTAL 
GENERAL PROCESS HAZARDS (Section 7) 
I.HANDLINS & PHYSICAL CHANGES ONLY 10 10 50 
2.REACTIQN CHARACTERISTICS 2510 50 
3.BATCH REACTIONS 10 TO 60 
4.MULTIPI!CITY OF REACTIONS 2510 75 
5.MATERIAL TRANSFER 0 TO 150 
6. TRANSPORTABLE CONTAINERS 10 TO 100 
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SFECIAL PROCESS HAZARDS (Section 8) 
1.10W PRESSURE(BELOW 15 PSIA) SB TO 150 
2.HIGH PRESSURE B TO 161 
340W TENP.:L.CARBON STEEL fIIC TO -25C I TO 30 
2.CARBON STEEL BELOW -25C 31 TO III 
3.OTHER MATERIALS B TO ill 
4.HI6H TE1IP.1.FLAMMABIE MATERIALS I TO 35 
2.MATERIAL STRENGTH I TO 25 
5.CORROS!0P4 & EROSION I TO 481 
6.JO!NT & PACKING LEAKAGES B TO 61 
7.YIBRATION,LDAD CYCLIN6,EIC. I TO LII 
8.PROCESSES/REACTIONS DIFFICULT 10 CONTROL 21 TO 300 
..0FERATIOI1 IN OR NEAR FLAMMABLE RANGE 2510 450 
1I.GREATER THAN AVERAGE EXPLOSION HAZARD 41 TO ill 
11.01.1ST OR MIST EXPLOSION HAZARD 30 TO 70 
12.HI6H STRENGTH OXIDANTS I TO 400 
13.PROCESS IGNITION SENSITIVITY I TO 100 
14.ELECTROSTATIC HAZARDS If TO 28I 
SPECIAL PROCESS HAZARDS TOTAL 
QUANTITY HAZARDS 	(Section 9) 
MATERIAL TOTAL TONNES 
QUANTITY FACTOR 
LAYOUT HAZARDS (Section 10) 
HEIGHT IN METRES 
WORKING AREA IN SQUARE METRES 
1.STRUCTURE DESIGN I TO 201 
2.DONIND EFFECT I TO 250 
3.BELOW GROU?(D SI TO 151 
4.SURFACE DRAINAGE I TO 101 
5.OTHER 50 TO 250 
LAYOUT HAZARDS TOTAL 
ACUTE HEALTH HAZARDS (Section 11) 
1.SKIN EFFECTS 	 ITO 50 
2. INHALATION EFFECTS 	 B TO 50  














ACUTE HEALTH HAZARDS TOTAL 	 T 	Go 
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	 FILE NO. 
OFFSETTING INDEX VALUES FOR SAFETY .!.. PREVENTATIVE MEASURES 
A.CONTAINMENT HAZARDS (Section 16.0 
1-PRESSURE VESSELS 
2-KON-PRESSUP.E VERTICAL STORAGE TANKS 
3-TRANSFER PIPELINES A)DESIGN STRESSES 
B)JOINTS & PACKINGS 
4-ADDITIONAL CONTAINMENT & BlINDS 
5-LEAKAGE DETECTION & RESPONSE 
6-EMERGENCY VENTING OR DUMPING 
040 
0.15 0 4q,oic 
PRODUCT TOTAL OF CONTAINMENT FACTORS 
B. FROCESS CONTROL (Section 16.2) 
1-ALARM SYSTEMS 
2-EMERGENCY POWER SUPPLIES 
3-PROCESS CODLIN6 SYSTEMS 
4-INERT GAS SYSTEMS 
5-HAZARD STUDIES ACTIVITiES 
6-SAFETY SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS 
1CIllIPUTER CONTROL 
B-EXPLOSION/INCORRECT REACTOR PROTECTION 
9-OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS 
lB-PLANT SUPERVISION 
PRODUCT TOTAL OF PROCESS CONTROL FACTORS 
C.SAFETY ATTITUDE (Section 16.3) 
1-NANA8NENT INVOLVEMENT 
2-SAFETY TRAINING 
3-MAINTENANCE & SAFETY PROCEDURES 
PRODUCT TOTAL OF SAFETY ATTITUDE FACTORS 
D.FIRE PROTECTION (Section 17.1) 
I-STRUCTURAL FIRE PROTECTION 
2-FIRE WALLS,SARRIERS 
3-EQUIPMENT FIRE PROTECTION 
PRODUCT TOTAL OF FIRE PROTECTION FACTORS 
E.MATERIAL ISOLATION (Section 17.2) 
1-VALVE SYSTEMS 
2-VENTILATION 
PRODUCT TOTAL OF MATERIAL ISOLATION FACTORS 
F.FIRE FIGHTING (Section 17.3) 
I-FIRE AI..ARMS 
2-HAND FIRE EXTINGUISHERS 
3-WATER SUPPLY 
4-WATER SPRAY OR MONITOR SYSTEMS 
540AM & ENERTIN6 INSTALLATIONS 
6-FIRE BRIGADE ATTENDANCE 
7-SITE CO-OPERATION IN FIRE FIGHTING 
8-SMOKE VENTILATORS 
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EC!UAT IONS 
EQUIVALENT DOW INDEX (for initial assessment and review) 
D = B(I+M/1)(1+R/1)(1+(S 4 QfL 1 T)/10)) 
FIRE INDEX 
INITIAL ASSESSMENT AND REVIEW F= BK/N 
OFFSET 	 F*K1*K31K5*K6 
INTERNAL EXPLOSION INDEX 
INITIAL ASSESSMENT AND REVIEW E=I+(M+P+S)/Ilg  
OFFSET 	 E*K2*K3 
AERIAL EXPLOSION INDEX 
INITIAL ASSESSMENT AND REVIEW 	 /"Sill  
OFFSET 	 A*K1*K2*K3*K5 
OVERALL RISK RATING 
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LOCTION 	 T.L 
PLANT r'ou1 	CE€S%1& \LPrT'J 	k 
UNIT 
MATERIALS 	 Ac 
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 







FRESSUF:E = psiglAW 	 TEMPERATURE t= DEG.0 L 
MATERIAL FACTOR (Section ) 
KEY MATERIAL OR MIXTURE : 
FACTOR DETERMINED BY : 
MATERIAL FACTOR  
RANGE 
SPECIAL MATERIAL HAZARDS (Section 6) 
1.OXIDISIN6 NATERIALS ITO 20 
2.6IYES CONBUSTIBLE GAS WITH WATER I TO 30 
3.flIflNG & DISPERSION CHARACTERISTICS -61 TO 100 
4.SUBJECT ID SPONTANEOUS HEATING 3010 250 
5.NAY RAPIDLY SPONTANEOUSLY POLYMERISE 25 TO 75 
6.IGPHTION SENSITIVITY -75 TO 150 
1.SUBJECT TO EXPLOSIVE DECOMPOSITION 75 TO 125 
8.SUBJECT TO GASEOUS DETONATION I 10 150 
.COUDENSED PHASE PROPERTIES 200 TO 1500 
ILOTHER I TO 150 
SPECIAL MATERIAL HAZARDS TOTAL 
GENERAL FROCESS HAZARDS (Section 7) 
1.HANOLING & PHYSICAL CHANGES ONLY 1010 51 
2.REACTION CHARACTERISTICS 2510 50 
3.BATCH REACTIONS 1010 60 
4.M!YLTIF'LICITY OF REACTIONS 2510 75 
5.MATERIAL TRANSFER 0 TO 150 
6. TRANSPORTABLE CONTAINERS 1010 100 
6ENERAL PROCESS HAZARDS TOTAL 
FACTOR 
INITIAL 	REVIEW 
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SPECIAL PROCESS HAZARDS (Section 8) 
1.LOW PRESSURE(BELOW 15 PSIA) 50 TO 150 
2.HISH PRESSURE I TO 160 
3.LOW TEMP.:l.CARBUN STEEL +IIC TO -25C ITO 30 
2.CARBON STEEL BELOW -25C 3910 100 
3.OTHER MATERIALS I TO ill 
4.HIGH TE1IP.1.FLANPIABLE MATERIALS I TO 35 
2.IIATERIAL STRENGTH I TO 25 
5.CORROSIOPI & EROSION I TO 400 
6.JO!NT & PACKING LEAKAGES I TO 60 
7.VIBRAT!ON,LOAD CYCLING,ETC. I TO 100 
8.PROCESSES/REACTIONS DIFFICULT TO CONTROL 29 TO 300 
Y.OPERATION IN OR NEAR FLAMMABLE RANGE 25 TO 450 
ILOREATER THAN AVERAGE EXPLOSION HAZARD 40 TO Ill 
11.DUST OR MIST EXPLOSION HAZARD 30 TO 70 
12.HISH STRENGTH OXIDANTS I TO 400 
13.PRUCESS IGNITION SENSITIVITY I TO LII 
14.ELECTROSTATIC HAZARDS 1010 200 
SPECIAL PROCESS HAZARDS TOTAL 
QUANTITY HAZARDS (Section 9) 
MATERIAL TOTAL TONNES 
QUANTITY FACTOR 
LAYOUT HAZARDS (Section 10) 
HEIGHT IN METRES 
WORKING AREA IN SQUARE METRES 
1.STRUCTURE DESIGN I TO 200 
2.11OMIND EFFECT I TO 250 
3.BELOW GROUND 50 TO 150 
4.SURFACE DRAINAGE I TO 100 
5. OTHER 50 TO 250 








LAYOUT HAZARDS TOTAL 
	
L 	2.oa 
ACUTE HEALTH HAZARDS (Section 11) 
L.SKIN EFFECTS 	 0 TO 	50 
2. INHALATION EFFECTS 	 I TO 50 
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PAGE NO. 3 
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	 FILE NO. 
OFFSETTING INDEX VALUES FOR SAFETY & PREVENTATIVE MEASURES 
A.CONTAINMENT HAZARDS (Section 16.1) 
1-PRESSURE VESSELS 
2-NON-PRESSURE VERTICAL STORAGE TANKS 
3-TRANSFER PIPELINES A)DESI6N STRESSES 
B)JO!NTS & PACXIN6S 
4-ADDITIONAL CONTAINMENT I BUNDS 
5-LEAKAGE DETECTION & RESPONSE 
6-EMERGENCY VENTING OR DUMPING 
PRODUCT TOTAL OF CONTAINMENT FACTORS 	 Ki= c6 	L9 
B. PROCESS CONTROL (Section 16.2) 
1-ALARM SYSTEMS 
2-EMERGENCY POWER SUPPUES 
3-PROCESS COOLING SYSTEMS 
4-INERT GAS SYSTEMS 
5-HAZARD STUDIES ACTIVITIES 
6-SAFETY SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS 
7-COMPUTER CONTROL 
8-EXPLOSION! INCORRECT REACTOR PROTECTION 
9-OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS 
ig-PIANT SUPERVISION 
PRODUCT TOTAL OF PROCESS CONTROL FACTORS  
C.SAFETY ATTITUDE (Section 16.3) 
1-MANAGNENT INVOLVEMENT 
2-SAFETY TRAINING 
3-MAINTENANCE & SAFETY PROCEDURES 
PRODUCT TOTAL OF SAFETY ATTITUDE FACTORS K3= 
D.FIRE PROTECTION (Section 17.1) 
1-STRUCTURAL FIRE PROTECTION 
2-FIRE WALLS,BARRIERS 
3-EQUIPMENT FIRE PROTECTION 
PRODUCT TOTAL OF FIRE PROTECTION FACTORS 1(4= 
E.MATERIAL ISOLATION 	(Section 	17.2) 
1-VALVE SYSTEMS 
2-VENTILATION 
PRODUCT TOTAL OF MATERIAL ISOLATION FACTORS 1(5= 0 
F.FIRE FIGHTING 	(Section 	17.3) 
I-FIRE ALARMS 
2-HAND FIRE EXTINGUISHERS 
3-WATER SUPPLY 
4-WATER SPRAY OR MONITOR SYSTEMS 
5-FOAM & INERTING INSTALLATIONS 
6-FIRE BRIGADE ATTENDANCE 
7-SITE CO-OPERATION IN FIRE FIGHTING 
8-SMOKE VENTILATORS 
PRODUCT TOTAL OF FIRE FIGHT ING FACTORS 1(6= 
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EQUAT IONS 
EQUIVALENT DOW INDEX (for initial assesgment and review) 
D = B(i+MhLO)(1+P/1B)(1+(S+Q+L'T)ltø)) 
FIRE INDEX 
INITIAL ASSESSMENT AND REVIEW F= BK/N 
OFFSET 	 F*K1*K3*K5*K6 
INTERNAL EXPLOSION INDEX 
INITIAL ASSESSMENT AND REVIEW E1+(M+P+S)/188 
OFFSET 
	 E*K2*K3 
AERIAL EXPLOSION INDEX 
INITIAL ASSESSMENT AND REVIEW A=B(1#m/Iøø)(1+p)(OHE/1100)(t+273)/3 
OFFSET 	 A4K1*K2*K3*K 
OVERALL RISK RATING 
INITIAL ASSESSMENT AND REVIEW RD(1+(.2E4S9UARE ROOT(AF))) 
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PLANT MOUUe VQC&?t,Jc,- c'kr1- - Ltwc 
UNIT rC 
MATERIALS C 
ADD IT I ONAL I NFORMAT ION 





C ONFIEN T 
MUM BER 
PRESSURE = psig 	 TEMPERATURE t= DEG.0 
MATERIAL FACTOR (Section 5) 
KEY MATERIAL OR MIXTURE : 
FACTOR DETERMINED BY 
MATERIAL FACTOR 	 : B= 
RANGE 	 FACTOR 
INITIAL 	REVIEW 
SPECIAL MATERIAL HAZARDS (Section 6) 
1.OXIDISIN6 MATERIALS 0 TO 20 
2.SIVES CONBUSTIBLE GAS WITH WATER I TO 30 
3.NIXINS It DISPERSION CHARACTERISTICS -60 TO 100 m 
4.SURJECT TO SPONTANEOUS HEATING 30 TO 250 
5.NAY RAPIDLY SPONTANEOUSLY POLYMERISE 25 TO 75 
6. IGNITION SENSITIVITY -75 10 ISO 
1.SUSJECT TO EXPLOSIVE DECONPOSITION 75 TO 125 
8.SURJECT TO GASEOUS DETONATION I TO 150 
9.CDNOENSED PHASE PROPERTIES 200 TO 1500 
ILOTHER I TO 150 
SPECIAL MATERIAL HAZARDS TOTAL M 
GENERAL FROCESS HAZARDS (Section 7) 
1.HANDLINS & PHYSICAL CHANGES ONLY 10 TO 50 
2.REACTIQN CHARACTERISTICS 25 TO 50 
33ATCH REACTIONS 10 TO 60 
4.MULTIPIICITY OF REACTIONS 25 TO 75 
5.NATERLAL TRANSFER 0 TO 150 
6.TRANSPORIABLE CONTAINERS 10 TO 100 





- 78 - 
NDI'JiD IItX 1B t5 	 PAGE NO. 2 
FILE NO. 
SPECIAL PROCESS HAZARDS (Section 8) 
1.LOW PRESSURE(BELOW 15 PSIA) 59 TO 159 
2.HISH PRESSURE B TO 160 p 
3.LOW TEMP.:LCARBON STEEL +IBC TO -25C B TO 30 
2.CARBON STEEL BELOW -25C 3010 100 
3.OTHER MATERIALS I TO LII 
4.HIGH TEIIP.L.FLANNABLE MATERIALS B TO 35 
2.NATERIAL STRENGTH U TO 25 - 
5.CORROSION & EROSION I TO 400 400 
6.JOINT & PACKING LEAKAGES B TO 60 Lo 
73IBRAIION,LOAD CYCLIN6,ETC. B TO LU £0 
G.PROCESSESIREACTI0NS DIFFICULT TO CONTROL 29 TO 300 - 
.OPERAT ION IN OR NEAR FLAIIMABI.E RANGE 25 TO 450 
ILGREATER THAN AVERAGE EXPLOSION HAZARD 40 TO III 
11.DUST OR MIST EXPLOSION HAZARD 30 TO 70 - 
12.HISH STRENGTH OXIDANTS I TO 400 
13.PROCESS IGNITION SENSITIVITY ITO 100 .s( 
14.ELECTROSTATIC HAZARDS 10 TO 290 
SPECIAL PROCESS HAZARDS TOTAL S 	Co 
QUANTITY HAZARDS (Section 9) 
MATERIAL TOTAL TONNES 	 K 	tO 
DUANTITY FACTOR 	 Q Q 
LAYOUT HAZARDS (Section 10) 
HEIGHT IN METRES H 	L 
WORKING AREA IN SOUARE METRES N 
1.STRLICTURE DESIGN I TO 200 
2.DO)IIND EFFECT lTD 250 
3.8ELOW GROUND 50 TO 151 
4.SURFACE DRAINAGE 0 10 101 0 
5.OTHER 50 TO 250 
LAYOUT HAZARDS TOTAL L 
ACUTE HEALTH HAZARDS (Section 11) 
L.SKIN EFFECTS 	 I TO 50 	 So 
2. INHALATION EFFECTS 	 0 TO 50 
ACUTE HEALTH HAZARDS TOTAL 	 T 
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FILE NO. 
OFFSETTING INDEX VALUES FOR SAFETY & PREVENTATIVE MEASURES 
A.CONTAINMENT HAZARDS (Section 16.1) 
1-PRESSURE VESSELS 
2-NON-PRESSURE VERTiCAL STORAGE TANKS 
3-TRANSFER PIPELINES A)DESISN STRESSES 
B)JOINTS & PACKIN6S 
4-ADDITIONAL CONTAINMENT & BUNDS 
5-LEAKAGE DETECTION & RESPONSE 
6-EMERGENCY VENTING OR DUMPING 
PRODUCT TOTAL OF CONTAINMENT FACTORS  
B.F'ROCESS CONTROL (Section 16.2) 
I-ALARM SYSTEMS 
2-EMERGENCY POWER SUPPLIES 
3-PROCESS COOLING SYSTEMS 
4-INERT GAS SYSTEMS 
5-HAZARD STUDIES ACTIVITIES 
6-SAFETY SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS 
7-COMPUTER CONTROL 
8-EXPLOSION/INCORRECT REACTOR PROTECTION 
9-OPERATIPIS INSTRUCTIONS 
18-PLANT SUPERVISION 
PRODUCT TOTAL OF PROCESS CONTROL FACTORS 	K2= 0 . Z 1. 
C.SAFETY ATTITUDE (Section 16.3) 
1 -MANAGNENT INVOLVEMENT 
2-SAFETY TRAINING 
3-MAINTENANCE & SAFElY PROCEDURES 
FIRE PROTECTION (Sect• 	
PRODUCT TOTAL OF SAFETY ATTITUDE FACTORS 
ion 17.1) 
1-STRUCTURAL FIRE PROTECTION 
2-FIRE WAILS,BARRIERS 
3-EQUIPMENT FIRE PROTECTION 






PRODUCT TOTAL OF MATERIAL ISOLATION FACTORS 	K5= G F.FIRE FIGHTING (Section 17.3) 
1-FIRE ALARMS 
2-HAND FIRE EITINGUISHERS 
3-WATER SUPPLY 
4-WATER SPRAY OR MONITOR SYSTEMS 
5-FOAM & INERTING INSTALLATIONS 
6-FIRE BRIGADE ATTENDANCE 




OF FIRE FIGHTING FACTORS 	I:6 = 01it4 
- 80 - 
I1DN1D INJEX 18 	 PAGE NO. 4 
FILE NO. 
EQUATIONS 
EQUIVALENT DOW INDEX (for initial assessment and review) 
D = B(1+M/1)(t+P/1øø)(1+(S+0 4LT)' 10 
FIRE INDEX 
INITIAL ASSESSMENT AND REVIEW F= BK/N 
OFFSET 	 F*K1*K34K5*K6 
INTERNAL EXPLOSION INDEX 
INITIAL ASSESSMENT AND REVIEW E=i+(N+P+S)/1ø9 
OFFSET 	 E*K2*K3 
AERIAL EXPLOSION INDEX 
INITIAL ASSESSMENT AND REVIEW 	 1380  
OFFSET 	 A*K1*K2'Y.3'K5 
OVERALL RISK RATING 
- INITIAL ASSESSMENT AND REVIEW R=D(t+(.2E*S9UARE RUOT(AF))) 
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PLANT 	ctoo' 	 5% 9LPP4JT t Lr\ '?) 
UNIT \\k 	QfZ.E -Ce 2J1i0.j 
MATERIALS 
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 
C ON EN T 
NUN BE R 
FRESSURE = psig to 	TEMPERATURE t= DEG.0 
MATERIAL FACTOR (Section ) 
F::EY MATERIAL OR MIXTURE : 
FACTOR DETERMINED BY 	 - 
MATERIAL FACTOR 	 : B= 
RANGE 
SPECIAL MATERIAL HAZARDS (Section 6) 
1.OXIDISI1IG NATERIALS 0 TO 20 
2.6IVES COMBUSTIBLE 6A5 WITH WATER 0 TO 30 
3.NIXING & DISPERSION CHARACTERISTICS -60 TO 100 
4.SUBJECT TO SPONTANEOUS HEATING 30 TO 250 
5.MAY RAPIDLY SPONTANEOUSLY POLYMERISE 25 10 75 
6.IGNITION SENSITIVITY -75 10 150 
7.SUBJECT TO EXPLOSIVE DECOMPOSITION 75 TO 125 
8.SUBJECI TO GASEOUS DETONATION 0 TO 150 
9.CONOENSED PHASE PROPERTIES 290 TO 1509 
18.OTHER 010 150 
SPECIAL MATERIAL HAZARDS TOTAL 
3ENERAL PROCESS HAZARDS (Section 7) 
1.HANDLING & PHYSICAL CHANGES ONLY 1010 50 
2.REACTION CHARACTERISTICS 2510 52 
3.BATCH REACTIONS 1010 60 
4.MULTIPLICITY OF REACTIONS 25 TO 75 
5.MATERIAL TRANSFER 0 TO 150 
6. TRANSPORTABLE CONTAINERS 10 TO 100 
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SPECIAL PROCESS HAZARDS (Section 8) 
1.LOW PRESSLIRE(BELOW 15 PSIA) 50 TO 151 
2.HISH PRESSURE I TO 160 
3.LOW TEMP.:1.CARBON STEEL +IIC TO -25C 0 TO 30 
2.CARBON STEEL BELOW -25C 30 TO 100 
3.OTHER MATERIALS 0 TO III 
4.HIGH TE1IP.1.FIANMABLE MATERIALS I TO 35 
2.MATERIAL STRENGTH I TO 25 
5.CORROSION & EROSION I TO 400 
6.JOINT & PACKING LEAKA6ES I TO 60 
73IBRATION,LOAD CYCL!N6,ETC. I TO III 
8.PROCESSES/REACTIDHS DIFFICULT TO CONTROL 20 TO 300 
.OPERAT ION IN OR NEAR FLAMMABLE RANGE 25 10 450 
10.GREATER THAN AVERAGE EXPLOSION HAZARD 40 TO III 
11.DUST DR MIST EXPLOSION HAZARD 30 TO 70 
12.HISH STRENGTH OXIDANTS 0 10 400 
13.PRDCESS IGNITION SENSITIVITY I 10 100 
14.ELECTROSTATIC HAZARDS II TO 200 
SPECIAL PROCESS HAZARDS TOTAL 
QUANTITY HAZARDS (Section 9) 
MATERIAL TOTAL TONNES 
QUANTITY FACTOR 
LAYOUT HAZARDS (Section 10) 
HEIGHT IN METRES 
WORKING AREA IN SQUARE METRES 
1.STRUCTURE DESIGN 0 TO 200 
2.DONINO EFFECT I TO 250 
3.BELOW GROUND 50 TO 150 
4.9URFACE DRAINAGE I TO LU 
5.OTHER 50 TO 250 
LAYOUT HAZARDS TOTAL 
ACUTE HEALTH HAZARDS (Section 11) 
1.SKIN EFFECTS 	 010 	50 
2. INHALATION EFFECTS 	 I TO 50 
ACUTE HEALTH HAZARDS TOTAL  
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PAGE NO. 3 
FILE NO. 
OFFSETTING INDEX VALUES FOR SAFETY PREVENTATIVE MEASURES 
A.CONTAINMENT HAZARDS (Section 16.1) 
1-PRESSURE VESSELS 
2-NON-PRESSURE VERTICAL STORAGE TANKS 0 
3-TRANSFER PIPELINES A)OESIGN STRESSES 
B)JOINTS & PACKINGS o-ç 
4-ADDITIONAL CONTAINMENT & BUNDS 
5-LEAKAGE DETECTION & RESPONSE 
-EMER6EflCY VENTING OR DUNP INS 
C). 
PRODUCT TOTAL OF CONTAINMENT FACTORS 1(1= 0 •1e4, 
B. FROCESS CONTROL 	(Section 16.2) 
I-ALARM SYSTEMS c . 
-ENERGENCY POWER SUPPLIES C 
s-PROCESS COOLING SYSTEMS - 
I-INERT GAS SYSTEMS  
s-HAZARD STUDIES ACTIVITIES 
I-SAFETY SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS 
-CDflPUTER CONTROL 
l-EIPLOS1ONIINCORRECT REACTOR PROTECTION 
i-OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS 
LB-PLANT SUPERVISION C? 
PRODUCT TOTAL OF PROCESS CONTROL FACTORS 1(2= 	.2_(4 
_.SAFETY ATTITUDE (Section 16.3) 
L-MANA6MENT INVOLVEMENT 0 , 
-SAFETY TRAINING 
-MAINTEWANCE & SAFETY PROCEDURES C) - 	C 
PRODUCT TOTAL OF SAFETY ATTITUDE FACTORS 13= 
).FIRE PROTECTION (Section 17.1) 
1-STRUCTURAL FIRE PROTECTION 
!-FIRE WAILS,BARRIERS C 
-EOUIPMENT FIRE PROTECTION 
PRODUCT TOTAL OF FIRE PROTECTION FACTORS 1(4= 
_.MATERIAL ISOLATION 	(Section 	17.2) C' 
1-VALVE SYSTEMS 
i-VENTILATION 
PRODUCT TOTAL OF MATERIAL ISOLATION FACTORS i:= 
.FIRE FIGHTING 	(Section 17.3) 
-FIRE ALARMS  
!-HAND FiRE EXTINGUISHERS  
-WATER SUPPLY 
-WATER SPRAY OR MONITOR SYSTEMS ct 
-FOAfl & INERTING INSTALLATIONS 0.1 t i-FIRE BRIGADE ATTENDANCE 
'-SITE CO-OPERATION IN FIRE FIGHTING c 
-SNOEE VENTILATORS 
PRODUCT TOTAL OF FIRE FIGHTING FACTORS 1(6= 
98 
I1DN1D INDX 18 	 PAGE NO. 4 
F I LE NO. 
EQUATIONS 
EQUIVALENT DOW INDEX (for initial asesment and review) 
D = 8(1+M,10)(1+P/100)(1+(S+Q+L#1)/109)) 
FIRE INDEX 
INITIAL ASSESSMENT AND REVIEW F= 8K/N 
OFFSET 	 F*K1*K3*K5*K6 
INTERNAL EXPLOSION INDEX 
INITIAL ASSESSMENT AND REVIEW E=1+(M+P+S)/1ø 
OFFSET 	 E*K2*K3 
AERIAL EXPLOSION INDEX 
INITIAL ASSESSMENT AND REVIEW A=B(1+m/1ø8)(1+p)(QHE/100)(t+273)/3ø 
OFFSET 	 A4K1*K2*V.3*K5 
OVERALL RISK RATING 
INITIAL ASSESSMENT AND REVIEW R=D(1+(.2E*S9tJARE RUOT(AF))) 
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F M E A , F T A A N D C C A A F' F' L I C AT I 0 N 
1. INTRODUCTION. 
This chapter describes the results of the investigation 
of two examples of near-miss events which occured during 
the operation of the HASSI RMEL gas processing plant 
(MPP4). 
The investigation was carried out according to the 
procedures presented in the reviews of the Failure Mode 
and Effects Analysis, the Fault Tree Analysis and the 
Cause-Consequence Analysis. 
2.INVESTIGATION PROCEDURE. 
The investigation procedure is a combination of three 
methods of analysis. The first one, FMEA, which was used 
to help discriminate between minor problems and those 
which require thorough investigation, the second one, FTA, 
was carried out to spot the root causes of the near-miss 
event and the third one, CCA, was developed to show the 
possible consequences of the event of interest. 
To illustrate the procedure, this section will present 
the results of the 	application of the methods to two 
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separate near-miss events. One being production of foam in 
a hydrocarbons/glycol separation drum and the other being 
gas blow-by in a medium pressure separation drum. 
Throughout this section reference should be made to the 
tables and diagrams presented at the end of this chapter. 
This section has been written with the assumption that 
the reader is familiar with the HPP4, FMEA,FTA and CCA. 
Appendix Bi contains a detailed description of the MMP4 
and Appendices C.2. C.3 and C.4 describe how FHEA, FTA and 
CCA are carried out. 
2.1 FMEA Application. 
In order to keep good safety records in a process plant, 
like the HPP4, each single deviation from the normal 
operating conditions should be investigated. Applying the 
FMEA to the device whose failure resulted in the event, 
help to distinguish between simple deviations and 
near-miss events. 
2.1.1 Analysis approach. 
The analysis was carried out in accordance with the 
procedure described in Appendix C.2. 
Piping and Intrumentation Diagrams for this subsystem 
can be found in Appendix Bi, and the completed FMEA sheets 
_1 O1_ 
are Dresented at the end of this chapter. 
2.1.2 Ob.jective of analysis. 
T h e ob.jective of the analysis was to identity those 
events which require a thorough investigation. 
2.1.3 Results of analysis. 
Two separate devices have been analysed using the FMEA. 
The first being a level transmitter and the second being a 
glycol filter. 
a)Level transmitter. 
Device LT 106 is a level transmitter whose function 
is to provide a signal to the level controller 
(L0106), the high level switch (LSH 108)and the level 
indicator (LI 108) (see LICA 108 on diagram P&ID 1.1 
at the end of the chapter). 
The ways in which it can fail are by giving a high 
or a low signal (high in our case) which could be 
caused by the impulse line being blocked, a 
miscalibration or an internal fault. 
The operational mode considered in this analysis is 
the operating mode. 
-102- 
The effects of the 	failure, 	on the 	local level, 
will be 	that a 	high signal is 	sent 	to level 
controller , 	 the level control valve positioner (LCV 
UJS) and 	the high level switch. On the next higher 
level the 	effects will 	be t h a t the 	level 	control 
valve will open too 	far. At the end effect the rapid 
fall in liquid 	level in D 103 will lead to gas blowby 
to D104 Through the 	liquid line. 
The more reliable ways of detecting the drop of 
level will be the low pressure alarm (PAL 113) fitted 
on the vessel (D 103) which in the event of a rapid 
fall in level will indicate the consequent fall in 
pressure, and the high level alarm (LAH 111) fitted 
on the downstream drum D104 which will indicate the 
consequent rise in level in that vessel (see P&ID 
1/1). 
To compensate for this failure, the operator in the 
main control room (MCR) must put the level controller 
on manual and close the valve controlling the level. 
The severity class (see Appendix C.2) for this 
particular event will be 2 since it does disturb the 
process and could cause the shutdown system to be 
initiated and cause damage to the personnel or 
equipment. 
This kind of event is frequent but could have 
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catastrophic consequences if it is not properly (or 
quickly) dealt with. 
b)Glycol filter. 
D e v i c e S.302 (see P&ID 2 at t h e. e n d of this 
chapter) is a glycol filter whose function is to 
remove all impurities from the glycol solution coming 
back from the trains. 
The failure mode could be a quick saturation of its 
beds due to poor quality of the molecular sieves, bad 
regeneration procedure, fluidization of the bed or to 
a malfunction of the pressure differential recorder 
(PdR 302 part of EdRA 302) which should give an alarm 
whenever the filter is saturated and needs to be 
regenerated. 
The mode of operation under which the event 
happened was the operating mode. 
The local effect of the failure is that the glycol 
is not properly filtered affecting, on the next 
higher level the regeneration unit particularly the 
distillation section (foaming in the column, 
cavitation of the bottom pumps etc.) which at the end 
will cause foaming in some parts of the main process. 
The failure detection mode (when noticing all these 
-104- 
effects) is to compare the readings given by the 
pressure differential recorder (PdR 302) and the ones 
given by the pressure gauges at the inlet (PG 306) 
and the outlet (PG 307) of the filter. 
The 	best way to compensate is to inject an 
anti-foaming agent and put both filters on operating 
mode while permutating the two regeneration units (45 
and 46, see Appendix B2 P&ID A015) . Since this 
particular failure can be counteracted and controlled 
without major disturbance to the process it will be 
classified as class 3 severity. 
2.2 FTA and CCA application. 
To avoid repetitions due to the complementarity of the 
two methods, the fault trees and the cause-consequence 
diagrams will be discussed in this section at the same 
time. 
The FTA investigated the causes and failure paths that 
result in the near-miss event while the CCA investigated 
the failure paths that lead to catastrophic events (e.g. 
fire or explosion). 
2.2.1. Objective of analysis. 
Two objectives were assigned to this analysis. The first 
one was to identify the concurrent failures necessary to 
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cause the near-miss event being considered and those which 
could lead to the worst consequences and,the second one 
was to show the importance of investigating near-miss 
events since these investigations are of many advantages, 
the most important being the gain of experience in safely 
operating the process. 
The analysis was restricted to failures in the control 
system. The analysis was limited to the train and the 
glycol regeneration unit. 
2.2.2 Analysis approach. 
The 	fault tree analysis and the cause-consequence 
analysis investigating near-miss events were carried out 
in accordance with the procedures discussed in Appendices 
C.3 and C.4. 
The events determined by the FMEA as being near-miss 
events were more deeply investigated by developing fault 
trees and a cause-consequences diagrams. Each event being 
at the same time the top event of the fault tree analysis 
and the starting point of the cause-consequence analysis. 
The following events were analysed: 
a)Gas blowby from D103 
b)Foaming in D106 
2.2.3 Gas blowby. 
106... 
The fault tree for gas blowby is shown in sheets PTA 
1/1. P&ID A1004 in Appendix B2, P&ID 1/1 and P&ID 1/2 at 
the end of this chapter, show the interrelationship of the 
components making up the level control system. 
If the liquid in the vessel falls below the outlet level 
allowing gas into the outlet pipe, gas blowby will occur. 
Generally, liquid is fed to a vessel which operates at 
lower pressure. Therefore, gas blowby may result in the 
downstream vessel being subjected to a pressure above its 
design pressure. 
The level control valve on the liquid outlet must remain 
	
wide open so that the liquid outflow exceeds in inflow. 	- 
The level must fall slowly to a sufficiently low level 
before the low pressure alarm PAL 113 will attract the 
operator attention. 
To follow the rule of the "worst case 	(see Chapter 3 
section 6.1.2), it is assumed that the operator has 
insufficient time to rectify the situation, because no low 
level alarm is fitted on the vessel. The tree gives a 
pessimistic view because it is assumed that the delayed 
operation of the pressure alarm gives the operator 
insufficient warning but it stresses that the factor time 
plays a major role in the succession of events. 
The downstream drum D 104 is 	protected 	against 
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overpressure by a wide variety of devices which initiate 
shutdown or relieve the excess pressure in the vessel. 
CCA1/? and CCA 1/2 shows the relationship of the events 
which may cause the vessel to rupture and release 
hydrocarbons into the module. F& IL AIOC4 in Apoendix . 2 
shows the instruments in this section. 
For rupture to occur the vessel must be exposed to a 
pressure greatly in excess of its design pressure 37.7 
Kg/cm21G. This can only occur if there is a source of 
overpressure and the preSsure safety valves fail to 
relieve the excess pressure. In the case of gas blowby 
from D103, the D104 will be submitted to a pressure of 70 
Kg/ctn2G which is about 186% that of its own working 
pressure. 
PSV 105 and HXC 108 are two pressure safety valves 
fitted to D104. An interlocking system prevents both 
valves from being locked off or on simultaneously. 
The other events in the diagram show how the shutdown 
system protects D 104. 
There are two methods or protection. The first is to 
isolate the train by closing PlC 139. Secondly, the 
pressure may be vented by HIC 107 A&B and PSV 104 opening, 
or should these valves fail to open the gas may be vented 
to the flare system via LiZ 138 or LiZ 135. The latter 
valves are situated on the discharge of K101 A&B. Both 
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valves open when shutdown is initiated. 
In principle FTA and CCA can be used to quantify the 
hazard of having gas blowby, but in the case of the 
present work the lack of data makes it impossible. 
2.2.4 Foaming. 
The fault tree for foaming is shown in sheets FTA2/2. 
Foaming occurs, in our case, as a result of the presence 
of small particles of impurity on the surface layer of 
liquid in the hydrocarbons/glycol separation drum D 106. 
This causes the liquid level to rise in appearance leading 
to a consequent response of the level control loop. The 
residence time of the liquid in the vessel being less than 
the one prescribed by the design, results in glycol being 
entrained with the hydrocarbons to the bottom part of the 
column C 101. 
The fault tree shows that the improper operation of the 
glycol filter at the entrance of the glycol regeneration 
unit is the cause of foam formation in D 106. 
If glycol is present in the bottom part of the column it 
will decompose since the temperature at the bottom of the 
column exceeds the glycol decomposition temperature. The 
residue (carbon) resulting will be pumped with the 
hydrocarbons to the furnace and will deposit and form a 
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layer which will reduce the heat transfer coefficient. The 
end result will be the formation of hot spots which lead 
to the rupture of the tube and in hydrocarbons being 
released in the furnace resulting in fire or explosion. 
There are two methods of protection. The first is to 
inject an anti-foam agent into the glycol going to the 
trains. Secondly, permutate the two glycol regeneration 
units to be able to change the molecular sieves of the 
filters causing the problem. 
3. DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS. 
The two near-miss events that have been chosen to 
illustrate the study of methods happened only when the 
MPP4 was in normal operating mode. Hazardous events that 
occur during startup and shutdown should also be 
investigated. 
The analysis was restricted to considering the ways in 
which hydrocarbons could be released into the train as a 
direct consequence of near-miss events. The trees that 
have been drawn do not show that hydrocarbons can be 
released due to small leaks. For example, gas may escape 
from valve glands, instruments, fittings and flanges. 
The fault tree drawn from API RP 14c which is contained 
in Appendix C.3, shows that mechanical deterioration due 
to corrosion can also be a factor in hydrocarbons being 
_11o_ 
released. This was not taken into account in 	this 
analysis. 
3.1 Modeling operator intervention. 
I have found it difficult to accurately represent the 
opportunities given to the operator to correct deviations 
from the normal operating parameters. The assumptions that 
I have made are pessimistic. 
The analyst can work out what indications the operator 
will have given a particular set of circumstances. The 
operator may misinterpret these data and fail to prevent 
the fault condition from arising. Most analysts remodel 
the fault tree to take account of operator intervention 
after the basic structure has bee i decided. 
3.2 Gas blowby. 
Gas blowby may appear to be a serious problem, but this 
is not the case as high pressure switch and pressure 
safety valve protect the downstream vessel which is being 
subjected to high pressure as a result of gas blowby. 
Rupture of the downstream vessel would only result if 
the pressure to which it was subjected was sufficient to 
cause rupture (more than 150% of the working pressure) and 
if the protection devices failed simultaneously. 
At least two pressure safety valves are fitted to each 
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pressure vessel and to the discharge lines 'of 	the 
turbo-expanders. These valves are fitted with an interlock 
mechanism which prevents them from being locked off 
simultaneously. This of course also prevent the valves 
being locked on at the same time. 
The interlock mechanism allows each valve-to be tested 
and calibrated without lowering the standard of 
overpressure protection as the other PSV must be locked on 
before maintenance work can commence. There is much to 
commend this practice as it ensures that a valve can not 
be incorrectly locked off. 
The cause-consequence diagrams and the fault trees show 
the protection afforded by the shutdown system. Although 
the risk inherent in processing gas are high, the shutdown 
system ensures that a minimum of four simultaneous 
failures are required to cause the rupture of equipment, 
the absence of common mode failure render this possibility 
very unlikely. No quantitative analysis could be carried 
out due to the abscence of data (nonavailable), but it 
seems likely that the probability of vessel rupture is 
small. 
3.3 Foaming. 
The main element shown by the analysis is the extent to 
which simple event like foam formation in a separation 
drum will lead. Foaming being a common occurrence the 
_1 12_ 
build up of carbon in the furnace is likely to occur over 
a long period of time leading to the formation of hot 
spots. However, it is very difficult to account for time 
in both FTA and CCA. 
4 COMMENTS. 
The combination of the different hazard analysis methods 
(FMEA, FTA and CCA) render the investigation of near-miss 
events easier than if just one of these methods is used 
alone. The FMEA select which events should be studied in a 
deeper way. This allow time to be saved since those, events 
which do not present substantial hazards will be 
identified at this stage. The FTA determines the root 
causes of the near-miss event, thus help understanding the 
different mechanisms which led to the top event. Finally, 
the CCA points out the weak parts of the process and gives 
an idea about the hazards behind the near-miss event under 
investigation. 
In conclusion it appears that foam formation is more 
likely to cause a problem over a period of time than gas 
blowby. The quantification of these models was not 
conducted due to the lack of data. This emphasises the 
fact that there is a need to collect data on failure rates 
etc., which can be used in such studies. 
_1 13_ 
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CHAPTER VI - 
CONCLIUSIONS - 
1 . INTRODUCTION. 
The exploitation of industrial installations processing 
hazardous substances always presents some degree of 
unwanted and sometimes unforeseen hazards which if not 
controlled will result in catastrophic events. 
Since the complete elimination of hazards is almost 
impossible, the only way to deal with them is to limit the 
frequency of their occurence by preventing as much as 
possible failures and consequently releases, and limit 
their eventual consequences. This can be achieved in a 
first step by the remote location of industrial 
installations with relation to populated areas. At the 
plant level, the layout of the different equipment and 
units contributes a great deal in preventing escalation of 
incidents. The second step is to devote more attention to 
the design, fabrication and inspection stages in order to 
avoid early errors which might be costly later on. The 
third step, which is the most important specificly in the 
context of the Algerian petrochemical industry is to avoid 
departures from the operating conditions during the 
operating stage (in order not to alter the integrity of 
the equipment), to have a high standard of training for 
-129- 
all personnel, to 	adhere 	to 	the established operating 
procedures, 	to check 	regularly the safety and control 
systems 	and investigate 	minor accidents, abnormal 
circumstances, and 	near 	misses. Similarly, maintenance 
operations and/or modifications should be carried out with 
caution. 
As already mentioned, the two main objective of this 
study, were to learn about the different hazard analysis 
methods and to provide a way of investigating near-miss 
events. 
The 	investigation 	of 	near miss-events should be 
conducted in a selective and progressive manner to 
concentrate the efforts (time and money) on the events 
that present a serious threat to life and/or property. The 
more an event is hazardous the deeper the study should go. 
For example, a leaking valve in the water treatment unit 
will not be given as much consideration as a leaking valve 
in the high pressure separation unit where hydrocarbons 
are released to the atmosphere. Applying the I'Iond Index to 
the whole plant gives indication on which unit sould be 
monitered with greater attention. The events occuring in 
this particular unit should be given more consideration 
with regard to the events occuring in the other units of 
the plant. This does not mean in any way that the latter 
should be ignored. The most important factor in applying 
the Mond Index is the division of the plant into blocks or 
units to be investigated separately. This factor 
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influences a great deal the final outcome (see Chapter 4): 
The FMEA specifies the failure modes of the component, 
the effects of these failures at different levels of the 
system/process, and more importantly gives a ranking of 
the possible consequences of failures. Referring to the 
example given above, the position of the valve , its size, 
the amount and nature of material released, etc. will give 
a clear indication wheather a more detailed investigation 
is needed or not. The weakness of this method is that it 
is impossible to include the human factor in the analysis. 
Finally, if required (see FMEA results) both FTA and CCA 
are carried ou± to determine the root causes of the 
incident and to show the possible consequences. If the 
analyst can assemble enough data, a quantification of the 
trees produced by the FTA and the CCA would. give 
substantial information on the probability of occurence of 
such an event and its consequences. This will help 
deciding if more preventive and protective measures should 
be introduced in the process. 
2.EVALUATION OF METHODS. 
It is clear from the brief descriptions already given in 
Chapter 3 that most of the methods of hazard analysis are 
dissimilar except Fault Tree Analysis and Cause 
Consequence Analysis which complement one another and will 
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be evaluated under the same heading. 	Although 	the 
procedures are very different, the principles upon which 
the methods are based and the objectives of the techniques 
are alike. Each aims to identify aspects of the design 
which are unacceptable and require to be modified. Thus 
each aims to help to ensure the safety of the personnel 
and the plant. 
The basis upon which the methods were evaluated is 
subjective, being based on "hands on experience gained 
during their use in studying the near-miss events. The 
following criteria where chosen: 
a)The understanding of the process required 
ease of application, and 
c)The time required to carry out the analyses. 
2.1 Understanding Of The Process Required. 
The first criterion upon which the evaluation was based 
was the understanding of the process which the analyst 
required before the analysis could begin. This is directly 
dependent on the level of detail into whi.h the method 
itself goes. 
The more detailed methods, like PTA and CCA, require a 
greater understanding of the system before the study can 
begin. The understanding required of the analysis 
technique to be used is discussed in subsection 2.2. 
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2.1.1 Hand Index. 
The analyst needs to be acquainted with the general 
design parameters of the process being studied. As the 
method is a rapid ranking tool, the analyst can use 
approximations of various factors without seriously 
affecting the outco ne. The detailed information that the 
Mond Index needs can be easily obtained from the design 
specifications. 
2.1.2 FMEA. 
The understanding of the process required by the analyst 
before an FMEA is begun is dependent on the indenture 
level at which the system is studied. At high levels, at 
for example the failure of whole systems, the analyst 
needs to understand how the system interacts with the 
other systems on the plant. Drawing functional dependency 
diagrams is a useful way of. gaining this knowledge. 
Where the failure of instruments is being studied, the 
analyst must know what types of devices are being used and 
the ways in which they can fail. The FMEA of the near-miss 
events required such knowledge. During the study I 
constantly refered to the operating manual. 
2.1.3 FTA and CCA. 
The analyst requires an intimate knowledge of the system 
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and the operating procedures used to control the process. 
The breadth of knowledge required is dependent on the top 
event or events which are to be investigated. 
This understanding of the system can be gained by 
studying the piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs), 
the design specifications, the operating procedures and 
the system description manual. Where an existing system is 
studied, a visit to the process and discussion with the 
operators are invaluable. 
2.2 Ease Of Application. 
The second criterion used to evaluate the methods of 
hazard analysis used in this study was the ease with which 
the techniques could be applied during the design phase of 
a plant project. 
This criterion is based on the understanding of the 
method required before it can be used. It is also based on 
my experience of using each method in this study. 
2.2.1 Mond Index. 
In general, points schemes do not require the user to 
have a detailed understanding of the principles inherent 
in the approach they adopt. For example, the user does not 
need to understand why an index is calculated in the way 
it is. The analyst needs only to be conversant with its 
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use and can become so by proceeding step by step through 
the technical manual. However, when dividing the plant 
into unit much attention should be paid since this could 
influence the final results. 
2.2.2 FMEA. 
The most definitive document available on FMEA is the 
MIL-STD-1692A from which the procedure described in 
Appendix C.2 was written. Although many papers have been 
published on the use of FMEA in the nuclear industry by 
Taylor of Riso, the method has not been used extensively 
in the petrochemical industry. 
The procedure described in Appendix C.2 was found to be 
readily applicable to the investigation of near-miss 
events. The standard forms which are completed ensure that 
the study is adequately documented. This also assists the 
review of the analysis by an independent analyst. 
Appendix C.2 recommends that functional dependency 
diagrams (FDDs) be drawn for each sub-system studied. 
However I found that it was more helpful to redraw the 
piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs) as these are 
themselves FDDs. 
2.2.3 FTA and CCA. 
An analyst must have a detailed understanding of FTA and 
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CCA before begining an analysis of a complex system. It is 
very easy to make logical errors which may be the result 
of an inadequate understanding of the process or of the 
techniques. 
It is also difficult to model a dynamic system using a 
fault tree diagram as the state of the system is 
constantly changing. The use of inhibit gates helps to 
overcome this problem by allowing the analyst to specify 
the extent of the failure before the top event can occur. 
The difficulty of modelling the system is lessened if 
the analysis is qualitative and is restricted to the study 
of failure paths. The assumptions that are made must be 
documented particularly those relating to the intervention 
of the operator to rectify faults. 
2.3 Time Required. 
In the following sub-sections estimates are given for 
the amount of time required to become familiar with the 
method of analysis and the system to be analysed, and 
thirdly for the time required to carry out the study. 
2.3.1 Mond Index. 
The application of the Mond Index can be learnt in two 
working days and experienced users would be able to carry 
out a calculation in less than an hour. This however 
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depends on having all the information required on hand 
when calculating the Index. A design engineer who is 
familiar with the technique would be able to carry out the 
calculation in the same time, perhaps even less as he is 
already acquainted with the design specification. 
It can take longer to carry out an analysis of existing 
plant because the design information must be sought out 
first. These data are generally not readily available. 
2.3.2 FMEA. 
An FMEA is often used by an analyst to gain a better 
understanding of a system. The analyst need not therefore 
spend a lot of time to gain an understanding of the 
process before starting the analysis. Approximately three 
working days would suffice. He does however require to 
have a good background understanding of devices used in 
the system. 
The description and FMEA procedure set out in Appendix 
C.2 explains the basic principles of FMEA. It would take 
about a week to become familiar with FMEA. 
The amount of time required to carry out the analysis is 
dependent on the detail to which the analyst studies the 
process. I estimate that the analysis of a specific 
near-miss event would take one working day. A further day 
should be allowed for report writing. 
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Again I think that an engineer who is familiar with the 
method and the system could complete the study in less 
time. 
2.3.3 FTA and CCA. 
Like FMEA, there are few practical descriptions of how 
to carry out FTA or CCA. Appendices C.3 and C.4 bring 
together the basic principles that the engineer must be 
familiar with before attempting to carry out an FTA or 
CCA. It would take 7 working days to become familiar with 
each technique. 
FTA and CCA require a thorough knowledge of the process 
which is to be studied. This takes a minimum of two weeks 
and further study of the system may be needed as the 
analysis is completed. 
The objectives of the FTA and CCA will affect the amount 
of time the analysis would take to complete. If the 
analysis is qualitative four weeks should be sufficient. A 
quantitative study requires the collection of data and 
also requires greater accuracy of the trees and diagrams. 
This could take over seven weeks to complete. A point that 
is easily overlooked is that it takes quite some time to 
draw the trees or diagrams. 
3. RECOMMENDED USE OF METHODS. 
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The scope and use of each method of analysis used in the 
study is discussed in the following sub-sections. Should 
an engineer wish to use an alternative method to those 
discussed here, the review of method analysis in Chapter 3 
may be of some use. 
3.1 Mond Index. 
The Mend Index could be used to identify weakness in 
existing processes which require attention. It may however 
be more cost-effective for a company to develop a rapid 
ranking points scheme for its own use. This type of 
in-house scheme can be written so as to reflect company 
policy and can be used to review existing processes as 
well as those that are being designed. 
It may be used to evaluate alternative protection 
strategies by assessing the way each mitigates the risk 
inherent to the process. 
The Mond Index could also be used at the preliminary 
stages of design to compare alternative process designs. 
The chosen process would however require to be studied in 
more detail during the later stages of the design. 
3.2 FMEA. 
FMEA is a useful fundamental method of analysis whose 
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principles can be applied by the user to study the causes 
and effects of failures in any system or process. FMEA is 
a tool which enables the user to identify the hazards 
inherent in a process, and to assess the way in which 
these hazards may cause the occurence of hazardous events. 
FMEA can be oriented to the failure of equipment or 
consider the failure of the operator. 
Although FMEA is a laborious method, if it is carried 
out during the design, the analysis should not delay the 
progress of the project. Care must be taken to review any 
modifications in the design as the conclusions of the FMEA 
may be annulled by these design changes. 
FMEA is also a useful aid to more detailed analyses. such 
as Fault Tree Analysis or Cause-Consequence Analysis. The 
FMEA can be used to help to discriminate between minor 
problems and those which require thorough investigation. 
3.3 FTA And CCA. 
FTA or CCA should be used to study problems which have 
been identified during less detailed analysis such as one 
cai'ried out using FMEA. 
FTA and CCA are time consuming and difficult, and the 
analysis may need to be carried out by an experienced 
analyst in preference to the design engineer. For example, 
the complexity of the system to be modelled may prevent 
the design engineer from carrying out the analysis as he 
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has neither the time nor the experience needed. Where a 
problem requires to be investigated using FTA or CCA, the 
analysis should be started at the earliest possible 
opportunity. An analysis which is begun at a late stage in 
the design may result in the project being delayed or 
modification having to be made during rather than before 
the construction phase. As the resulting financial 
penalties incurred are great, the engineer should ensure 
that the hazard analysis begins when the design process 
starts. 
Where a quantitative analysis must be carried out, FTA 
or CCA are the obvious choice as these methods lend 
themselves to this form of analysis. It is a popular 
misconception however that fault trees or 
cause-consequence diagrams must be quantified. In many 
cases the decisions reached by a visual inspection of the 
diagrams by an experienced engineer are likely to be the 
same as those decisions which have a quantitative basis. 
These are instances where the design engineer is 
required to justify the inclusion of additional safety 
measures to senior managment. Fault trees or 
cause-consequence diagrams can be used by the engineer to 
illustrate the value of the proposed measures. These 
diagrams can be readily understood by senior personnel who 
may be unfamiliar with the process. 
Where 	the process system is to be controlled by 
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computer, the computer specialists also model the system. 
Considerable duplication of effort could be avoided if the 
hazard analyst were to work alongside the computer 
specialists. 
4. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS. 
There is considerable resistance by the 	Algerian 
petrochemical and gas industry in carrying out quantified 
hazard analysis. There are mainly two reasons. 
-Firstly, quantified hazard analysis is restricted on 
the grounds that the models used are incomplete and 
that the basic failure rate data are unavailable or 
unapplicable. These reasons will steadilly diminish in 
importance as failure rate data are obtained, modelling 
tools improve, and computer controlled systems are 
developed. 
-Secondly, the potential financial losses in the oil 
industry motivate most companies to ensure that the 
acceptable risks are kept to a minimum. In most cases 
where a problem has been identified, oil companies are 
prepared to spend money to rectify them. Every 
improvement in financial loss 	prevention 	has 	a 
commensurate effect on life safety. 
Whilst such hostility 	to quantified hazard analysis 
remains in the oil 	industry, proponents of hazard analysis 
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should emphasize the value of qualitative analysis as a 
design tool. The introduction of these methods together 
with other developments will in time lead to an acceptance 
of quantitative techniques. 
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AE'PENDIX A 
LIST OF ABREVIATIONS - 
API 	American Petroleum Institute 
AS 	Air Supply 
ASH 	Gas Detector 
ATMOS. 	Atmosphere 
BL 	Base Line 
BNOC 	British National Oil Corporation (now Britoil) 
BP 	British Petroleum Plc. 
BV 	Breather Valve 
BW 	Butt Weld 
CCA Cause Consequence Analysis. 
CCC Cause Consequence Charts. 
C.INS Cold Insulation 
CW Cooling Water 
DG Draft Gauge 
DP Dew Protection 
ESS 	Emergency Shutdown System 
ETA 	Event Tree Analysis 
FC 	Fail Closed 
FDD 	Functional DependencyDiagram 
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FDT Fractional Dead Time 
FMEA Failure Mode And Effect Analysis 
Fail Open 
FSV Flow Safety Valve 
FTA Fault Tree Analysis 
FTET Fault Tree Event Tree 
HAZOP 	Hazard And Operability Study 
HCV 	Hand Control Valve 
HH 	Very High 
H..L 	High And Low 
HSS 	High Signal Selector 
H.INS 	Hot Insulation 
101 	Imperial Chemical Industries 
IFAL 	Instantaneous Fractidnal Annual Loss 
LAH High Level Alarm 
LAHH Extra High Level Alarm 
LAL Low Level Alarm 
LALL Extra Low Level Alarm 
LCV Level Control Valve 
LGR Level Glass Reflex. 
LGT Level Glass Transparent 
LI Level Indicator 
LL Very Low 
LSH High Level Switch 
LSHH Extra High Level Switch 
LSL Low Level Switch 
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LSLL 	Extra Low Level Switch 
LSS 	Low Signal Selector 
LT 	Level Transmitter 
MANU. 	Manual 
MAX. Maximum 




NC 	Normal Close 
NFPA 	National Fire Protection Association (USA) 
NL 	Normal Level 
NRV 	None Return Valve (also called FSV) 
OPEC 	Organisation Of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
PAH 	High Pressure Alarm 
PAHH 	Extra high Pressure Alarm 
PAL 	Low Pressure Alarm 
PALL 	Extra Low Pressure Alarm 
PB 	Push Button 
PCV 	Pressure Control Valve 
PDCV 	Differencial Pressure Control Valve 
PDIC 	Differencial Pressure Indicator And Controller 
PDR 	Differencial Pressure Recorder 
PG 	Pressure Gauge 
P1 	Pressure Indicator 
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PlC Pressure Indicator And Controller 
PP Personnel Protection 
PSH High Pressure Switch 
PSHH Extra High Pressure Switch 
PSL Low Pressure Switch 
PSLL Extra Low Pressure Switch 
PSV Pressure Safety Valve 
PSX Pressure Switch 
FT Pressure Transmitter 
P&ID Piping And Instrumentation Diagrams 
RL Running Lamp 
SAC 	Safety Analysis Checklist 
SAFE 	Safety Analysis Function Evaluation Chart 
SAT 	Safety Analysis Table 
SR 	Split Range 
SW 	Switch 
TLV 	Threshold Limit Value 
TW 	Therino Well 
IJCL 	Unit Control Logic 
VB 	Vortex Breaker 
XV 	Shutdown Valve 
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APEENDIX B - 1 
ELIANT DESCRIE'TION 
1. INTRODUCTION. 
The Module Processing Plant (MPP) has been designed for 
the recovery of heavy hydrocarbons (condensates and LPG) 
from the raw gas coming from Hassi RMel gas field and 
producing treated gas (sale gas or reinjection gas). 
The MPP is composed of three trains of treatment. They 
all have the same process equipment and the same daily 
production capacity of 60*10ES Sni3 of treated gas per day 
(S stands for Standard, meaning 15'C/ bar absolute). 
The liquid hydrocarbons recovered in the high pressure 
separation sections are separated into LPG and condensates 
in the fractioning section and then piped to central 
storage and transfer facilities (CSTF). 
2.RAW GAS AND PRODUCTS SPECIFICATIONS. 
2.1 Inlet Gas Specifications. 
This plant has been designed to process a raw gas with 








































Saturated at 310 barG and 90'C 
iii)Temperature. 
Mm: 45'C (Winter operation) 
Max: 65'C (Normal operation) 
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iv)Pressure. 
Mm: 100 bars G 
Max: 140 bars G 
The actual flow rate of raw gas to the plant has not 
been stated precisely. However, the plant was designed to 
process 64.9*10E6 Sm3/day of raw material which will give 
the products listed in subsection 2.2 
2.2 Products Specifications. 
Under normal operating conditions the products will have 
the following specifications: 
i)Sale Gas 
Composition. 

















-6'C (max) at 80.5 bars G 
50 vol.ppm (max) 
9350 Kcal/m3 (mm) 
9450 Kcal/in3 (max) 
(evaluated at 15'C, ibar A) 
0.5% niol (max) 
60'C (max) 




3% mol (max) 
C5+ content: 	0.4% mol (max) 
iii)C5± (condensates) 
Reid vapour tension:10 psia (max) 
3.PROCESS DESCRIPTION. 
This process is characterised by the utilisation of 
Turbo-expanders for the maximum liquid hydrocarbons 
recovery. The main advantage in using a Turbo-expander is 
that the expansion will be isentropic and the temperature 
obtained will be lower than the one which is obtained if 
an adiabatic expansion, through a Joule-Thomson Valve 
(JTV), is performed. The turbine recovers energy from the 
gas and uses it to drive a compressor which will 
recompress the product gas to the sale gas pressure. This 
means that with the Turbo-expander the high pressure gas 
will be expanded to lower pressures than with a JTV. 
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The low temperature gas (-40'C)from the Turbo-expander 
is used to cool the raw gas. No external refrigeration 
system is needed. 
The water contained in the raw gas causes hydrate 
formation at low temperature which could raise the losses 
by friction in the heat exchangers or plug the tubes or 
canalisations. To avoid this happening, a solution of 
mono-ethylene glycol is injected at those points of the 
process where there is a risk of hydrate formation (mainly 
heat exchangers). 
3.1 High Pressure Separation Section. 
3.1.1 Generalities. 
In this section the raw gas is cooled in order to 
condense its heavy constituents and to improve its 
qualities. It first passes through the aerorefrigerant 
(E101), then the gas/gas heat exchangers and finally the 
Turbo-expander. 
The treated gas goes to the transfer section after being 
compressed in the compressor side of the Turbo-expander 
(KiOl) to the tranfer line pressure and the liquid 
hydrocarbons are sent to the fractioning section where 
they are separated into LPG and condensates. 
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3.1.2 Fluid circulation in the process. 
The distribution drum (DOOl) divides the raw gas (mixed 
phase) collected from the wells into three equal streams. 
The stream entering each train is first cooled in the 
aerorefrigerant (E101) to 48.9 'C , then it goes to the 
admission separation drum where the condensed liquids and 
the water are separated from the gas. The water is sent to 
the blow down section through the flare separation drum 
(D404) and the separator SPI (S409). 
The gas from the admission separation drum (DiOl) is 
first cooled to -6.7'C in the gas/gas exchangers (E102 and 
E103) and expanded through the Joule-Thomson Valve 
PRC-108, then it heads for the final high pressure 
separation drum (D102) where it is separated from the 
liquid condensates and the hydrated glycol solution. To 
avoid hydrates formation in the gas/gas heat exchangers 
(E102 and E103), a solution of glycol is injected in the 
gas stream. Having absorbed the water, the glycol 
solution, separated from the liquid hydrocarbons in the 
final high pressure separator is sent under pressure to 
the glycol regeneration section. 
The gas leaving the final high pressure separator (D102) 
is isentropically expanded in a turbo-expander (KiOl) in 
order to lower its temperature. - The liquid hydrocarbons 
produced by this expansion are separated from the gas in 
the medium pressure separator (D103). 
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Glycol solution is injected at the turbo-expander 
suction to avoid hydrate formation and to remove the 
maximum amount of water from the gas. The hydrated glycol 
solution is then separated from the liquid condensates in 
the medium pressure separator and sent under pressure to 
the glycol regeneration unit. 
The gas passes through the shell side of the gas/gas 
heat exchangers where it cools down the incoming raw gas, 
then heads for the transfer section as sale gas. 
The 	liquid hydrocabons collected in the admission 
separator circulate towards the rich condensate separator 
0105) where the light constituents are rectified 
(evaporated).The stabilised liquid will constitute the 
bottom feed of the de-ethanizer (C101). 
The liquid hydrocarbons collected in the final high 
pressure and the medium pressure separators (D102 and 
D103) are sent the low pressure separator where the light 
constituents are rectified. The stabilized liquid will 
constitute the top feed of the de-ethanizer (C101). 
The gas from the low pressure separator (D104) and the 
gas from the de-ethanizer reflux drum are mixed and sent 
to the shell side of the gas/gas heat exchanger (E103). 
Then joined by the gas from the rich condensate separator 
(D105), they head for the recompression section where 
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their pressure is raised to the sale gas pressure. 
The gas from the rich condensate separator (D105) being 
at a relatively high temperature contains a large quantity 
of water and, therefore, will influence the gas water 
content if reinjected in the gas stream. For this reason 
it is recommended to use it as fuel gas. 
3.1.3 Main control points. 
The following variables constitute the main control 
points in this section: 
a)The outlet gas temperature in 	the 	admission 
aero-refrigerant (E101): 
This temperature is maintained at 48.9'C by the 
TIC-101 which varies the angle of the fan blades to 
control the amount of air flowing through the heat 
exchanger. 
b)The pressure in the final high pressure separator 
(D102): 
This pressure is maintained at a constant level by 
the PRC-108 since a pressure of 100 barG at the 
suction of the turbo-expander is required for a 
maximum liquid recovery. 
c)The oulet temperature of the gas at the gas/gas 
heat exchangers (E102 and E103): 
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The outlet tube side temperatures are regulated by 
varying the shell side gas flow rate in response to 
the signals emitted by feedback from TRC-102 or 
TIC- 124 
d)Raw gas flow rate. 
It is the FRC-101 (Flow Recorder and Controller), 
which by varying the blades angle of the 
turbo-expander regulates the raw gas flow rate. 
e)Fressure in the rich condensate separator (D105): 
PIC-116 maintains this pressure at 32.4 barG. 
f)Pressure in the low pressure separator (D104): 
PIC-115 keeps this pressure at a constant value of 
34.2 barG. 
In 	order 	to protect the equipment from abnormal 
occurences, the high separation section has been fitted 
with pressure and temperature controllers calibrated at 
values that can not be changed: 
-PICA-139 (admission separator DiOl): 
Closes when the pressure reaches 150 kg/cni2. 
-PIC-101 (admission separator D101): 
Open when the pressure reaches 153 kg/cm2. 
-PIC-114 (admission separator DiOl): 
Open when the pressure reaches 153 kg/cni2. 
-TIC-124 (gas/gas heat-exchangers E102): 
Open shell side by-pass if the temperature is 
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lower than -40'C even if it receives the signal 
"close from the TRC-102 (tube side temperature 
regulator). That will maintain the temperature 
at a constant level. 
3.2 Distillation Section. 
3.2.1 Generalities. 
The liquid hydrocarbons recovered in the high pressure 
separation section are split up into LPG and condensate in 
the debutanizer (C102) after being relieved from their 
light constituents in the de-ethanizer (C101). The latter 
consists of 28 trap trays, 12 in the upper section and 16 
in the lower section separated by an accumulation tray. To 
avoid hydrates formation in the column a glycol solution 
is injected in the reflux line. The mixture collected in 
the accumulation tray is sent to the hydrocarbons/glycol 
separator where a total separation occurs. The liquid 
hydrocarbons are then pumped back to the column under the 
accumulation tray and the glycol solution send to the 
glycol regeneration unit. 
The feed enters the column at the 5th and the 21st 
trays. The 6th and the 19th are designed to be used as 
feed trays if the gas composion is to vary. The 
debutanizer consists of 32 trap trays of which the 21st is 
the feed tray. 
157 
3.2.2 Fluid circulation in the process. 
i)De-ethanizer: 
The 	liquid 	hydrocarbons 	from the low pressure 
separator (D104) is pre-heated in the reflux heat 
exchanger (E106) then feeds the column at the 5th tray. 
The 	liquid hydrocabons from the rich condensate 
separator (D105) are pre-heated in the feed 	heat 
exchanger (E104) and enter the column at the 21st tray. 
The gas leaving the column from the top passes through 
the reflux heat exchanger (E106), is partially condensed 
(T-23C) and then goes to the reflux drum where it is 
separated from the liquids. To avoid hydrate formation 
in the ElOS and to remove the maximum amount of water, 
glycol solution is injected in the gas stream when it 
leaves the column. 
The gas heads then for the recompressiOn section while 
the pressure in the reflux drum (D107) is regulated by 
the PIC-123. 
The hydrated glycol solution is sent under pressure to 
the glycol 	regeneration 	unit 	while 	the 	liquid 
hydrocarbons are pumped back, under flow control 
(FIC-127), to the first tray of the column by the P103. 
To avoid hydrate formation in the top section of the 
column, glycol solution is injected down stream from the 
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pumps discharge pipe. 
The liquid descending from the top trays is collected 
in the accumulation tray from where it flows out under 
gravity to the hydrocarbons/glycol separator (DiOB). The 
hydrocarbons are separated from the glycol and pumped 
back to the column by the P102 under the accumulation 
tray. The glycol solution is sent under pressure to the 
regeneration unit. 
A fraction of the liquid accumulated in the bottom 
section of the column is pressurised by the P101 and 
sent to the reboiler under flow control (FIC-136). The 
reboiler (HiOl) heats up the liquid to a temperature of 
about 240'C and vaporises it to 50% by weight. This 
mixture heads back to the bottom of the de-ethanizer. 
The remaining part of liquid will constitute the feed of 
the debutanizer. It flows away under the action of 
FIC-128 and LIC-117 (in cascade). 
ii)Debutanizer. 
The gas from the top is totally liquified in the 
ref lux aero-refr igerant (E108) before entering the 
reflux accumulator drum 0108). A fraction of this 
liquid is pumped back to the first tray at the top of 
the column, by the P105, as reflux and its flow rate is 
controlled by the FRC-143. The remaining liquid is sent 
product LPG to the storage and transfer section. 
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If the LPG does not conform to the specifications 
(analysed in the gaseous phase by the chromatographe 
AR-101), the LIC-128 AV closes and the LIC-128 BV open 
so that the LPG will be sent to the off-spec storage 
sphere. 
A fraction of the bottom product is sent under 
pressure (P104) to the reboiler. The flow rate is 
controled by the FIC-144. The liquid hydrocarbons after 
being heated to a temperature of 263'C and partially 
vaporised (50% wt) in the furnace are sent back to the 
bottom part of the column. 
The remaining fraction is extracted as condensates, 
under level control by the LIC-126, and sent to the 
storage section after being cooled down to 48.9C in 
the heat exchanger (E104) and the aero-refrigerant 
(E107). 
3.2.3 Main control points. 
The following variables constitute the main control 
points in this section: 
i) De-ethanizer (C101). 
a)Pressure: 
The pressure in the de-ethanizer is maintained at a 
value of 26.4 kg/cm2G by the PIC-123 which regulate the 
amount of vapours from the reflux drum 0107). 
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b)Top feed temperature: 
The top feed temperature is a function of the amount 
of heat transfer occuring in the reflux heat exchanger 
(ElOS). The quantity of heat transfer is controled by 
the heat exchanger by-pass valve LIC-123V on the tube 
side which responds to the signal from the LIC-123. In 
other words, when the level in the reflux drum (D107) is 
low, the LIC-123 send the signal to close the LIC-123V. 
As a result the amount of heat transfer will rise 
leading to a rise in level up to the required value. 
c)Bottom feed temperature: 
The bottom feed temperature is conditioned by the 
amountof heat transferred in the bottom feed •heat 
exchanger. This temperature is controlled by the TIC-104 
which acts on the shell side by-pass. The prescribed 
value is maintained by opening or closing this valve. 
d)Reflux flow rate: 
The FIC-127 at the discharge of the pumps P103 
regulate the reflux flow rate. 
e)Flow rate to the reboiler: 
The flow of liquids to the reboiler is regulated by 
the FIC-136 positioned at the discharge of the reboiler 
pumps P101. 
f)Reboiler outlet temperature: 
...161 - 
This temperature is controled by regulating the fuel 
gas flow rate with TRC-109. 
ii)Debutanizer. 
a )Pressure: 
The following drawings explain the pressure regulation 
in the debutanizer. 
Partial condensation in the DiOS. 
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b)Reflux flow rate: 
The FIC-143 at the discharge of the pumps P105 
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regulate the reflux flow rate. 
c)Flow rate to the reboiler: 
The flow of liquids to the reboiler is regulated by 
the FIC-144 positioned on the discharge line of the 
reboiler pumps P104. 
d)Reboiler outlet temperature: 
TRC-114 regulates the reboiler outlet temperature by 
acting on the fuel gas flow rate. 
4. REMAINING SECTIONS. 
In all process plants, beside the main production unit 
or units, there are the secondary or support unit. A 
brief description of these units which constitute the 
MPP 4 is given below: 
4.1 Condensats degasification and LPG storage 	and 
transfer section. 
Two spheres and three storage tanks, -with a storage 
capacity of 48 hours production (LPG and condensates), 
are provided all with their support equipment (pumps, 
compressors etc.). 
4.2 Glycol regeneration units. 
Two glycol regeneration units are installed in the 
plant. On normal operation, one of the two is on 
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operating mode while the other is on standby. A unit 
'storage of glycol' and a unit 'glycol injection pumps' 
are respectively the upstream and the downstream units 
with regard to the regeneration units. 
4.3 Low pressure gases recompression section. 
A compression system has been designed to recompress 
all the low pressure gases produced in the low 
temperature and pressure separation sections of the 
trains, and the distillation sections of the trains. 
This unit comprise two centrifugale compressors driven 
by a gas turbines and with a daily compression capacity 
of 5 1 000,000 Sm3 each. Under normal operating 
conditions, one is on operation while the other is 
maintained on standby. 
4.5 Combustible gas unit. 
The 	gases 	recuperated from the rich condensate 
separation drum D105 have a high water content which 
prevent from processing them with the gases from the 
other stages of separation. The best way to use them is 
as fuel gas. They are collected in the fuel gas unit and 
sent back to different parts of the process. 
4.7 Utilities. 
The utilities are composed by: 
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-A water treatment section which provide the process 
with, cooling water (e.g. for pumps bearings), water for 
maintenance purposes and water for domestic use 
(showers, drink etc.). 
-An air instrument and air service section which covers 
all the needs of the proces s in this area. 
-Inert gas is also produced onsite in the inerte gas 
section. 
-The 	electrical 	power 	section 	composed 	by two 
sub-stations which contain the electrical transformers 
and equipment switches. 
-A flare and dumping sections with three high pressure, 
a medium pressure and a low pressure relief flares and a 
burn pit to burn eventually the liquid hydrocarbons. 
i65_ 
APPENDIX 2. 
LIST OF DIAGRAMS. 
General Plot Plan. 
Operational Flow Diagram. 
Piping Symbols. 
P&IDs for "Gas Admission" Section. 
P&IDs for "High Pressure Separation" Section. 
P&IDs for "Compressor Expander" Section. 
P&IDs for "Low Pressure Separation" Section. 
P&IDs for "Deethanizer Section 1. 
P&IDs for "Deethanizer" Section 2. 
P&IDs for "Debutanizer" Section. 
11. P&IDs for "Glycol Regeneration" Section. 
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2 
PIPING SY&S SY!IES If TUYA(JTERIE 
-vAIV(A PASSAGE DIRECT AIR CYLINIfR OPERATED VALVE 
GLOBE VALVE ROBINET A SOUPAPE CONTROL VALVE WITH LIMIT SWITCH 
CHECK VALVE CLAPET DE RETENUE CONTROL VALVE WITH VALVE 
POSITION TRANSMITTER 
BUTTELY VALVE VANNE A PAPIU.ON MANUAL OPEN-CLOSE (SIDE HANDLE) 
MU. TYPE COCK VALVE ROBI NET A BOISSEAU A B I LLE 
MANUAL OPEN-CLOSE (TOP HANDLE) 
N 
NEEDLE VALVE VANNE A POINTEAU 
PRESSURE REGULATOR F 
ANG LE VALVE VANJ( DANGLE (SELF CONTAINED) 
PRESSURE REDUCING REGULATOR 
THREE HA Y VALVE VANNE A TROtS VOICS (DIRECT CONNECTED) 
, RELIEF OR SAFETY VALVE SOUPAPE DE SURETE 
.LDIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE REGULATOR 
OR DOUBLE DIAPHRAGM VALVE 
F 
$ 
NETERIF$ COCK VALVE VANNE NESURANTE A BOISSEAU FAILURE ACTION 
- LINE SIZE CHANGE (REDUCER) EVASENE NT (REDUCTION) SEUUENCE CONTROL FUNCTION O R F 
COMPUTING FUNCTION F 
FLANGE CONNECTION RACCORD A BRIDE LOCALLY MOUNTED FUNCTION F 
-H 
- HOSE CON(CTION RACCORD POUR TUYA'J 	FLEXIBLE 	- PANEL MOUNTED INSTRUMENT AT I 
- MAIN CONTROL ROOM 
NOZZLE WITH BLIND FLANGE TUBIJLURE A BRIDE PLEINE .iiY PANEL MOUNTED INSTRUMENT AT I 
UTILITY CONTROL ROOM C 
RESISTANCE TE1ERATURE DETECTOR DETECTEUR DE TEMPERATURE A RESISTANCE 
INSTRUNENT ON LOCAL PANEL I 
V DR I TYPE STRAINER FILTRE EN Y OU I 
' INSTRUNENT TRANSMITTER 1 
_--.... CONICAL STRAINER FILTRE COMIQUE 
 PROCESS & UTILITY PIPING 
LINE TRACE (ELECTRIC HEATER) RECHAUFFAGE ELECTRIQUE 
--- INSTRUNENT ELECTRICAL LEAD C 
OPEN DRAIN SYSTEM SYSTEI( DE DRAINAGE OUVERT 
PNEUMATIC LINES (GAS OR AIR) C 
Jt RUPTURE DISC DISQUE DE RUPTURE INSTRLP(NT CAPILLARY TIJBI* I 
RESTRICTION ORIFICE ORIFICE DE RESTRICTION -1 H -- DRAIN TRAP F 
CONTINUATION QF 	-.WING4- CONTINUATION DLI PLAN 
....{}........ FLOW ELEMENT TURBINE C 
( V FLOW ELEMENT - ORIFICE F1.MGE BRANCHEMENT POUR DEBITMETRE - 3RIDE A ORIFICE 
-_ FLOW ELEMENT INTEGRAL ORIFICE 
Nf 	l FLOW ELEMENT - VENTURI BRANCHEMENT POUR DEBITMETRE - VENTURI ..4....... SPECTACLE BLIND (NORMAL OPEN) 
(3) FLOW ELEMENT VOLUMETRIC . DEBITMETRE VOLUMETRIQUE 
_. SPECTACLE BLIND (NORMAL CLOSE) 
FLOW ELEMENT AREA TYPE ROTAMETRE [ft 
AE CCOLER I 
FLOW ELEMENT(PITOT )uBE OR BRANCHEMENT D'UN TUBE DE PIlOT OU ANNULAIRE 
ANNULAR) 
U SP 	IAL EC- C SIGHT GLASS VITREDE REGARD 
n GLYCOL DRAIN 
y
(-S VIDANGE BE GLYCOL 
a CHOKE 	VALVE 	 - 
PURGE COIECTION RACCORD POUR PURGE - -. - 
DIAPHRAGM OPERATtD VALVE SOUPAPE A DIAPHRAGI( UIAFHRACM 	VALVE 
_<. MOTOR OPERATED VALVE SOUPAPE COANDEE PAR MOTEUR 
AIR MOTOR OPERATED VALVE SOUPAPE CONNANDEE PAR MOTEUR A AIR 
SOLENOID OPERATED VALVE SOIJPAP€ A COANDE PAR SOLENOIDE 
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APFENDIX C - 1 
REVIEW OF THE MOND FIRE AND 
EXFLIOSION INDEX.. 
1. INTRODUCTION. 
The Mond Fire and Explosion Index has been developed by 
Dr D.J. LEWIS formerly ICI Mond Division. The idea for a 
point scheme to be used in the petrochemical industry 
originated in Factory Mutual Inc. The first index to be 
published was that developed by the Dow corporation (1), 
and it is from this method that the Mond Index was 
developed. 
1.1 Philosophy Of The Mond Index. 
The Mond Index is a rapid hazard assessment method for 
use on chemical plant or in plant design. The philosophy 
of the Mond Index is to assign points to the aspect of the 
process which contribute to the hazard and safety of the 
plant. It produces a numerical, ranking for each section of 
the plant based upon the properties of materials present, 
quantity, operating conditions and type of process. Scales 
are provided to convert the rankings into qualitative 
descriptions of the hazard potential of each unit. The 
Index is primarily concerned with fire and explosion 
problems. Toxicity is considered only as a possible 
-178- 
complicating factor. The method gives credits for plant 
safety features associated with both hardware and the 
software. 
The index has been designed to suit the needs of ICI 
Mond Division, who manufacture a wide range of chemicals, 
and their process plant is not enclosed. LEWIS has 
extended the method to cover storage areas as well as 
chemical plants, and the method has been used successfully 
to calculate the plant spacing requirements (3). 
2. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE MOND INDEX. 
Initially the plant is divided into a number of units 
which are then assessed individually. Each unit is 
assessed by a three-stage procedure. Page 1 of the 
standard form (a set of blank calculation sheets has been 
included at the end of this chapter) provides space to 
record the location of the plant and the particular unit 
being assessed, the material contained in the unit and any 
other relevant information in addition to the process 
operating conditions of temperature and pressure. 
The first stage considers the unit in a basic form with 
the minimum of controls required for normal operation. 
This gives a worst case assessment. To begin this stage 
the dominant hazardous material is identified and its 
material factor calculated. The material factor is a 
measure of the energy content per unit weight of material 
_179. 
present and provides a numerical base for the indices. 
However, this base will be modified by many other 
considerations, such as: 
Any special material properties which may enhance the 
potential hazard 
The effects of the type of process 
The effects of the process conditions 
The quantities involved 
Relevant plant layout features, and 
Material toxicity. 
Each of these sections is sub-divided to cover the 
individual aspects for which penalty factors may be 
assigned. 
After all the factors have been allocated the indices 
are calculated and their categories recorded. It should be 
noted that these represent the worst case assessment. 
The second stage in the assessment of the unit is a 
review of the factors contributing to the initial indices. 
This gives an opportunity to reconsider any of the 
penalties assigned earlier or to seek more precise data 
about materials in use or about plant conditions. The 
review is unnecessary if, for example, the conditions and 
materials were well known from the start or if the rating 
obtained is satisfactory even though pessimistic data 
where used. 
The third stage is the offsetting. This considers those 
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features which, if correctly maintained, will help to 
reduce either the magnitude of an incident or will 
diminish the likelihood of an incident starting. Such 
features are assigned values of less than one. Formulae 
are provided to allow reduced values of the indices to be 
calculated. This final, lower assessment represents: 
"The hazard potential of the unit in the condition as 
studied 	with 	all 	the safety systems and other 
preventive measures operational in the designed mode." 
(4). 
3. INDEX CALCULATION PROCEDURE. 
This description of the procedure will follow the 
aproach specified in the technical manual (2). In order to 
simplify the calculation procedure I have developed a 
computer program which is shown at the end of this 
Appendix. 
3.1 Division Of A Plant Into Units. 
The boundaries of the unit to be studied must be 
defined, and are best identified by the valves which 
isolate the unit from upstream and downstream processes. 
All the pipework between the isolation valves is 
considered in the review of the unit. 
Apart from being physically 	separated 	from 	the 
neighbouring units (o.r potentially separable) a unit is 
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also likely to differ in the nature of the operation 
carried out, the materials it contains or the operating 
conditions in the unit. 
3.2 Selection Of The Dominant Material. 
The dominant (key) material is that compound or mixture 
in the unit which, due to its inherent properties and the 
quantity present, provides the greatest potential for an 
energy release by combustion, explosion or exothermic 
reaction. 
3.3 Calculation Of The Material Factor: B 
The first step in a Mond index assessment is the 
calculation of the material factor for the key material 
present in the unit. The material factor is a quantitative 
measure of the energy release potential of the key 
material by fire or explosion. It is based on the 
properties and possible reactions of the key material in 
its normal state at ambient temperature. In most instances 
it is combustion in air that gives the greatest energy 
release and hence the highest value of B. 
3.4 Special Material Hazards: M 
This section takes into account any special properties 
of the key material which may affect either the nature of 
an incident or the likelihood of its occurence. The 
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material is considered under the conditions normally 
existing within the unit; thus the factors assigned in 
this section may vary from unit to unit within one plant, 
even though the same material is involved. 
3.5 General Process Hazards: P 
The hazard potential of the process is dependent on the 
nature of the material that is being used, and on the way 
in which it is processed. This section takes account of 
the hazards that arise out of the type of operation being 
undertaken. Where the material is only changing 
physically,there is less hazard than where the material 
reacts with another substance. 
3.6 Special Process Hazards: S 
This section looks at specific characteristics of the 
process which enhance the degree of hazard. For example, 
the unit operating pressure and temperature are important 
factors to be considered, as are other more unusual 
hazards like the build up of an electrostatic charge in 
the material, the discharge of which may release 
sufficient energy to ignite a flammable mixture 	of 
material. 
3.7 Quantity Hazards: Q 
The 	degree of hazard resulting from processing a 
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material is dependent on the amount of material used in 
the process. A factor is allocated for the additional 
hazards associated with the use of large quantities of 
combustible, flammable, explosive or decomposable 
materials. This is related to the total amount of heat 
that can be released in an accident, given the heat of 
combustion of the material. 
3.8 Layout Hazards: L 
Various features of the design and layout of the unit 
being assessed can introduce additional hazards. Special 
attention is given to "Domino" or "Knock-on" effects which 
are related to the height of the unit, and the plant 
separation distances. For example, the potential effects 
of the collapse of a distillation column are greater, as 
are the effects of a running liquid fire which occurs at a 
high level and spread downwards through the plant. 
3.9 Acute Health Hazards: T 
This section considers the influence of acute toxic 
hazards on the overall assessment of the unit. The 
approach used is to consider the delaying effect caused by 
the material's toxicity when tackling a developing or 
potential incident. If operators have to wear protective 
equipment in order to approach the release point there 
will be a delay in tackling the incident and a greater 
chance of major fire or explosion. 
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3.10 Computation Of Indices. 
Using the values worked previously four indices are 
calculated, namely an equivalent of the Dow Index, and 
separate indices for fire , internal explosion and overall 
risk. The Dow Index is not used for interpretative 
purposes but is retained as a link to the Dow method and 
to simplify later calculations. The next three indices 
rank particularly hazards within the units and can be used 
individually. The Overall Risk Rating Index is a weighted 
combination of the other indices and, as with other 
indices, its value can be equated to a descriptive 
category. This index facilitates comparison between units 
with different types of hazard. For example, Table 3.10 
below, taken from the manual, shows the Overall Risk 
Rating categories which range from Mild, if the index is 
less than 20, to Very Extreme, if the index exceeds 
65,000. 
Overall Risk 	Overall Risk 







12, 500-65, 000  
M i ld 
Low 
Moderate 
High (group 1) 




>65,000 	 Very Extreme 
Overall Risk Rating Categories 
Table 3.10 
3.11 Equations For Indices Calculations. 
3.11.1 Equivalent Dow index, D 
D = B*(1 + M/100)*(1 + P/100)*(1 + (S + Q + L + T)/100) 
3.11.2 Fire index, F 
F = B * K/N 
3.11.3 Internal explosion index, E 
E = 1 + (M + P + S)/100 
3.11.4 Aerial explosion index, A 
A = B*(1 + m/100)*(Q*H*E/100)(t + 273/300)*(1 + p) 
3.11.5 Overall risk rating, R 
R = D(1 + (0.2 * E * SR(A*F))) 
3.12 Process Developement By Hazard Factor Review. 
When proceeding beyond the initial assessment where the 
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indices and categories have been determined, the process 
may be reviewed in order to identify modifications which 
will reduce the hazard potential of the unit. 
Permissible changes such as variation of the materials 
of construction, reduction in inventory, alteration in 
sizes of equipment and operating conditions, substitution 
of different types of process equipment may reduce the 
hazard potential. The scope for such change is greatest in 
assessments conducted at an early design stage. For an 
existing plant the review stage allows reconsideration of 
the factors allowed initially and can sometimes include 
changes of the type listed above. 
It must be emphasised that the designer should aim at 
reducing the hazard potential in the most rational, cost 
effective way. The Mond index is not a substitute for 
competent design, and a numerical effect of a modification 
on the Mond Index should not be the only reason for 
implementing the change in design. 
New values assigned to any of the individual hazard 
factors should be entered in the 'Reduced Values" column 
on the form and a note made of the reason for the change. 
When all the factors have been reviewed the indices are 
recalculated. These new, reduced index values form the 
basis for the final stage of the index, ie offsetting. 
3.13 Offsetting Index Values For .Safety And Preventive 
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Measures. 
Up to this point in. the calculation of the indices, 
measures which mitigate the hazard potential of the unit 
have been left apart (disregarded). The following safety 





e)Material Isolation, and 
f)Fire Fighting. 
The degree of hazard or hazard potential of a unit is a 
function of the frequency with which hazards occur, 
multiplied by their consequencies. Therefore, the 
offsetting factors can be divided into two groups: 
-Preventive Measures; 	those 	which 	reduce 	the 
frequency of hazardous occurences, and 
-Protective 	Measures; 	those which mitigate the 
concequencies once an undesired incident has occured. 
a-Preventive Measures. 
These measures are considered under three headings: 
Containment Hazards; Process Control and Safety 
Attitude. Each results in a reduction in the frequency 
J8& 
with which accidents occurs. 
The 	more 	rigorous 	the 	design of the process 
containment system, the less 	likely 	a 	loss 	of 
containment results in the release of flammable 
material, which if ignited may lead to a severe fire or 
an explosion. The provision of an adequate process 
control system is an important feature because 
deviations from normal operating conditions can be 
rectified before resulting in extreme conditions. 
The safety record of a company is a reflection of the 
safety policies and the management's attitude to safety. 
A positive management approach to safety is seen in the 
standard of training for all employees, the authority 
invested in the safety officer, and by the standard of 
housekeeping of their plant. 
b-Protective Measures. 
Protective measures help to reduce the size of any 
incidents which may occur and are intended to minimise 
the consequential damage from a fire or an explosion, 
either by passive resistance or by active intervention. 
Two aspects of passive resistance are considered: Fire 
Protection; and Material Isolation. These factors are 
interrelated. 
For example, the material isolation or shutdown system 
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restricts the amount of fuel available, thus shortening 
the duration of a fire which results from a loss of 
containment. This also reduces the degree of fire 
resistance required to protect the plant. 
However, the type of fire protection required is also 
determined by the nature of the fire. 
Finally, account is taken of the fire fighting 
measures on the plant, which include the provision of 
hand held fire extinguishers, and fixed fire 
installations. 
3.14 FINAL OFFEST INDICES CALCULATIONS. 
The overall Index is offset by each of the hazard 
reduction factors calculated in the previous section. 
Because of the grouping of these factors, the reduction in 
the other indices may be calculated by applying the 
appropriate offsetting factors. The overall risk rating is 
then calculated. Subscript "r" will be added to all the 
indices to distinguish them from the indices determined 
previously. 
It is stated that the offset Overall Risk Category, 
which is given by Table 3.10, represents: 
'The hazard potential of the unit in the conditions as 
studied with all the safety 	systems 	and 	other 
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preventive measures operational in the design mode.' 
(4) 
ACCURACY OF THE INDEX. 
The indices have no dimension although they reflect the 
hazard potential of the process that is studied, they do 
not quantify the individual hazard frequency or 
consequences. 
MOND INDEX PROGRAM. 
The following program is in BASIC. 
10 	REM "MOND INDEX" 
20 PRINT CHR$(141);'NAME OF THE UNIT' 
30 	INPUT NAME$ 
40 PRINT "GIVE B,M,P,S,Q,L,T,K,H,m,p,AND t" 
50 	INPUT B,M,P,S,Q,L,T,K,H,m,p,t 
60 PRINT "D";B*(1-s-(M/100))*(1+(P/100)*(1+((S+Q+L+T)/100)) 
70 	PRINT "GIVE ME THE VALUE OF D" 
80 INPUT D 
90 	PRINT 'F";B*K/N 
100 PRINT "GIVE ME THE VALUE OF F" 
110 INPUT F 
120 IF F>0 AND F<2 THEN PRINT "LIGHT" ELSE GOTO 130 
130 IF F>2 AND F<5 THEN PRINT "LOW" ELSE GOTO 140 
140 IF F>5 AND F<10 THEN PRINT "MODERATE" ELSE GOTO 150 
150 IF F>10 AND F<20 THEN PRINT "HIGH" ELSE GOTO 160 
160 IF F>20 AND F<50 THEN PRINT "VERY HiGH" ELSE GOTO 170 
170 IF F>50 AND F<100 THEN PRINT 'INTENSIVE" ELSE GOTO 180 
180 IF F>100 AND F<250 THEN PRINT "EXTREME" ELSE GOTO 190 
190 IF F>250 THEN PRINT "VERY EXTREME" 
200 PRINT "E';l-i-((M+P+S)/lOO) 
210 PRINT "GIVE ME THE VALUE OF E" 
220 INPUT E 
230 IF E>0 AND E<1.5 THEN PRINT "LIGHT" ELSE GOTO 240 
240 IF E>1.5 AND E<2.5 THEN PRINT "LOW" ELSE GOTO 250 
250 IF E>2.5 AND E<4 THEN PRINT "MODERATE" ELSE GOTO 260 
260 IF E>4 AND E<6 THEN PRINT "HIGH" ELSE GOTO 270 
270 IF E>6 THEN PRINT "VERY HIGH' 
280 PRINT 'A";B*(1-i-(m/100))*(1+p)*((Q*H*E)/1000)*(t+273)/300 
290 PRINT 'GIVE ME THE VALUE OF A" 
300 INPUT A 
310 IF A>O AND A<10 THEN PRINT "LIGHT" ELSE GOTO 320 
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A>10 AND A<30 THEN PRINT "LOW" ELSE GOTO 330 
A>30 AND A<100 THEN PRINT "MODERATE' ELSE GOTO 340 
A>100 AND A<400 THEN PRINT "HIGH' ELSE GOTO 350 
A>400 AND A<1700 THEN PRINT "VERY HIGH" ELSE GOTO 360 
A>1700 THEN PRINT "VERY EXTREME" 
INT "R" ;D*(1+(0.2*E*SQR(A*F))) 
INT 'GIVE ME THE VALUE OF R" 
PUT R 
R>0 AND R<20 THEN PRINT "MILD" ELSE GOTO 410 
R>20 AND R<100 THEN PRINT 'LOW' ELSE GOTO 420 
R>100 AND R<500 THEN PRINT 'MODERATE' ELSE GOTO 430 
R>500 AND R<1100 THEN PRINT 'HIGH (GROUP 1)" ELSE GOTO 440 
R>1100 AND R<2500 THEN PRINT "HIGH (GROUP 2)" ELSE GOTO 450 
R>2500 AND R<12500 THEN PRINT "VERY HIGH" ELSE GOTO 460 
R>12500 AND R<65000 THEN PRINT "EXTREME' ELSE GOTO 470 
R>65000 THEN PRINT "VERY EXTREME" 
INT 'GIVE M1,Pl,Sl,L1,T1,AND ml" 
PUT M1,P1,S1,Ll,T1,ml 
INT "Dl" ;B*(1+(M1/100))*(1+(P1/100)*(1+((S1+Q+L1+T1)/100)) 
INT "GIVE ME THE VALUE OF Dl" 
PUT Dl 
INT "FlT";B*K/N 
INT "GIVE ME THE VALUE OF Fl" 
PUT Fl 
F1>0 AND F1<2 THEN PRINT "LIGHT" ELSE GOTO 570 
F1>2 AND F1<5 THEN PRINT "LOW" ELSE GOTO 580 
F1>5 AND F1<10 THEN PRINT "MODERATE" ELSE GOTO 590 
P1>10 AND F1<20 THEN PRINT "HIGH" ELSE GOTO 600 
P1>20 AND P1<50 THEN PRINT 'VERY HIGH" ELSE GOTO 610 
F1>50 AND F1<100 THEN PRINT "INTENSIVE" ELSE GOTO 620 
F1>100 AND P1<250 THEN PRINT "EXTREME" ELSE GOTO 630 
F1>250 THEN PRINT "VERY EXTREME' 
INT "E1";1-s-((Ml+P1+S1)/100) 
INT "GIVE ME THE VALUE OF El" 
PUT El 
El>O AND E1<1.5 THEN PRINT "LIGHT" ELSE GOTO 680 
E1>1.5 AND E1<2,5 THEN PRINT "LOW" ELSE GOTO 890 
E1>2.5 AND E1<4 THEN PRINT "MODERATE" ELSE GOTO 700 
E1>4 AND E1<6 THEN PRINT "HIGH" ELSE GOTO 710 
E1>6 THEN PRINT "VERY HIGH" 
INT 'Al" ;B*(l+(m1/100))*(1+p)*((*H*E1)/10O0)*(t+273)/300 
INT "GIVE ME THE VALUE OF Al" 
PUT Al 
A1>0 AND A1<10 THEN PRINT "LIGHT" ELSE GOTO 760 
A1>10 AND A1<30 THEN PRINT 'LOW" ELSE GOTO 770 
A1>30 AND A1<100 THEN PRINT "MODERATE" ELSE GOTO 780 
A1>100 AND A1<400 THEN PRINT "HIGH" ELSE GOTO 790 
A1>400 AND A1<1700 THEN PRINT "VERY HIGH' ELSE GOTO 800 
A1>1700 THEN PRINT "VERY EXTREME" 
INT "Rl" ;Dl*(1+(0.2*El*SQR(A1*Fl))) 
INT "GIVE ME THE VALUE OF Ri" 
PUT Ri 
R1>0 AND R1<20 THEN PRINT "MILD" ELSE GOTO 850 
R1>20 AND R1<100 THEN PRINT "LOW" ELSE GOTO 860 
R1>100 AND R1<500 THEN PRINT "MODERATE" ELSE GOTO 870 
R1>500 AND R1<1100 THEN PRINT "HIGH (GROUP 1)" ELSE GOTO 880 
R1>1100 AND R1<2500 THEN PRINT "HIGH (GROUP 2)" ELSE GOTO 890 
R1>2500 AND R1<12500 THEN PRINT "VERY HIGH" ELSE GOTO 900 
J92_ 
900 IF R1>12500 AND R1<65000 THEN PRINT "EXTREME' ELSE GOTO 910 
910 IF R1>65000 THEN PRINT "VERY EXTREME" 
920 PRINT "GIVE K1,K2,K3,K4,K5,K6" 
930 INPUT K1,K2,K3,K4,K5,K6 
940 "DrD1";D1 
950 PRINT "Fr' ;F1*K1KK3KK5*K6 
960 PRINT "GIVE ME THE VALUE OF Fr" 
970 INPUT Fr 
980 IF Fr>0 AND Fr<2 THEN PRINT "LIGHT' ELSE GOTO 990 
990 IF Fr>2 AND Fr<5 THEN PRINT "LOW" ELSE GOTO 1000 
1000 IF Fr>5 AND Fr<10 THEN PRINT "MODERATE" ELSE GOTO 1010 
1010 IF Fr>10 AND Fr<20 THEN PRINT "HIGH" ELSE GOTO 1020 
1020 IF Fr>20 AND Fr<50 THEN PRINT 'VERY HIGH" ELSE GOTO 1030 
1030 IF Fr>50 AND Fr<100 THEN PRINT "INTENSIVE" ELSE GOTO 1040 
1040 IF Fr>100 AND Fr<250 THEN PRINT 'EXTREME" ELSE GOTO 1050 
1050 IF Fr>250 THEN PRINT "VERY EXTREME" 
1060 PRINT "Er";E1*K1*K2*K3 
1070 PRINT "GIVE ME THE VALUE OF Er" 
1080 INPUT Er 
1090 IF Er>0 AND Er<1.5 THEN PRINT "LIGHT ELSE GOTO 1100 
1100 IF Er>1.5 AND Er<2.5 THEN PRINT "LOW" ELSE GOTO 1110 
1110 IF Er>2.5 AND Er<4 THEN PRINT "MODERATE" ELSE GOTO 1120 
1120 IF Er>4 AND Er<6 THEN PRINT "HIGH" ELSE GOTO 1130 
1130 IF Er>6 THEN PRINT "VERY HIGH" 
1140 PRINT "Ar";A1*K1*K2*K3*K5 
1150 PRINT "GIVE ME THE VALUE OF Ar" 
1160 INPUT Ar 
1170 IF Ar>0 AND Ar<10 THEN PRINT "LIGHT" ELSE GOTO 1180 
1180 IF Ar>10 AND Ar<30 THEN PRINT "LOW" ELSE GOTO 1190 
1190 IF Ar>30 AND Ar<100 THEN PRINT "MODERATE" ELSE GOTO 1200 
1200 IF Ar>100 AND Ar<400 THEN PRINT "HIGH" ELSE GOTO 1210 
1210 IF Ar>400 AND Ar<1700 THEN PRINT "VERY HIGH" ELSE GOTO 1220 
1220 IF Ar>1700 THEN PRINT "VERY EXTREME" 
1230 PRINT "Rr' ; R1*K1*K2*K3*K4*K5*K6 
1240 PRINT "GIVE ME THE VALUE OF Rr" 
1250 INPUT Rr 
1260 IF Rr>0 AND Rr<20 THEN PRINT "MILD" ELSE GOTO 1270 
1270 IF Rr>20 AND Rr<100 THEN PRINT "LOW" ELSE GOTO 1280 
1280 IF Rr>100 AND Rr<500 THEN PRINT "MODERATE" ELSE GOTO 1290 
1290 IF Rr>500 AND Rr<1100 THEN PRINT "HIGH (GROUP 1)" ELSE GOTO 1300 
1300 IF Rr>1100 AND Rr<2500 THEN PRINT "HIGH (GROUP 2)" ELSE GOTO 1310 
1310 IF Rr>2500 AND Rr<12500 THEN PRINT "VERY HIGH' ELSE GOTO 1320 
1320 IF Rr>12500 AND Rr<65000 THEN PRINT "EXTREME" ELSE GOTO 1330 
1330 IF Rr>65000 THEN PRINT "VERY EXTREME" 
1340 GOTO 10 
6. REFERENCES. 
1) 	"Fire and Explosion Index, Hazard classification 
Guide", DOW Corporate Safety and Loss Prevention, May 
1976. 
_193_ 
"Technical Manual for the Mond Fire and Explosion 
Index' ICI Mond Division, 1985. 
LEWIS, D.J.,'The Application of the Mond Index to Plant 
Layout and Spacing Distances" Loss Prevention, Vol.13, 
p.20-26, 1980. 
LEWIS, D.J.,The Mond Index - A Development of the Dow 
Index 	The Appaisal and Measurement of Fire Safety, 
University of Edinburgh, June 1980. 
_194_ 
I•1 D IJ E' I D X 1 171 E3 1- 1-5 
-w - -?- -'- -- -- .3- -3E- -- -*- -.- -w -- -- -3E- 
LOCATION 
F' LA NT 
UNIT 
MATER I ALS 
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 






PRESSURE = psig 
MATERIAL FACTOR (Section 5) 
VEY MATERIAL OR MIXTURE : 
FACTOR DETERMINED BY 
MATERIAL FACTOR 	 : B 
TEMPERATUF:E t= DES. C 
RANGE 
SPECIAL MATERIAL HAZARDS (Section 6) 
1.OX!DISINS MATERIALS 0 TO 20 
2.61 YES COMBUSTIBLE GAS WITH WATER 0 TO 30 
3.NIXINS & DISPERSION CHARACTERISTICS -60 TO 100 
4.SUBJECT TO SPONTANEOUS HEATING 30 TO 250 
5.MAY RAPIDLY SPONTANEOUSLY POLYMERISE 25 TO 75 
6. IGNITION SENSITIVITY -75 TO 150 
7.SUBJEC7 TO EXPLOSIVE DECOMPOSITION 75 TO 125 
8.SUBJECT TO GASEOUS DETONATION 010 150 
9.CONDENSED PHASE PROPERTIES 200 TO 1500 
ILOTHER 0 TO 150 
SPECIAL MATERIAL HAZARDS TOTAL 
GENERAL PROCESS HAZARDS (Secti on 7) 
L.HANOLING & PHYSICAL CHANGES ONLY 1010 50 
2.REACTION CHARACTERISTICS 2510 50 
3.BATCR REACTIONS 1010 60 
4.MULTIPLICITY OF REACTIONS 2510 75 
5.MATERIAL TRANSFER 010 150 
6. TRANSPORTABLE CONTAINERS 1010 100 
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SPECIAL PROCESS HAZARDS (Section 8) 
1.10W PRESSURE(BELOW 15 PSIA) 50 TO 150 
2.HISH PRESSURE 0 TO 160 
3.10W TEPIP.:1.CARBON STEEL +IBC TO -25C B TO 30 
2.CARBON STEEL BELOW -25C 3010 100 
3.OTHER MATERIALS 010 100 
4.HI6H TEIIP.1.FLAMMABLE MATERIALS ITO 35 
2.PIATERIAL STRENGTH S TO 25 
5.CORROSION & EROSION 010 400 
6.JOINT & PACKING LEAKAGES I TO 60 
73IBRATION,LDAD CYCLIN6,ETC. 010 100 
8.PROCESSES/REACIIONS DIFFICULT TO CONTROL 20 10 300 
9-OPERATION IN OR NEAR FLAMMABLE RANGE 25 TO 450 
10.GREATER THAN AVERA6E EXPLOSION HAZARD 4010 lOB 
11.0)1ST OR MIST EXPLOSION HAZARD 3010 70 
12.HIGH STRENGTH OXIDANTS 010 400 
13.PROCESS IGNITION SENSITIVITY ITO 100 
14.ELECTROSTATIC HAZARDS 1510 285 
SPECIAL PROCESS HAZARDS TOTAL 
QUANTITY HAZARDS 	(Section 9) 
MATERIAL TOTAL TOMNES 
QUANTITY FACTOR 
LAYOUT HAZARDS (Section 10) 
HEIGHT IN METRES 
WORKING AREA IN SQUARE METRES 
1.STRUCTURE DESIGN S TO 200 
2.DOMINO EFFECT 010 250 
3.BELUW GROUND SITU 155 
4.SURFACE DRAINAGE 010 100 
5.OTHER 50 TO 250 
LAYOUT HAZARDS TOTAL 
ACUTE HEALTH HAZARDS (Section 11) 










2. INHALATION EFFECTS 
	
STO 50 
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OFFSETTING INDEX VALUES FOR SAFETY & PREVENTATIvE MEASURES 
A.CONTAINMENT HAZARDS (Section 16.1) 
1-PRESSURE VESSELS 
2-NON-PRESSURE VERTICAL STORAGE TANKS 
3-TRANSFER PIPELINES A)DESISN STRESSES 
B)JOINTS & PACKINGS 
4-ADDITIONAL CONTAINMENT & BUNDS 
5-LEAKAGE DETECTION & RESPONSE 
6-EMERGENCY VENTING OR DUMPING 
PRODUCT TOTAL OF CONTAINMENT FACTORS 	 K1= 
B. PROCESS CONTROL (Section 16.2) 
1-ALARM SYSTEMS 
2-EMERGENCY POWER SUPPLIES 
3-PROCESS COOLING SYSTEMS 
4-INERT GAS SYSTEMS 
5-HAZARD STUDIES ACTIVITIES 
6-SAFETY SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS 
7-COMPUTER CONTROL 
8-EXPLOSION/INCORRECT REACTOR PROTECTION 
9-OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS 
18-PLANT SUPERVISION 
PRODUCT TOTAL OF PROCESS CONTROL FACTORS 	K2= 
C.SAFETY ATTITUDE (Section 16.3) 
I -PIANAGMENT INVOLVEMENT 
2-SAFETY TRAINING 
3-MAINTENANCE & SAFETY PROCEDURES 
PRODUCT TOTAL OF SAFETY ATTITUDE FACTORS 
D.FIRE PROTECTION (Section 17.1) 
1-STRUCTURAL FIRE PROTECTION 
2-FIRE WALLS,BARRIERS 
3-EQUIPMENT FIRE PROTECTION 
PRODUCT TOTAL OF FIRE PROTECTION FACTORS 	14= 
E.MATERIAL ISOLATION (Section 17.2) 
1-VALVE SYSTEMS 
2-VENTILATION 
PRODUCT TOTAL OF MATERIAL ISOLATION FACTORS 
F.FIRE FIGHTING (Section 17.3) 
1-FIRE ALARMS 
2-HAND FIRE EXTINGUISHERS 
3-WATER SUPPLY 
4-WATER SPRAY OR MONITOR SYSTEMS 
5-FOAM & INERTINS INSTALLATIONS 
6-FIRE BRIGADE ATTENDANCE 
7-SITE CD-OPERATION IN FIRE FIGHTING 
8-SMOKE VENTILATORS 
PRODUCT TOTAL OF FIRE FIGHTING FACTORS 	16= 
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FILE NO. 
EQUAT I ONS 
EQUIVALENT DOW INDEX (for initial assessment and review) 
D = 
FIRE INDEX 
INITIAL ASSESSMENT AND REVIEW F= 8K/N 
OFFSET 	 FfKI*K3fK5*K6 
INTERNAL EXPLOSION INDEX 
INITIAL ASSESSMENT AND REVIEW E=1+(M+P+S)/1øø 
OFFSET 	 EIK2*K3 
AERIAL EXPLOSION INDEX 
INITIAL ASSESSMENT AND REVIEW 
OFFSET 	 A'KI'K2*K3.k5 
OVERALL RISK RATING 
INITIAL ASSESSMENT AND REVIEW R=D(1+(.2E.SQUARE ROOT(AF))) 
OFFSET 	 R'K1'K2.K3.K4.K5,K6 
INDICES CONFUTATION 
INDEX 	INITIAL 	 REVIEW 	 OFFSET 








REVIEW OF FAILURE MODE AND 
EFFECTS ANALYSIS. 
INTRODUCTION. 
The Failure-Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) is concerned 
almost entirely with equipment. It is used to identify the 
ways in which they could fail and the effects, having a 
serious impact on the safety and successful life of the 
system, that could be generated. Furthermore, this 
analysis permits system changes in order to reduce the 
failure effects. 
FMEA is a component oriented technique of analysis and 
has been widely used in the Nuclear and Aerospace 
Industries (1,2). The French Nuclear safety Authorities 
favour FMEA over FTA as in FMEA all component failures are 
investigated. 
FAILURE TYPES. 
A failure could be defined as any occurence in which a 
system element does not carry out its function in a 
desired manner. There are mainly three types of non-human 
system element failure which are: 
2.1 Primary Failure. 
A failure of a system element which occurs while the 
element is functioning under conditions that it was 
designed for. Primary failures are due only to element 
aging. 
2.2 Secondary Failure. 
The failure of a system element which obcurs while the 
element is functioning under conditions that it was 
NOT designed for. This places the element under 
excessive stress which exceeds its funtional 
limitations. This stress can be caused by 
environmental conditions, by human actions or by 
failure of other system elements. 
2.3 Command Fault. 
A failure of a non-human system element to perform its 
designed function due to an improper control signal or 
some other factor which interferes with the control 
signal. This failure does not degrade the condition of 
the particular element nor is it a result of any 
malfunction within the boundaries of that element: 
3. APPROACH. 
The analysis consists of a critical review of the 
system, coupled with a systematic examination of all 
conceivable failures at the limits of resolution and an 
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evaluation of the effects of these failures on the safety 
and capability of the system. A level of resolution must 
be specified and must remain consistent throughout the 
analysis. Time permitting, the analysis should be 
performed at the lowest system element level (subsystem, 
component, part, etc.) where a failure mode can be 
identified (3). 
The system review begins by describing the system in 
terms of functional block diagrams showing each critical 
function performed by system elements (at the limits of 
resolution. Functions are identified with each system 
element (subsystem, component, part, etc.) at the level of 
resolution. Critical functions are those which must be 
performed if the system is to operate. They differ 
slightly from the general functions considered when 
constructing the systems'. hierarchy. Critical functions 
are stated more concisely and include only those functions 
necessary for the system to achieve its objective. 
A failure occurs when the system element does not 
perform its function in a suitable manner or a manner 
which would meet specifications. A system element may have 
several functions (4). 
By considering failures in each critical function, 
systematic coverage of all 	functional 	failures 	is 
achieved. 	Failures 	are considered by answering the 
following questions: 
-201- 
HOW can the assumed functional failure actually 
occur, i.e. , what is the failure mode? In what manner 
does the failure happen? 
What is the root cause; i.e., WHY does the failure 
occur? 
What are the effects of the failure; on interfacing 
elements (local effect)' and on the overall system 
(system effect)? 
Based on the worst credible effects, what is the 
failure or hazard classification? 
How can the failure mode or its causes be removed 
or the effects made less severe? 
These are general objectives which apply in 	any 
instance. it is advisable for the analyst to formulate 
specific objectives so as to define the boundaries of the 
study. 
In carrying out the FMEA in this study the following 
specific objective was formulated: 
The objective of the FMEA in this study is to help 
discriminate between minor problems and those which 
require thorough investigation using fault tree 
analysis and cause-consequence analysis.' 
i02 
4. E'ROCEDIJRE. 
The FMEA procedure contains five steps: 
Determine level of resolution (indenture level) 
Develop a consistent format 
Define the problem and boundary conditions 
Complete the FMEA table 
Report the results. 
Each of these is discussed below. 
4.1 Determine Level Of Resolution. 
The level of resolution determines the detail to be 
included in the FMEA tables. If a plant-level hazard is 
being addressed, the FMEA should focus on the individual 
systems or subsystems in the plant and on their failure 
modes and effects with respect to plant-level hazard; for 
example, the FMEA might focus on the glycol regeneration 
unit, the storage and transfer unit, the recomnpression 
unit,etc. .When a system-level hazard is being addressed, 
the FMEA should focus on individual equipment that makes 
up the system and on its failure modes and effects with 
respect to the system-level hazard. For a system level 
hazard, such as loss of control of liquid level in the 
separation system, the FMEA might focus on the level 
transmitter, the level control valve, the level controller 
etc. . Of course, effects identified at the system or 
equipment level may subsequently be related to potential 
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plant hazards in the FMEA tables (5). 
4.2 Develop A Consistent Format. 
A standard FMEA format promotes consistency in the 
information contained in the FMEA tables and assists in 
maintaining the level of resolution defined in subsection 
4.1. Figure 5.1 at the end of this Appendix shows an 
example format for an FMEA table. 
4.3 Define The Problem And Boundary Conditions. 
This step identifies the specific items to be included 
in the FMEA within the previously defined level of 
resolution. The problem and boundary condition definition 
specifically states what systems and equipment are to be 
included in the FMEA. Minimum requirements for the problem 
definition include: 
* Identifying the plant and/or systems that are 
subject of the analysis. 
* Establishing the physical system boundaries that 
include the equipment contained in the FMEA. This 
statement specifies the places at which the equipment 
communicate with other processes and utility/support 
systems and what portions of these "interfaces' are to 
be included in the FMEA. These boundary conditions 
should also state the operating conditions at the 
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interface that are assumed for the FMEA. 
* Collecting up-to-date reference information that 
identifies the equipment and its functional 
relationship to the plant/system. This information is 
needed for all equipment included within the system 
boundary. 
* Providing a consistent ranking definition that 
addresses the potential effects of the equipment 
failures. 
4.4 Complete The FMEA Table. 
The PHEA table should be completed in a deliberate, 
systematic manner to reduce the possibility of omissions 
and to enhance the completeness of the FMEA. A table can 
be produced by beginning at a system boundary on a 
reference drawing and systematically evaluating the items 
in order as they appear in the process flowpath. Each 
equipment item can then be checked off or red-lined on 
the reference drawing when its failure modes have been 
evaluated completely. All entries for each item or system 
being addressed in the FMEA should be completed before 
proceeding to the next item. The following items should be 
standard entries in the FMEA table: 
4.4.1 Equipment identification. 
A unique equipment identifier that relates the equipment 
to a system drawing, process, or location. This identifier 
distinguishes between similar equipment (e.g., motor 
operated valves) that perform different functions within 
the same system. Equipment numbers or identifiers from 
system drawings, such as piping and instrumentation 
diagrams, are usually available and provide a reference to 
existing system information. 
4.4.2 Failure modes. 
The analyst should list all failure modes for each item 
consistent with the equipment description. Considering the 
equipments normal operating condition, the analyst should 
consider all conceivable malfunctions that alter the 
equipment's normal operation. The failure modes can be 
identified by considering the effects of: 
a )Premature operat ion 
b)Failure to operate at prescribed time 
c)Intermittent operation 
d)Failure to cease at prescribed time 
e)Failure during operation 
f)Degraded output, and 
g)Other unique failure conditions. 
For example, the failure modes of a normally open valve 
may include: 
* Fails open (or fails to close when required) 
*Tranfers to a close position 
*Leaks to external environment 
*Valve body rupture. 
S. 
The 	analyst should concentrate on identifying the 
various failure modes rather than the potential causes of 
failure. Considering various causes will assist in 
identifying different failure modes. However, the analyst 
should limit the table entries to failure modes even 
though there may be several causes of the failure mode. 
The analyst should include all postulated failure modes so 
that their effects can be addressed. 
4.4:3 Operating mode and system configuration. 
The operating mode in which the system is being analysed 
is stated. It is important to examine the effect of the 
failure in ever y system configuration and operating mode 
as the effect of the failures is dependent on these 
conditions. 
4.4.4 Failure effects. 
The effects of each failure mode are investigated by 
considering their effect on the succeeding higher 
indenture levels of the system. These entered in the 
columns: Local Effect, Next Higher Level and End Effects. 
For example, the immediate effect of a pump seal leak is a 
spill in the area of the pump. If the fluid is flammable, 
a fire could be expected (because the pump is a potential 
ignition source) that might involve additional nearby 
equipment. 
The end effect is the result of the failure on the whole 
system. For example, the safe failure of a device in the 
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shutdown system will initiate shutdown. The failure to 
danger mode may than be defined by identifying those 
failures which delay or prevent shutdown. The extent of 
the effect of a component failure depends on ccmponents 
function. 
4.4.5 Failure detection method. 
The ways in which the failure can be identified are 
noted in the column with this heading. Often, the failure 
will be identified by its effect on another component. The 
presence of a device that is dedicated to warning the 
operator of the failure is noted here. For example, a gas 
detector fitted in an enclosed area will warn the operator 
that there is a leak of hydrocarbons from the process. 
Often at low indenture levels, there are no dedicated 
warning devices and the operator must rely on other 
indications to detect the failure which is being studied 
by the analyst, and these should also be noted. These 
indications fall into threegeneral categories: 
a)They occur when the system is operating normally 
b)They occur when the system has malfunctioned, and 
c)Indications that are incorrect. 
4.4.6 Compensating provisions. 
The means of mitigating the failure are recorded under 
the heading Compensation Provision. Design provisions at 
any indenture level which allow the system to continue 
operating, or which shutdown the system in safe manner or 
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which provide a duplicate system to operate in standby, 
are taken into account. 
It is also important to investigate the action that the 
operator can take to restrict the effect of the failure, 
given the information at his disposal. The effect of 
action taken in response to abnormal indications, and also 
the effect of incorrect action on the system, should be 
determined. 
4.4.7 Ranking. 
The analyst should classify each failure mode and effect 
according to the ranking definition developed in the 
problem definition. Each effect is examined in terms of 
its hazard and the potential result of that hazard and 
then compared to the ranking definition for classification 
(from MIL-STD-1629 A (6)). 
Class I -CATASTROPHIC- Will cause death or severe injury 
to personnel, or system loss. 
Class II 	-CRITICAL- Will cause personal injury or major 
system damage 	or 	will 	require 	immediate 
corrective action for personnel or system 
survival. If a safety feature MUST work in order 
to avert death or serious injury, then effects 
should be listed as Class II. 
Class III -MARGINAL- Can be counteracted or controled 
without injury to personnel or major system 
damage. 
Class IV 	-NEGLIGIBLE- Condition that will not 
result in personal injury, system damage, or 
process interuption. 
4.4.8 Remarks. 
Any pertinent remarks are recorded in the final column 
to aid the review of the FMEA by another analyst or 
engineer.  -
Report The Results. 
The result of the FMEA is a systematic and consistent 
tabulation of the effects of equipment failure within a 
process or system. The equipment identification in the 
FMEA provides a direct reference between the equipment and 
system piping and instrumentation diagrams or process flow 
diagrams. The ranking provides a relative measure of the 
equipment failure mode's contribution to the system 
hazards. 
Equipment failures with an unacceptable ranking should 
be re-examined to verify the failure modes and their 
effects. These failures are the, most likely candidates for 
protective measures, especially if the failure leads 
directly to a serious accident. 
FMEA Procedure. 
A procedure which has been developed by Lygate (8) from 
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MIL-STD-1629 A (6) is given below. In essence it is a 
summary of this chapter, setting out in logical form the 
basic rules of FMEA. 
STEP No 
1 	Define the system to be analysed by describing: 
1.1 For each operational mode: 
1.1.1 	Statement of primary and secondary objectives. 
1.1.2 A description of the function of each part of the 
system. 
1.1.3 	Draw functional or reliability block diagrams to 
illustrate the function of each part of the 
system. 
1.1.4 	Define what constitute the failure. 
2 	Examine each hardware item in turn: 
2.1 For each indenture level starting at the most 
detailed 1e7el: 
2.1.1 	Draw a reliability block diagram to illustrate 
the function of the component being considered. 
2.2 	Complete the FMEA Worksheet: 
2.2.1 Record the components unique identification 
number. 
2.2.2 	Identify 	all 	possible 	failure 	modes by 
considering the effects of: 
a )Premnature operat ion 
b)Failure to operate at the prescribed time 
c)Intermittent operation 
d)Failure to cease at the prescribed time 
e)Loss of output or failure during operation 
f)Degraded output 
g)Other unique failure conditions. 
2.2.3 	State the operation in which the component is 
being considered. 
2.2.4 	Identify the effects of each failure on the 
system by considering: 
a)Effect at local level (in the same indenture 
level) 
b)Effect at the next higher indenture level 
C)Effect on the whole system (End Effects). 
2.2.5 
	
	Identify the means of detecting the failure by 
Qonsidering: 
a)Dedicated warning devices 
b)Other indications: 
i)when the system is operating normally. 
ii)When the system has malfunctioned. 
iii)that are incorrect because of failure of an 
indicating device. 
c)Record the means of isolating the failure. 
2.2.6 	Identify and evaluate the compensating provisions 
which mitigate the effect of the failure: 
a)Consider the design provisions at any indenture 
level which may be: 
i)redundant components which permit continued 
....211... 
operation 
• ii)safety shutdown or relief devices 
iii)alternative modes 	of 	qperation 	(e.g., 
stand-by systems) 
b)Consider the action the operator may take: 
i)identify the best course of action given the 
information he has available. 
ii)investigate the effects of incorrect action in 
response to abnormal indications. 
	
2.2.7 	Classify the severity of the effects of each 
failure: 
a)Category I 	-CATASTROPHIC- Will cause death 
or severe injury to personnel, or system 
loss. 
b)Category II 	-CRITICAL- Will cause personal 
injury or major system damage or will require 
immediate corrective action for personnel or 
system survival. If a safety feature MUST work 
in order to avert death or serious injury, then 
effects should be listed as Class II. 
c)Category III -MARGINAL- Can be conteracted or 
controled without injury to personnel or major 
system damage. 
d)Category IV -NEGLIGIBLE- Condition that will 
not result in personnel injury, system 
damage, or process interuption. 
2.2.8 	Note any pertinent remarks, particularly design 
improvement to/be recommended in the FMEA report. 
Information should be given about Category I or 
II failure modes and appropriate action to be 
taken to reduce the probability 	of 	their 
occurence. 
7. COMMENTS. 
FMEA can be initiated at any stage of design or 
development and at any level of detail (2). the technique 
leads to minimisation of the risk failures, ensures that 
items of optimum reliability are selected in system 
design, optimises probability of mission accomplishment, 
and is especially beneficial in spotting single-point 
failures. On the other hand, the effectiveness of the 
technique is limited to analysis of single units or single 
failures. Other failures may be overlooked. As usually 
applied, it may give inadequate attention to human error, 
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hazardous characteristics of the 	equipment, 	adverse 
environments, or the effects of failure combinations 
The results of the FMEA are useful in other hazard 
evaluation methods. For example, in conjunction with a 
HAZOF study, the FMEA provides a concise summary of the 
hazards associated with components failure. (In fact, the 
FMEA is a subset of a complete HAZOP study). The FMEA is 
also useful in fault tree analysis, event tree analysis, 
and cause-consequence analysis. where the analyst must 
determine the contributing equipment failure for a stated 
hazard. For example, an impbrtant hazard identified in a 
HAZOP can be compared to the effects listed in the FMEA to 
identify specific equipment failure modes that are 
directly involved with the hazard (7). 
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AFFENDIX C. 3 
REVIEW OF FAULT TREE ANALYSIS. 
1.INTRODUCT ION. 
The original concept of fault tree analysis (FTA) was 
developed at the Bell Telehone Laboratories in work on the 
safety evaluation of the Minuteman Launch Control System 
in 1961. From then on, it has been widely used in the 
nuclear power industry and constitutes the core of the 
methodology applied in risk studies (1), where in addition 
to calculating the expected frequency of undesired events, 
their consequonces are assessed (2). Relatively few 
applications of the method to process plant system have 
become known. They mostly refer to trip systems of 
hazardous installations (3), auxilary systems, or parts of 
chemical processes (4-9). The fault tree analyses for 
process plant systems, which have become known, deal with 
events during normal steady-state operation. Start-up and 
shut-down, which frequently give rise to accidents, are 
not addressed. 
During the last twenty years several authors published 
papers which discussed the application of FTA to complex 
chemical process plants (10-15). However, the main 
emphasis of the work has 	been to develop computer 
programs to aid the analyst construct and evaluate fault 
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trees. Useful review of computer methods in FTA has been 
published by Cross (16) and Areridt and Fussell (17) and 
Cainarinopoulos (24). 
1.1 Definition. 
Fault tree analysis is a deductive method which is 
normally used in a quantitative way, although it requires 
as an initial step a qualitative study of the system under 
consideration, just as any method of system analysis. 
After defining the undesired event, its logical 
connections with the basic events of the system are 
searched for and the result of this search is represented 
graphycally by means of a fault tree, as, for example, in 
Figure 1 at the end of this Appendix (fault tree derived 
from API RP 14c). The tree reflects the outcome of the 
qualitative part of the analysis, in which questions of 
the "how can it happen?" type are answered. These serve to 
identify, firstly, process functions and subsystems such 
as cooling or electric supply whose failure causes the 
undesired event and then connects these failures 
successively with the basic events. 
1.2 Logic Gates And Event Symbols. 
The logical connections in the fault tree are generally 
represented by two types of gates, the OR and the AND" 
In the case of the 'OR' gate, any one of the entries alone 
is capable of producing the output event, while the output 
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event of an 'AND" gate only occurs if all its entry events 
are fulfilled. 
Table 1.2 shows the different type of logic gates and 




Output exists only if all inputs exist 
( 
OR gate 
Output exists if any input exists 
INHIBIT gate 
Output equals input if condition input 
satisfied 
G~~D DELAY gate 
 Output exists after delay time has elapsed 
Event Symbols 
RECTANGLE 
Fault event usually resulting from more 








Fault event not developed to its cause 
TRIANGLE A A A conecting or transfer symbol 
UPSIDE DOWN TRIANGLE 
\v/ 	
A similarity transfer. The input is similar 
but not identical to the like identified 
input 
HOUSE 
Event normally expected to occur 
TABLE 1.2 Fault Tree Logic and Event Symbols. 
Throughout the analysis of the unit I have used the set 
symbols listed in Table 1.2. 
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Two states of the basic events are normally admitted. 
They are either failed or functioning which implies two 
possible states for the undesired event, its occurrence, 
and its nonoccurrence. The two states are adopted with 
certain probabilities which are generally obtained for 
each 	type of component by evaluating the operating 
behaviour of a great number of similar 	components. 
Applying these probabilities to the basic events of the 
tree, the probability of the undesired event may be 
calculated. 
2. PROCEDURE. 
In order to carry out a fault tree analysis the 
following steps are required: 
Familiarisation with the system using 	process 
description, piping and instrumentation diagrams, etc., 
and information obtained from the plant personnel. 
Definition of the top and initiating events using 
material information, checklists, historical evidence, 
etc. 
Development of the fault tree(s). 
ci. Obtaining probabilities for the failure of technical 
components and human error (see chapter 2). 
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2.1 Identification Of The Top And Initiating Events. 
Petrochemical 	processes 	involve both physical and 
chemical hazards. Physical hazards derive from operating 
conditions which may be extreme, such as very low or very 
high temperatures and pressures. Chemical hazards are 
those associated with the materials present in the 
process, which may be toxic, flammable or explosive, or 
exhibit several of these properties at the same time. The 
matter is complicated further by the fact that some of 
these properties may vary with changes of process 
parameters suck-i as temperatures, pressures, or 
concentrations, or that these changes may give rise to 
side or spontaneous reaction, for example, heating, 
decomposition, or polymerisation. As it happens, incidents 
in chemical plants are characterised by these changes 
• only. In addition, dangerous properties, if not present 
under normal process conditions, may develop upon contact 
of process media with auxiliary media such as coolants, 
lubricants, or impurities, which may be introduced into 
the process with process streams or originate from 
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component materials. After release they may occur as a 
consequence of reactions with substances present in the 
environment. The above enumeration, which is by no means 
complete, shows what difficulties the process safety 
analyst has to face. 
2.1.1 Undesired events. 
The 	undesired 	event in a safety analysis for a 
petrochemical process plant usually is a toxic release, a 
fire or explosion, or a situation •in whichthese may be 
produced as, for example, release of hydrocarbons 
containing hydrogen suiphide. It is usually assumed that 
in addition to air, water and ignition source are present 
in the environment. In our case the undesired event will 
be a near-miss event. The latter is usually defined as an 
event which could have developed into a catastrophe (a 
toxic release, a fire or explosion). Once the undesired 
event or events have been fixed, the initiating events 
(events potentially capable of bringing about the 
undesired event) must be found. 
2.1.2 Initiating events. 
If a system is designed properly, incidents can only 
occur if there are deviations from normal operating 
conditions. These may be provoked by component failures, 
which imply either the loss of function (stuck valve, for 
example) of the loss of integrity (e.g., damaged gasket) 
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and spontaneous/external events or human error. 
Systems usually have components which are required to be 
working in order for the system to function (operationa.l 
components), stand-by components which take over from them 
should they fail, and components which belong to 
protection and safety systems, and hence only have to work 
under special circumstances. Since only failures of the 
operational components may affect system behaviour 
directly, they are usually taken to be initiating events. 
In addition, the loss of component integrity (of the 
system boundary) in such a way that a release from the 
system or the introduction of air or auxiliary media to 
the system has to be considered, if dangerous situations 
can result. Human error must be considered as well. 
2.1.3 Outline of a computer-aided search for undesired and 
initiating events. 
The search for undesired events requires the analyst to 
have a thorough knowledge of the system under 
investigation and a good background in physics, chemistry, 
and engineering. His ability in detecting dangerous 
situations should be enhanced by experience with previous 
analyses and an overview of past incidents in the same 
type or similar plants. This knowledge, together with 
specific information on the properties of the materials 
involved, process conditions, and component failure modes 
(e.g., a valve may fail open or closed, leak, or be 
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stuck), is combined to identify the 	undesired 	and 
initiating events. 
This situation lends itself to building an expert 
system. Therefore, a preliminary computer program was 
written which combines material properties (18) 3  
information on possible failure modes of components 
obtained in the field study, and case histories (19) with 
input information on the process to yield specific 
warnings and undesired and initiating events. The program 
processes information using rules in the form IF ... THEN, 
and it is assumed in line with the spirit of a safety 
analysis that anything that might go wrong will go wrong: 
IF the initial condition is satisfied THEN the outcome 
will occur with probability 1. For the case histories, a 
screening process according to material and event type is 
carried out. The user must then select those events which 
proceed in his specific case. Operational component 
failures are simply input after consulting a list with 
possible failure modes. The results of an analysis 
performed with the program are recorded and provide 
feedback in form of a checklist for later use. 
2.2 Fault Tree Development. 
In a process/system there are usually a number of 
stand-by components (which may step in if operational 
components fail) and protective and safety systems. These 
are normally capable of coping with the major part of 
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initiating events and may be considered as barriers 
between those and the undesired event. The latter only 
occurs if these barriers fail. 
If components from several barriers have to fail for the 
undesired event to occur, these are combined with the 
initiating event by an AND" gate. If several of these 
combinations exist, they are input into an OR gate, just 
as the contributions from the different initiating events 
to the undesired event. The components which have to be in 
failed state at the same time if the initiating event is 
to cause the undesired event are called redundancies and 
their number indicates the degree of redundancy. 
2.2.1 Obtaining probabilities 	for 	the 	failure 	of 
components and human error. 
Quantification of fault trees is achieved by assessing 
failure data or probability to each event on the tree. 
These data are then summed using Boolean algebra to reach 
a probability that the top event can occur. It is for this 
reason that FTA is used to study the reliability of 
systems. Failure rates and probabilities can be obtained 
as discussed in chapter 2. 
When quantifying a fault tree for the first time, many 
people do not pay sufficient attention to the dimensions 
of the data used to calculate the probability or frequency 
of the top event. This results in an incorrect calculation 
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of the probability of the top event. 
2.3 Verify The Tree. 
A fault tree should be verified by a senior engineer who 
has an intimate knowlege of the system that has been 
modelled. It is easy for the analyst to misunderstand or 
overlook an important aspect of the process. 
The time taken to verify the tree will be shortened if 
the analyst documents the assumptions he has made as he 
was constructing the tree. Most inadequacies in the tree 
will be related to these assumptions particularly when 
they have to do with temporal aspects. An engineer 
checking the tree and its assumptions may clarify the 
situation enabling the analyst to construc.t a more 
accurate model. 
2.4 Common Mode Failures. 
Apart from the independent failures treated previously, 
the possibility of common mode failures in technical 
system has to be considered with attention. This type of 
failure leads to the simultaneous unavailability of 
several components. The following types of common mode 
failures may be distinguished: 
a) Failures of two or more redundant components or 
partial systems of similar or identical design, due to 
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an outside cause, for example, a corrosive environment 
which leads to rapid component degradation 
Failures of two or more redundant components or 
partial systems which occur as a consequence of a 
single failure; this type of common mode failure is 
called "casual' failure 
Failures of two or more redundant components or 
partial systems which occur as a consequence of 
functional 	dependencies 	as, 	for 	example, 	the 
dependence on a common auxilary system. 
The remaining types of common mode failures due to 
common external cause (e.g., planning, construction, or 
maintenance errors) should be treated by evaluating 
relevant operating experience. In this category, which 
comprises the common mode failures in the strictest sense 
of the word, a distinction should be drawn between those: 
which occur or are discovered on occasion of an 
incident 
those which are discovered on functional demand of 
the system either because of testing or an operational 
requirement, or 
those which are self-annunciating (e.g., because 
the components affected are of the type which gives an 
alarm upon failure). 
Operating experience primarily supplies data for the 
last two types of common mode failures, while those 
occuring only on occasion of an incident can in general 
only be discovered using analytical methods. 
The evaluation of operating experience may be carried 
out with several models; among them are the B-factor 
method and the specialized Marshall-Olkin model. These 
models are discussed in detail in reference 25 and 26. 
2.5 Qualitative Evaluation. 
The 	completed 	fault 	tree 	provides 	much useful 
information by displaying the interactions of equipment 
failures that could result in an accident. However, except 
for the simplest fault trees, even an experienced analyst 
cannot identify directly from the fault tree all the 
combinations of equipment failures that can lead to an 
accident. A failure mode is Known as a cut set which is a 
set of primary failures or undeveloped faults which can 
give rise to the top event. Minimal cut sets are all the 
combinations of equipment failures that can result in the 
fault tree Top event, and they are logically equivalent to 
the information displayed in the fault tree. The minimal 
cut sets are useful for ranking the ways in which the 
accident may occur, and they allow quantification of the 
fault tree if appropriate data are available. Large fault 
trees require computer programs to determine their minimal 
cut sets. Details of different computer codes which 
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shorten the time taken to carry out FTA can be found in 
reference 16 and 17. 
The main source of problems is when a number of 
different events specified in a tree have common cause. 
For example, the blockage of the impulse lines of the 
level transmitter and of the extra low level switch could 
result from the build up of residue in the lines. This 
common cause is extreinly unlikely to occur during the 
interval between maintenance work. The analyst should 
therefore examine the tree, and reconstruct it to reflect 
the effect of the common cause failures. 
A problem which arises during the qualitative evaluation 
is that sometimes events are mutually exclusive. In large 
trees there will be events that will be in opposition to 
each other. For example, the level control valve cannot be 
too far closed and too far open at the same time. The 
analyst must discover these mutually exclusive events and 
discount the minimal cut sets where both events appear. 
After the cut sets have been determined, the effect of 
design modifications can then be investigated by studying 
their effect on the tree. As a general rule, the greater 
the number of events in a minimal out set, the lower the 
probability of the top event. Design changes which 
generate AND gates at the highest levels in the tree 
should be recommended. Th is reduces the probability of the 
top event. 
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2.6 quantitative Evaluation. 
The probability of occurrence of each basic event is 
required to start the quantitative evaluation of the fault 
tree. The probability of the top event may then be 
calculated and the most probable minimal cut sets or 
failure modes determined. The mathematical techniques 
required to resolve fault trees are well developed and 
computer programs are available to help resolve the 
probabilities of the minimal cut sets and the top event. 
(20-24). 
A variety of sources which include data banks and 
company maintenance records can provide the analystwith 
the required data. Careless application of data 
particularly of data taken from different contexts, from 
the Nuclear Industry for example, has caused most design 
engineers to regard quantified FTA with scepticism. This 
hostility mainly arises when the analyst fails to 
communicate the assumptions he has made and fails to carry 
out a sensitivity analysis to determine the level of 
uncertainty of the top event probability. 
During the design stages most of the problems can be 
identified and resolved by quantitative analysis. As the 
quality and accuracy of failure rate data improves, more 
reliance can be justifiably placed on quantified fault 
trees. 
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2.7 PTA Report. 
The analyst presents his findings and recommendations in 
the form of a report which should include the FTA, a short 
written description of the tree, the assumptions that have 
been made and a list of the most likely failure modes. 
The report should discuss the need for any design 
changes and illustrate their effects on the tree. The 
comments of the engineer who has verified the analysis 
should be included as this strengthens the integrity of 
the analysis. 
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REVIEW OF THE CAUSE—CONSEQUENCE 
ANALYSIS 
1. INTRODUCTION. 
Reliability performance of a completed plant are largely 
judged on the costs resulting from faults in term of loss 
of production, damage to plant, or injuries to staff. It 
is therefore important to develop systematic methods for 
cause-consequence analysis, relating the potential modes 
of failure to the ultimate consequences for the system. 
For 	such 	failure/consequence 	analysis, 	the 
cause-consequence diagrams or cause-consequence charts 
(CCC) provide the engineer with both an analysis strategy, 
and a notation for presentation and documentation. 
Besides, the cause-consequence diagrams offer a systematic 
support for probabilistic modelling (Nielsen and Runge 
(1)). 
1.1 Definition. 
A cause-consequence diagram is constructed by defining a 
critical event, and then both defining the consequence 
events and paths which flow from the critical event and 
defining cause events for the critical event and logical 
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relations between the cause events. In other words, the 
forward development is similar to an event tree and the 
backward development is similar to a fault tree. The main 
elements of the diagram are therefore event and condition 
definitions and logic gates and vertices. 
1.2 Logic Symbols. 
Table 1.2 shows the different type of logic symbols used 
to represent the events described in a cause-consequence 
diagram. The logic symbols include both gates which 
describe the relations between cause events and vertices 
which describe the relations between consequences. The 
event and condition symbols describe the type of event or 
condition. The symbols given are those which have been 
used by Nielsen(2). 
The main logic gates are the AND gate and the OR gate. 
There are corresponding logic vertices in form of the AND 
vertex and the OR vertex. 
The EITHER/OR vertex, or decision box, is also very 
useful. It is utilized in particular to determine the 
effect of an event or condition on the paths which the 
system takes. If, as is often the case, the 'NO' output 
from the decision box is the result of an abnormal 
condition, then a fault tree occurs on the diagram for 
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TABLE 1.2. 	Cause-Consequence Diagram Logic and 
Event Symbols. 
Throughout the analysis of the unit I have used the set 
symbols listed in Table 1.2. 
1.3 Quantification Of Cause-Consequences. 
Quantification 	of 	cause-consequence 	diagrams 	is 
achieved, in the same way as for the quantification of 
FTA, by assessing failure data or probability to each 
event on the diagram. These data are then summed using 
Boolean algerbra. 
2. APPROACH. 
2.1 System definition. 
On the highest level (plant level) the purpose of 
systematic cause-consequence analysis is to relate 
potential modes of failure of individual components to the 
ultimate consequences for the system ('loss of 
production', 	'plant damage', etc.). In starting the 
analysis, however, the following question arises: What is 
the expedient starting point? In our case it will be 
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near-miss events. 
Near-miss events are faults that arise during normal 
plant operation and could lead to large potential 
consequences (loss of life or property). They could be 
qualified as critical events that have been subdued either 
by the process control system or the operators . The 
direct effects would be that energy or mass balances of 
main process are disturbed. Attention should be focussed 
on faults or events that directly affect these balances 
and cause parameter changes/transients. 
Near-miss events can constitute the starting point for a 
search of a top event of which the potential consequences 
are sought. The cause-consequence analysis then proceedes 
from these near-miss events. 
The ability of the plant to meet and deal with excessive 
transients is largely determined by systems which are 
designed to perform accident preventing actions ('designed 
protective actions). In this way undesired event sequences 
are prevented. However, a desired intervention may fail 
('designed protective action x does not occur as 
intended') or it may not have been possible to design an 
intervention action at all. In such cases one must rely on 
accident-limiting systems (barriers, sprinkler systems, 
evacuation, etc.). 
2.2 The Cause-Consequence Diagram. 
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The 	display 	format 	used 	in 	connection 	with 
cause-consequence 	analysis 	is 	the cause-consequence 
diagram. Throughout this section the text will be 
illustrated by an example of a cause-c onsequence diagram 
for a near-miss event due to foam formation in a 
gas/liquid separation vessel. 
Foaming occured in a low pressure separation vessel 
leading to an increase in the liquid level. The response 
of the control system was to open the level control valve. 
Since this rise in the liquid level is only apparent the 
first consequence is that the liquid residence time is 
shortened reducing the separation efficiency. 
In the consequence diagram different possible event 
sequences are described. Often a near-miss event can lead 
to different event sequences that may depend on conditions 
within the process system; on fig. 1 it is indicated that 
different event sequences can occur if, for instance, one 
or more of the accident-preventing actions ('designed 
safety actions') does not occur as intended. As 
consequence diagrams provide the possibility for diplaying 
the logical connection between events and conditions, 
different sequences can be systematically identified. 
An advantage of presenting sequence events in 	a 
cause-consequence diagram is that the analyst is invited 
to study sequence. The sequence of events can be followed 
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along the different paths in the block diagram. 
Provided that the 'basic inputs' of the cause diagrams 
are independent, then the 	cause-consequence 	diagram 
displays 	the 	logical 	connection between a set of 
independent faults and their consequences. 
As a cause-consequence diagram for a near-miss event 
describes one or more sequences of events, the time 
dimension is introduced in the diagram. This provides, of 
course, the possibility of taking into account random 
faults that may occur in the time following the occurrence 
of the near-miss event; often a system with 
accident-limiting function is required to operate for a 
certain period (e.g. a pressure safety valve). 
2.3 System Configuration. 
The basic material for cause-consequence analysis is the 
plant hardware description in the form of functional 
system diagrams and piping and instrumentation diagrams. 
These must be supplemented by physical layout drawings, 
observation of the actual hardware layout if this is 
possible, and with experience of component behaviour, 
especially in the later stages of the analysis. The 
information required can be listed as follows: 
Interconnection of plant components, 
Location of systems with respect to each other, 
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i.e. 	process 	components, 	systems 	with 
accident-preventing or limiting functions, 	and 
auxiliary 	systems such as power, lubrication, 
cooling supplies, etc., 
Operating modes of systems, 
Normal operating conditions for each component 
(in each mode) together with component limits for 
static and transient pressure, temperature, stress, 
and radiation loading, 
Main process variables, 
Energy sources and their location, 
Physical and chemical properties of species 
under normal as well as abnormal conditions. 
A review of the necessary detailed information of this 
kind for chemical plant is given by Powers et al. (3). 
3. CCA PROCEDURE. 
A procedure for cause-consequence analysis - has been 
developed by NEILSEN and al. Some of the main steps are: 
1.Consider a NEAR-MISS EVENT. 
When studying a near-miss 	event 	within 	the 
boundaries of certain process system it is assumed 
that no other critical event has occured within the 
system. 
2. Modify the dynamic model of the process taking 
the near-miss event into account. 
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Specify 	the changes/transients (delay and 
magnitude) of the main process parameters at 
locations where there are protective devices or 
parts of protective devices (safety valves, 
sensors, etc.). 
3a. Which trip limits/set points are exceeded? 
Are 	loading 	limits for relevant process 
components exceeded by 	effects 	from 	process 
parameter changes/transients? 
Identify which 'designed protective actions' 
(i.e. accident-preventing or -limiting actions) are 
potential according to the answers to items 3a. 
In this connection it should be realized that: 
a designed protective action can, if released, 
be 'desirable' as well as 'undesirable' in the 
context of the actual accident situation. 
a desirable designed protective action may 
fail (i.e. designed protective action x does not 
occur as intended). 
6.Construct a consequence diagram which shows the 
potential combinations of 'release' and not 
release' designed protective actions. 
For each of the identified potential accidents 
specify the changes/transients of main process 
parameters 	(pressure, temperature) in relevant 
process components. 
The following applies to each of the identified, 
potential accidents: Are 	loading 	limits 	for 
relevant process components exceeded by effects 
from process parameter changes/transients? 
If so, what are 	the 	potential, 	significant 
consequences? 	('damage to 	. . ', 	'escape of..', 
injury to..'). 
4 .QUANTITATIVE EVALUATION. 
An assessment of the probability of significant plant 
hazards may be highly desirable. A necessary basis for 
probabilistic analyses is that: 
thorough 	cause-consequence 	analyses 	have 	been 
performed, and that 
the ability of safety systems to cope with the various 
critical events have been substantiated 	during 	the 
analysis. 
The 	probabilistic 	modelling 	techniques deal with 
component faults that can be considered as spontaneous and 
can be covered by significant statistical data. The 
effectof repair and test policy can be taken into account, 
if relevant. In connection with probabilistic failure 
modelling the cause-consequence diagram provides a 
systematic method of documentation (4). 
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